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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (5 May 69) FOR OT UT 691332

14 May 1969

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st
Logistics Command, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)**

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General**

1 Incl
as

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AD 502384

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO San Francisco 96384

AVCA GO-MH

19 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96375


Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20315

The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as


WILLIAM L. DUPART
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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FOR OT UT
691332
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SECTION I

OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

The 92 day period between 1 November 1968 and 31 January 1969 encompassed the last month of Phase I of the Command and Control Improvement Program begun in early August, and the entire two months of that program's consolidated phase.

Phase I had involved initiation of a broad array of intensive programs aimed at increasing efficiency and economy in logistical operations. Special titles such as COUNT, FILL, and RAGS were employed to better focus attention on policies and procedures which, in many cases, were already existent. During Phase II, these activities were carefully examined, reinforced and consolidated. The number of new projects initiated was kept to a minimum while careful thought was given to project priorities and additional programs for the future.

During the initial phase of the improvement program, major efforts had been initiated with strong backing from HQ, USARV in general supply, ammunition, transportation, maintenance, and property disposal; emphasis shifted from providing effective logistical support to increased efficiency and economy in operations. This was dictated not only by impending prospects of T-Day, but by current exigencies. The point had been reached in FY 68 where the entire logistics effort in Vietnam required careful reappraisal and intensive streamlining.

Inordinate quantities of all classes of supply tended to defeat attempts to reduce stock locations, accomplish precise accounting, efficient inventory, receipt or issue. Some items were in critically short supply, deadline ratios were increasing for certain equipment; there were an excessive number of emergency supply actions and low credibility levels with respect to stockage data.


First steps in achieving more effective control included:

- a. A command-wide effort to reconcile and cancel requisitions through validation and consultation between depots, direct support units, and customers resulting in a savings to date of \$38.7 million (Project RAGS).
- b. The stoppage of incoming shipments totaling \$65.9 million of unneeded items.
- c. The elimination of fringe and other stock excesses valued at \$3.4 million.
- d. Manual appraisal of stockage lists to reduce the number of Theater Authorized Stockage List items from 143,517 in November 1968 to 134,763 as of 31 January 1969. Many DSUs achieved reductions to 50 percent or better.
- e. Revisions to demand criteria and other measures to permit more intensive management of supply.


f. Conduct and completion on 28 December 1968, of the first "perimeter to perimeter" stock inventory ever conducted in a combat theater (Project COUNT).

Through these and other programs, depot demand satisfaction improved during the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969 from 47 percent to 63 percent and depot demand accommodation from 83 percent to 89 percent.

1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
DEPOT DEMAND SATISFACTION
FY 69



1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
DEPOT DEMAND ACCOMMODATION
FY 69




To further improve customer service, CONUS supply agencies were informed regarding short items of vital equipment and supplies on a "general to general" basis (Project FILL). To reduce stockage levels, more precise information was sought concerning items in the pipeline enroute to RVN. This was accomplished by extracting information from MILSTAMP, Cargo Traffic Messages, cargo manifests, weekly newsletters from Eastern and Western Areas Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service, and information submitted by commodity managers, thus assuring maximum visibility of in-bound cargo. Early identification of specific items resulted in increased thru-put to the customer and diversion of vessels to more appropriate destinations.


With establishment of a more responsive supply system, operational readiness improved by identification and replacement of war-weary equipment (Project DOG). There has also been increased emphasis on Closed Loop items to accelerate their return to the system. This, coupled with increased emphasis on maintenance training has reduced several equipment deadline rates significantly. During this period, equipment density increased with an additional 19 Program Six units arriving in country. Despite this rise in equipment density and the extreme limits to which equipment in RVN, is pushed, the command enjoyed the highest operational readiness rates ever achieved in a combat zone for many items.

FIREPOWER

USARV WIDE AVERAGE MONTHLY OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES TOWED ARTILLERY




SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY



COMBAT VEHICLES

(TANKS AND ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS)




COMMUNICATIONS

USARV WIDE AVERAGE MONTHLY OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES

RADIO SETS

AN/VRC 12, AN/GRC 26, 106



However, some areas require still greater efforts in order to decrease deadline rates. Much of the construction and materials handling equipment is overage and beyond overhaul criteria. In the case of self propelled artillery, in particular the M107/M110, much progress has been made by initiating the Repair and Return (R&R) program in which these weapons and their crews are brought to a direct support maintenance unit for seven days of intensive maintenance and training. To date, 81 of the 152 weapons identified for this program have been processed in this way.

In an attempt to reduce handling of excess material, forward units were authorized to ship excesses directly to an in-country depot, other customer, or out of country (Project THRU-PUT). Similarly, a continuing program was launched to identify and retrograde all serviceable excess and unserviceable ammunition beyond the in-country capability for repair.

Phase I of the ammunition retrograde program was completed on 28 December 1968. The four month goal of 14,800 S/T had been exceeded by 1,167 S/T.

Phase II, which was initiated 1 January 1969 with a goal of an additional 35,000 S/T was 50 percent completed by 31 January 1969. Action was also taken to match inbound tonnage to current lower consumption requirements by diverting inbound ammunition to other claimants in USARPAC or ARVN. In addition, the ammunition stockage objective was reduced from 225,000 S/T at the end of October 1968 to 191,000 S/T as of 25 January 1969. It should also be pointed out that the on-hand balance was brought into line during this period with the stockage objective.

To further reduce excesses within country, problem areas hindering the property disposal mission in RVN were isolated and actions were initiated to resolve them. New management tools were introduced, contract administration procedures improved, frequency of sales increased, larger export markets developed, and specialized scrap handling equipment requisitioned. As a result, for the first time since January 1968, the on-hand quantity of disposable materials decreased from an all time high of 92 thousand S/T in September 1968 to 70 thousand S/T in January 1969.

In the final analysis, efficient, effective and responsive combat service support to the fighting man ultimately depends upon the individual soldier. Cognizant of this fact, the command has made every effort to improve the morale, welfare, and the technical proficiency of its personnel.

Special councils, established to improve communications between enlisted men, NCO's and officers have helped to maintain troop morale at a high level. More command emphasis has been placed on safety, personal hygiene, and good conduct to reduce the number of non-productive man hours. In addition, every effort has been made to return stockade prisoners to duty as soon as possible and prevent others from taking their place (Preventive Law Program).

The shortage of technically qualified personnel was relieved somewhat with the arrival in-country of Program Six units containing many highly educated personnel who possessed critical skills. These personnel were identified and were voluntarily reassigned to other units where their special skills could be put to use. Training of local nationals in the basic skills was emphasized during this period in conjunction with the civilianization of military spaces. This civilianization program led to a reduction of the authorized level within the command from 55,087 to 53,766. For a breakdown by support command of this reduction refer to the charts below:

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PERSONNEL STRENGTHS (C)
Authorized as of 31 Jan 69

CATEGORY BY COMD	OFF	MILITARY		TOT	DAC		CONTRACT		TOT	TECH		LN		TOT
		WO	EM		TOT	US	TCN	LN*		ASST	PERS	DIRECT	DAILY	
HQ 1st Log	169	7	292	468	27					60	128	55		738
ICCV	70	6	297	373	184					11	110	32		710
USAPAV	44	0	14	58	59					0	77	11		205
Other Units	38	32	729	799	76					0	37	0		912
Sub Total	321	45	1332	1698	346					71	352	98		2565
SGN	936	295	19003	20234	147	1238	3262	13423	17923	67	8281	1234		47886
CRB	412	113	9119	9644	84	726	3203	5876	9805	15	3132	166		22846
QNH	581	129	12911	13621	79	155	2492	2302	4949	37	3997	1040		23723
DNG	370	89	8110	8569	27	18	0	670	688	25	965	320		10594
TOTAL	2620	671	50475	53766*	683	2137	8957	22272	33365	215	16727*	2858		107614

* Includes Civilianization

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PERSONNEL STRENGTHS (C)
Assigned as of 31 Jan 69


CATEGORY BY COMD	OFF	MILITARY		TOT	DAC TOT	CONTRACT			TECH ASST PERC	LN		TOT
		WO	EM			US	TCN	LN		DIRECT HIRE	DAILY HIRE	
HQ 1st Log	235	13	350	598	18				60	109	55	840
ICCV	67	4	278	349	149				11	100	32	641
USAPAV	47	2	34	83	48				0	73	11	215
Other Units	42	33	647	722	0				0	46	0	768
Sub Total	391	52	1309	1752	215				71	328	98	2464
SGN	870	274	18497	19641	104	1238	3262	13423	67	7801	1234	46770
CRB	417	106	8593	9116	51	726	3203	5876	15	2555	166	21708
QNH	573	133	12078	12784	47	155	2492	2302	37	3261	1040	22118
DNG	388	85	7905	8378	16	18	0	670	25	695	320	10122
TOTAL	2639	650	48382	51671	433	2137	8957	22271	215	14640	2858	103182

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
AUTH VS ASGN STRENGTH^{*}

AS OF 31 JAN 69



MILITARY FORCE SUPPORTED

31 JAN 69



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During this period, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and the headquarters of the four support commands were reorganized to provide Assistant Chiefs of Staff in principal functional areas rather than directors. The Retrograde and Disposal Directorate was abolished and duties redistributed between Supply, Maintenance and Transportation. Review Boards were established to monitor major logistical, contractual and resource problems and increased contingency planning to meet a variety of foreseeable conditions dealing with escalation as well as de-escalation of the conflict, historical analysis of logistical operations, security of logistical operations and comparative analysis of resources versus requirements in each of the support commands.

Efficiency and economy in logistical operations have improved during the last 92 days, but there is still much to do. Phase I projects of the Command and Control Improvement Program are being refined and extended to correct remaining problem areas in general supply, ammunition, transportation, maintenance, and property disposal. The next quarter will see implementation of new projects and programs in line with the USARV/1st Logistical Command concept of minimum essential supplies on the ground, reinforced by a responsive transportation system - in short, necessary support to the customer with the least expenditure of resources.

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ANNEX A (U) COMMAND GROUP

1. (U) Distinguished visitors to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command are indicated at Inclosure 1. Major General Lloyd B. Ramsey was reassigned from Headquarters, Third Army and assumed the duties of Deputy Commanding General on 21 December 1968. Colonel David D. Hulsey assumed the duties of Chief of Staff on 3 December 1968.

2. (U) Principal changes of key staff personnel during the quarter: Colonel Thomas J. McDonald, ACofS, SP&O replaced Colonel Max Etkin; Colonel Bruce W. Jamison, ACofS, Services replaced Colonel Richard Erlenkotter; Colonel Homer D. Smith, ACofS, Comptroller replaced Colonel David D. Hulsey; Colonel William L. Dupart, Adjutant General replaced Colonel Ed V. Hendren; and, Colonel Joseph A. Walsh, ACofS, Transportation replaced Colonel John E. Truog.

ANNEX B (U) ACoS, COMPTROLLER

1. (U) Management Analysis Division.

a. Reorganization of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command under TASTA 70 Concept. On 12 September a study was initiated to apply the TASCOM/FASCOM concept to the organization of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. The objectives were to save military spaces and to improve the functional coordination within the staff by reducing the span of control. The results of the study were approved for implementation on 1 November 1968. The major changes involved the command and control structure rather than disturbance of the operating divisions of the headquarters. These changes were:

(1) An Assistant Chief of Staff, Services was established using the Director of Engineering resources as the nucleus.

(2) Director of Petroleum and Director of Food became directorates under the Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply.

(3) Director of Retrograde and Disposal was dissolved. The Sales and Disposal Division was made a division under Assistant Chief of Staff, Services. The retrograde functions will continue to be performed by Assistant Chiefs of Staff, Supply, Maintenance and Ammunition in coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff, Transportation.

(4) The remaining directors were redesignated Assistant Chiefs of Staff. These changes are in keeping with current doctrine and should provide the Commanding General with one point of contact for all commodities except ammunition, which remained a separate Assistant Chief of Staff. This organizational realignment was accomplished within current authorized resources and in addition identified initially 52 spaces to use to meet other urgent requirements. The realignment will be re-evaluated after a shake-down period to identify further manpower savings.

b. Personnel Review at Pacific, Architects and Engineers Class IV, Engineering Construction Material Yard, Long Binh, Vung Tau, Contract DAB J-1169-C-0014. A Management Analysis Team conducted a review of subject contract and concentrated on the following areas:

(1) Personnel on hand versus personnel authorized.

(2) Personnel staffing and operations.

(3) Personnel management including payroll procedures and control.

(4) Reports control.

The result of the review was a recommendation that the personnel authorization be reduced by 627 personnel from its present authorized level of 2,583 personnel.

c. US Army Depot, Long Binh (USADLB) Management Assistance Survey. A management team made a survey and compilation of the organization and functions of the Directorates of Supply and Transportation, Data Processing, and the Troop Command. The study was made at the request of the Director of Management, USADLB to assist his office in preparing the Depot Organization and Functions Manual. The survey team was requested to determine the actual organization and functions as found on the date of the survey. The Director of Management, USADLB has reconciled this information with the Depot MTDA and incorporated it into the official organization and functions of the depot.

d. 53d General Support Group Management Survey. A Management Analysis Team conducted a management survey to determine an appropriate organization structure and manning level for the 53d General Support Group in order to operate the Vung Tau Sub-Area Command and in order to support U.S. and Allied Forces in the Vung Tau and delta areas. Intermediate objectives were:

(1) Evaluation of the organization and functions required to carry out the combat service support mission.

(2) Evaluation of the organization and functions required to carry out the "housekeeping" mission as installation coordinator.

e. On 17 January 1969, the United States Army Audit Agency validated a 1st Logistical Command cost saving management action for \$1,276,200. This was the result of one Direct Support Unit's (DSU) participation in the action. The remaining 20 DSU's are being researched for submission and the total savings should reach approximately \$18 million. The management action, entitled Project Clean/NCR 500, involved manually reviewing the NCR 500 stock accounting ledgers and correcting the errors found. The cost savings was accomplished by cancelling the open requisitions that were in error.

f. Reports Control Program. A renewed emphasis was placed on the reports control program in this headquarters during the second quarter of FY 69. An adhoc committee was established under the chairmanship of the ACoFS, Comptroller which meets monthly to iron out the problems in the reports control area. Reports Control Liaison officers were designated by each of the staff offices in this headquarters and each staff section wrote SOP's for the Reports Control Liaison officer in

their particular section. A concerted effort has been made to review all reports with an eye to the elimination or consolidation of existing reports. Since this effort began, reports have been rescinded and reports have been consolidated. In order to eliminate unauthorized reports, a system of challenging by the support commands has been implemented.

g. Same II. Same II was instituted by the Commanding General in December of 1968 and is an extension of the chart standardization program implemented in September 1968. Under Same II, the support commands are required to chart similar data in the exact manner as the data was charted in the 1st Logistical Command Review and Analysis. In order to accomplish this, staff sections were required to submit the source of all of their Review and Analysis data, the cut-off dates, formulas and criteria used to arrive at the final data for the charts. These data were published in the December Review and Analysis and the support commands have been required to be in agreement with these data. The support commands have also been required to be in agreement with these data. The support commands have also been required to have narrative analysis for all of their major operational or personnel charts. The two man rule has also been implemented in this area in that the support commands have been challenging any 1st Logistical Command data that does not agree with the data compiled at support command headquarters.

h. Command and Control Improvement Program was designated by Major General Heiser in December 1968 and incorporates the old Management Improvement Plan and the Command Management Information System. This program calls for a biannual review of what the command has accomplished, the current position of the command and a determination of where the command is going. Both 1st Logistical Command staff sections and support commands are required under this system to establish command objectives and to chart the progress of their objectives in the biannual report to the Commanding General. The first submission of both the support reports and the staff reports was made in January 1969.

2. (U) Budget Division.

a. Fiscal Year (FY) 1969 Budget Execution Review (BER). On 2 November 1968, the 1st Logistical Command FY 1969 Budget Execution Review was submitted to HQ, USARV. This submission reflected the status of available resources in comparison with projected fund requirements for the remainder of the fiscal year and provided a basis for mid-year adjustments to the Approved Operating Budget (AOB). Through this BER, this command's FY 1969 Operations and Maintenance, Army (O&M, A) fund requirements were reduced by \$22,212,797, from \$168,256,097, to \$146,043,300. These requirements were subsequently, on 6 January 1969, further reduced by HQ, USARV to \$145,088,600 by

virtue of the transfer of funding responsibility for USAHAC programs/projects to that command. The revised AOB is considered adequate to finance all known requirements of this command.

b. Fiscal Year 1970 Command Operating Budget (COB). On 19 January 1969, the 1st Logistical Command FY 1970 Command Operating Budget was presented to the Commanding General for approval and dispatch to HQ, USARV. This COB reflected in-country O&M,A fund requirements of \$136,771,100 or \$8,317,500 less than the USARV dollar guidance for FY 70. Reductions in funding requirements resulted from the transfer of funding responsibility for USAHAC administered programs/projects to that command, the cancellation or reduction in scope of operation of certain trucking contracts, the cancellation of contractual maintenance contracts and the reduced requirements for the in-country procurement of supplies, materials and equipment. A slight increase in requirements for purchased services is attributed to expected increased cost of stevedoring and the expansion of the Care and Preservation effort during FY 70.

c. Interservice Support Agreements (ISSA). Information was received by this headquarters in the latter part of November that the USARPAC Centralized Financial Management Agency (CFMA) was experiencing difficulty in the preparation and collection of reimbursable support billings for such support provided by USARV to non-Army agencies, non-USARV/US Army agencies, etc. For the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1969, \$12.5 million had been billed, but only \$0.6 million collected. As a result of this information, Project Account was established, with an objective of furnishing complete documentation to USARPAC CFMA for all reimbursable support/services provided to non-Army agencies, non-USARV/US Army agencies, and certain FWMAF so that reimbursement could be effected for such support/services provided. During this reporting period there were 108 reimbursable agreements in effect. The estimated monthly value of reimbursable support provided by the Army was \$12,352,637. There were 92 non-reimbursable agreements in effect, and the estimated monthly value of non-reimbursable support provided by the Army was \$4,334,895. One of the main reasons for customer non-payment of bills is the inability of Air Force and Navy funded customers to identify billed items with unliquidated supply obligations. This was caused by failure to perpetuate the requisitioner's document number into all reimbursable documents when the DSU/GSU could not fill a requisition and initiated a successor requisition to the depot with the DSU/GSU's requisition number. Action was taken to require the DSU to maintain a cross reference between the original customer document number and the related DSU number when a successor requisition is forwarded to the depot. When the depot fills the requisition and ships to the DSU, the related customer can be identified and the original document used to issue the

material to the customer. The fiscal copy of this document is then forwarded to USARPAC CFMA for billing. Other problems noted are the unfamiliarity in the field as to who is a reimbursable customer and improper/incomplete preparation of issue documentation. Action has been taken to provide support commands with all available aids published by USARPAC, MACV, USARV, and this headquarters to enable them to identify reimbursable customers, e.g. Electronic Accounting Machines (EAM) listings of ISSA's, EAM listings of recognized Activity Address Codes for reimbursable customers, etc.

3. (U) Finance and Internal Review Division.

a. Auditors from this headquarters began inspection of all imprest funds in Vietnam, and worked with ACofS, Ammunition in a continuous follow-up audit to the US Army Audit Agency (USAAA) Ammunition Audit. Completed audits were performed on the cost analysis of port operations, Nung Guard Review, Validity of Statistical Reports, and cost analysis of milk shipments in Vietnam. Follow-up audits were performed on Officers Open Messes at Vung Tau, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. USAAA completed the Foreign Excess Sales Office audit and the PA&E audit. USAAA started and completed an audit of Materials Handling Equipment, and resumed the Excess Program audit. Preaudit work is being done for the start of the Interservice Support Agreements audit, due to begin 4 Feb 69. Also, USAAA is providing a request audit on Property Disposal Activities.

b. The General Accounting Office (GAO) completed their field work on PA&E and on International Balance of Payments and comments were provided by this office. Three new studies by GAO scheduled for February include transportation of ammunition, use of Sea Land Container, and supply responsiveness.

c. USARV Internal Review completed audits on all the depots in 1st Logistical Command, contract printing, the Excess Program, and reimbursements. Presently, audits are being conducted of Maintenance Activities and Port Operations.

4. (U) ADP Division.

a. A letter on the timely submission of Automatic Data Processing Equipment (ADPE)/Punch Card Machine (PCM) utilization reports, dated 13 December 1968 was disseminated throughout the command to restate policy and identify Data Processing Installations by subordinate command. This action resulted in a substantial improvement in utilization reporting.

b. Action to establish the Office of the Special Assistant for Data Systems was initiated on or about 20 December 1968 utilizing the ADP Division of the ACoS, Comptroller as a nucleus. This office is to provide central staff supervision for ADPE hardware and software within 1st Logistical Command. Functions have been staffed, personnel spaces identified, and recruiting action initiated during this period.


c. LC Reg 18-1, Army Information and Data Systems, was developed and is currently being staffed. When published, this regulation will be the basic foundation of the overall ADP policy in the command.

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ANNEX C (C) ACoS, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS, Security Division

1. (C) Enemy activity directly affecting logistical operations showed a significant increase during the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969. The hostile actions involved mortar and rocket engagements, ground attacks against installations, sabotage of equipment and facilities, interdictions of Lines of Communications (LOC) and convoy ambushes. Though there were many attempts, no United States (U.S.) Ammunition Supply Points (ASP) were hit during the reporting period. Enemy interest was directed mainly against pipelines and convoys; specifically the POL pipeline that parallels Highway 19 between Qui Nhon and Pleiku and the convoys that traveled this route. During the latter part of the reporting period, the enemy also consistently ambushed convoys on the Long Binh/Tay Ninh, Tay Ninh/Dau Tieng routes.

2. (C) Pipeline Incidents:



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The chart on the previous page depicts an almost 100 per cent increase in enemy initiated incidents against the An Khe pipeline during the reporting period as compared with the previous period, 1 August to 31 October 1968.

a. Most of the incidents during the reporting period were sabotage by satchel charge. Some were highly coordinated so that several charges on different sections of the pipeline would explode in approximately the same time frame, destroying different sections of the pipeline. On 4 November 1968, 10,000 gallons of diesel fuel were lost when seven sections of pipeline were blown by satchel charges approximately 15 kilometers west of An Khe. The pipeline was repaired at 1100 hours. In another instance on 10 December 1968, an unknown number of satchel charges were detonated on the POL pipeline in three separate locations; BR 018508, BR 135541, and BR 280465 between An Khe and Pleiku. The line was pumping JP-4 at the time and pumping operations were stopped. Amount of damage and product lost were unknown.

b. Another prevalent form of attack against the pipelines, and one which was particularly difficult to defend against, was enemy small arms fire. In these incidents the loss of fuel was not as great as with the satchel charge attacks, but they would still delay operations as the pumping had to be shut down for necessary repairs. On 1 December, approximately 26 km east northeast of An Khe, the pipeline received an unknown number of rounds of small arms fire. Three sections of pipeline were damaged and 500 gallons of fuel were lost. In a later incident on the morning of 26 January, 11 km west of An Khe, 22 sections of the POL pipeline were destroyed by small arms fire while another 35 sections were found destroyed at a point 7 km further west. On 27 December 1968, approximately 2 km east of An Khe, the POL pipeline was blown by a satchel charge. Elements of the 1/50th Infantry on patrol in the area, observed, engaged and killed 5 enemy. This was the only time during the reporting period that the enemy saboteurs suffered losses.


c. In an effort to determine the vulnerable areas of the pipeline a density study was conducted on the frequency of enemy incidents. It revealed that approximately 40 per cent of the sabotage attacks occurred in the vicinity of either pump station number 7, approximately 17 km west of An Khe or pump station number 4, approximately 16 km east of An Khe. The attacks near pump station number 7 were directed against the pipeline while several in the vicinity of pump station number 4 were attacks by fire against the pump station. These attacks were believed to have been caused by elements of the 95B NVA Regiment and one local force company.

3. (C) Convoy incidents involving 1st Logistical Command personnel and vehicles are always a major concern of this Command, since the enemy

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attempts to interdict the land lines of communication. For statistical purposes these incidents are categorized as ambushes, highway mining incidents and attacks on convoys by sniper fire. The chart presented below depicts the number of convoy incidents reported since 1 August 1968, the start of the last ORLL reporting period. As shown by this chart, the total number of incidents, 47, for the reporting period 1 October 1968 to 31 January 1969, represents a 20% increase over the previous three month period. Further, the majority of this increase was due to an increase in number of attacks by sniper fire.



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a. The ambush is the greatest threat to the convoy, since, in many cases, the ambush kill zone is in excess of 1500 meters long. Over the past several months, some of the convoys most often ambushed were those traveling the routes between Long Binh/Tay Ninh and Tay Ninh/Dau Tieng in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

(1) On 17 December 1968, on Highway 239, a 1st Logistical Command convoy proceeding from Cu Chi to Dau Tieng was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force using rockets and small arms fire. The ambush was sprung against the second of two march units by destroying a 2½-ton truck loaded with peneprime, blocking the road. Four S&P trucks loaded with Class V, which followed, were hit by rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire and burned. The remainder of the vehicles in the second march unit were forced to withdraw and take defensive measures. Security was provided by elements of the 25th Infantry Division. Gunships, tactical (TAC) air, and a company of mechanized infantry supported. Friendly results were 7 killed, 5 wounded, one 2½-ton truck and 4 S&P trucks destroyed. Enemy results were 73 killed.

(2) Again on 14 January 1969, approximately 15 km southeast of Tay Ninh City, elements of the 2d Battalion (Mech), 22d Infantry, while providing security to a portion of the Long Binh/Tay Ninh Convoy, engaged an unknown number of enemy personnel. Artillery, a LFT and TAC air supported the friendly units. Friendly losses were 2 killed (1 - 1st Logistical Command), 5 wounded (2 - 1st Logistical Command), and 4 vehicles damaged. Enemy losses were 7 killed.

b. Another area of Vietnam where convoy ambushes frequently occur is along Highway 19 in the II Corps Tactical Zone from Qui Nhon to An Khe and Pleiku. This is the highway which follows and parallels the POL pipeline from Qui Nhon to Pleiku. Indicative of the type of ambushes along this route are the following:

(1) At 212315H Nov 68, approximately 11 km northwest of Qui Nhon, an 8th Transportation Group convoy consisting of nine vehicles was traveling north from Qui Nhon on Highway 1 to the Trailer Transfer Point (TTP) on highway 19 when it was ambushed with mortar, small arms (SA) and automatic weapons (AW) fire. A reaction force consisting of gun trucks and jeeps was at the ambush site within 10 minutes. AC-47 and gunships supported. Friendly losses were 2 killed, 12 wounded; all from the 2d Transportation Company, 27th Transportation Battalion. Two gun trucks, one gun jeep, and four cargo trucks were damaged. One gun jeep was destroyed. Enemy casualties were unknown.

(2) At 191641H Dec 68, at the An Khe pass while traveling east from Pleiku to Qui Nhon, an 8th Transportation Group convoy was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force using SA, AW, rockets, mortars, and satchel charges.

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The initial attack was on the front and rear vehicles of the convoy. Gun trucks returned fire and the Republic of Korea (ROK) infantry made a sweep of the area. Gunships, ROK artillery and TAC air supported. Friendly results were 1 US killed, 3 wounded (2 US, 1 ROK civilian), one 3/4-ton and six 5-ton trucks were damaged. Enemy results were unknown.

(3) At 1115H Jan 69, on Highway 19, an 88th Transportation Company convoy en route to An Khe from Qui Nhon was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force. Gunships supported and contact was lost 45 minutes later. Friendly losses were 1 US military and 1 Korean civilian killed, 4 US military and 1 Korean civilian wounded. Three Korean civilians contract vehicles were destroyed and 1 damaged. Three US five ton tractors and two gun trucks were damaged. One gun jeep was destroyed.

(4) At 150755H Jan 69, approximately 6 km east of An Khe, a 66 vehicle convoy from the 523d Transportation Company, was ambushed near bridge 18 on Highway 19, by an unknown size enemy force employing SA, AW, and RPG fire. Seven gun trucks and two gun jeeps, as well as eight Armored Personnel Carriers from the 1/50th Inf (Mech) provided security. A LFT from An Khe was also on station at the time of the incident. Contact terminated at 0804H. Friendly losses were 1 killed, 2 wounded (523d Transportation Company), three 5-ton vehicles received light damage, and two 5-ton vehicles received light damage, and two 5-ton vehicles received mortar damage. One 2 1/2-ton truck from 4th Infantry Division was also damaged. Enemy losses were 2 killed and 1 detained.

c. Convoy incidents caused by enemy SA fire may not be costly in terms of loss or damage incurred, but are often expensive in the loss or wounding of US personnel. On 16 January 1969, approximately 16 km west of An Khe, a 54th Transportation Battalion convoy, while traveling west on Highway 19, received SA and AW fire from an estimated reinforced enemy platoon. An LFT and elements of the 1/50th Infantry (Mech) supported, and there were no damages to the convoy. The incident, however, resulted in 1 US killed and 2 US wounded (1 - 1st Logistical Command).

d. In a mining incident on 1 December 1968, approximately 16 km WSW of Dong Ha in the I Corps Tactical Zone, an S&T tractor-trailer from the 446th Transportation Company hit an unknown type of mine near Mai Loc. The truck was in convoy at the time. The driver and shotgun were not injured, but the tractor was destroyed.

e. An analysis of convoy incidents involving 1st Logistical Command for the reporting period reveals that they were costly for the enemy. Even though he had the initiative, and benefit of the element of surprise, in every case his losses far exceeded his gains. A perusal of the KIA figures in the incidents cited above, reveal 15 US personnel were killed

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as compared to 89 of the enemy. Although the incidents included in this summary are some of the more significant during the reporting period, the casualty figures for all 1st Logistical Command convoy incidents followed the same pattern.

4. (C) A third type of enemy initiated offensive activity affecting 1st Logistical Command units during the reporting period was attacks by fire against military installations or operations. The number of these attacks showed a slight decrease from the previous period but the level of intensity remained about the same.

a. On 11 November 1968, a total of forty 82mm mortar rounds were fired into the An Tuc district of An Khe, impacting in the Market Place, dispensary, civilian homes, and pumping station. A total of 25 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle were fired on Camp Radcliffe. Rounds that hit the tank farm caused a fire that was extinguished at 1830 hours. Gunships swept the area and countermortar was fired at suspected enemy locations. Results were four Vietnamese (VN) civilians killed, 29 VN civilians wounded, five transfer pumps, one manifold and 42,000 gallons of MOGAS were destroyed. Enemy losses were unknown.

b. At the Quan Loi staging area, approximately 10 km northeast of An Loc, on 9 December 1968, a 48th Transportation Group convoy, waiting to return to Long Binh, received three separate mortar attacks. The initial attack at 2300 hours consisted of 3 to 4 rounds of mortar fire resulting in three US wounded. The second attack occurred at 2400 hours and consisted of 5 to 6 rounds of mortar fire. The third attack, at 100100H Dec 68, also consisted of 5 to 6 rounds of mortar fire. Total damages were one 5-ton tractor destroyed, three 5-ton trucks and one S&P trailer moderately damaged. All vehicles were empty and belonged to the 62d and 352d Transportation Companies.

c. In two other incidents of attacks by fire, the 340th Supply and Service Compound at An Khe received 15 rounds of mortar fire on 18 December 1968, and the Phouc Vinh Base Camp received 30 rounds of mixed 107mm rocket and 75mm recoilless rifle fire on 29 December. Cumulative results in these incidents were 18 US wounded.

d. A sapper ground attack was combined with a rocket attack in a significant enemy incident at Tank Farm #2, three km west-southwest of Qui Nhon, on 3 January 1969. The attack was initiated when a B-40 round hit a guard post while another hit a 420,000 gallon AVGAS tank. Enemy sappers penetrated the perimeter through a hole in the fence near the guard post and detonated satchel charges against a manifold complex. Losses include a 2x6 pump, twenty 500 gallon collapsible drums, one 250 gallon barrel collapsible drum, seven JP collapsible drums, fifty sections of pipeline, four fill stands, six filter separators, one CONEX container, and one 1/2-ton truck. Four personnel were wounded, none

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seriously. Enemy losses were 6 killed, one AK-47, one B-40 rocket launcher, and three satchel charges captured. A report of lessons learned in this incident indicated that the VC sappers were able to penetrate the Tank Farm undetected due to a blind spot along the perimeter fencing. The point of entry could not be clearly observed from any of the three guard posts in the vicinity. The report further indicated that the enemy attack was greatly facilitated by the high heavily foliated hill masses in close proximity to the Tank Farm.

5. (C) A fourth type of enemy initiated incident in the reporting period was attacks against shipping lanes. Examples of this type incident were as follows:

a. At 130940H Nov 68, approximately 22 km southeast of Nha Be, the SS "FRED MORRIS" an MSTs Charter Ship proceeding south on the Long Tau Channel received RPG fire from the west bank. One round hit the starboard side causing an unknown amount of damage. There were no casualties.

b. At 220250H Dec 68, at Nha Trang Harbor, the Shell Tanker "HELISONA" was damaged by either a limpet mine or a satchel charge while moored in Nha Trang Harbor. The explosion caused a hole approximately 10' x 12' in the hull of the vessel. There were no casualties.

6. (C) The fifth type of enemy initiated incident involving 1st Logistical Command was the sabotage of bridges on vital LOCs. On 24 January 1969, Bridge #302 on Highway QL 1 was blown. Two spans of the three span bridge were destroyed and traffic was diverted along QL 441. On the same day, a bridge on that road collapsed because of the added traffic, leaving major roads to the north and west of Qui Nhon closed. A land fill was constructed near the first bridge which initially was open only to one-way traffic and later expanded to accommodate traffic in both directions. The bridge on QL 1 will take several months to repair.

7. (U) On 29 January 1969, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 604-6 was published to establish policies and procedures governing access to special category information, Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM), and superseded the previous LC Regulation 604-6, dated 12 March 1968.

8. (U) The following statistics reflect the number of personnel security clearance actions completed during the period, which is approximately the same as for the last reporting period:

a. Clearances Validated:

(1) TOP SECRET: 339

(2) SECRET: 428

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- b. Requests for National Agency Checks: 79
- c. Requests for Background Investigations: 8
- d. Requests for United States Army Investigative Records Repository Checks: 409

- e. Clearances Granted:

- (1) Interim TOP SECRET: 104
- (2) Interim SECRET: 100
- (3) SECRET: 137
- (4) CONFIDENTIAL: 13

- f. At the end of the period, 324 clearance actions were pending.

9. (C) The following information is furnished concerning the activities of the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment during the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969:

- a. Assignment of Key Personnel:

- (1) CPT Benjamin E. Holberg, to be Training Officer - 26 November 1968.
- (2) 1LT Ross W. Pascall, to be Special Agent in Charge, Da Nang Field Office - 24 January 1969.
- (3) CW3 Hugh Owens, to be Special Agent in Charge, Long Binh Field Office - 19 November 1968.

- b. Headquarters, 524th Military Intelligence Detachment (CI), relocated from Cholon/Saigon to Long Binh Post 15 November 1968.

- c. Special Studies conducted:

- (1) 614 checks for possible outlets of Subversive and/or Anti-American Literature.

- (2) 1283 checks of salvage facilities and document destruction facilities for complete and proper destruction of classified information.

- d. Counterintelligence Services conducted:

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- (1) Nine Counterintelligence Surveys.
- (2) 74 Announced Counterintelligence Inspections.
- (3) 32 Unannounced Counterintelligence Inspections.
- (4) 162 After Duty Hours Counterintelligence Checks.

e. Personnel Security Investigations:

- (1) Number Conducted: 35
- (2) Number of Agent Reports submitted: 149

f. Incident Investigations (to include Subversion Directed Against the United States Army).

- (1) Number Conducted: 83
- (2) Number of Agent Reports Submitted: 187

g. Special Interest Incident Investigations - RA (Short Title) Lead Sheet: Number of Agent Reports Submitted: 200

h. Counterintelligence Personal and Impersonal Card File: Over the past six months, the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment has established a counterintelligence personal and impersonal file. Over 8,300 personalities and 750 impersonal items have been incorporated into the file.

i. Intelligence Contingency Fund Support: In November 1968, the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment (CI) began providing Intelligence Contingency Funds to the 716th and 92d Military Police Battalions, located in the Saigon area in support of the Volunteer Informant Program, (VIP) carried on by their units. This money will be used to pay Vietnamese Nationals for information on the enemy and on material or caches containing enemy weapons. Liaison with the units mentioned above is maintained through the S-2, 89th Military Police Group.

j. During this reporting period a total of 84 informant contacts were made (28 per month). Out of these 84 contacts, 45 (15 per month) produced IIR's for a percentage of 54%. During the previous period (1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968) there were a total of 112 informant contacts (37 per month), producing 53 IIR's (18 per month) for a percentage of 47%.

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10. (U) During the month of November the transition from the southwest to the northeast monsoon was nearly complete. During the remainder of the period, the weather in the northern half of the country was characterized by many days with rain or drizzle, low ceilings and poor visibility, while the southern half of the country experienced excellent ceilings and visibility, and a minimal amount of precipitation. During the last part of November two tropical storms hit the central coast of the Republic causing considerable flooding and temporarily disrupting logistical activities along the coast.

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ANNEX D (C) ACofS, SP&O, Force Development Division

i. (U) There have been several Force Development programs implemented which have affected 1st Logistical Command operations and combat service support. One of the more important ones was the Phase III Standardization, a Department of the Army directed program, in which all like units are to be reorganized along similar lines. The program allows for ease of personnel management because of the single authorization document concept and aids in equipment asset and supply management by use of a single document for all similar units. Once units are included in Phase III Standardization, they cannot be withdrawn without Department of the Army approval. Normally, such withdrawal will be only for higher priority requirements. Any changes in unit strength, organization, and equipment affects all like units. With this program temporary loans of equipment are all but discontinued due to a USARV policy of requiring that a MTOE be submitted for loans of equipment required to meet a continuing requirement.

a. At a Department of the Army, USARPAC, USARV conference in Washington on 8-10 January 1969, Phase III Standardization for 1st Logistical Command units was verbally approved by Department of the Army. USARV requested force structure changes will take place in March and April to balance trade-offs, activations, and inactivations. In March 1969 1st and 2nd force structure changes, twenty-one 1st Logistical Command units are affected. In April 1969 1st and 2nd force structure changes, sixty-three units are affected (See Chart 1 and Inclosure 12).

b. The Phase III Standardization Program was financed from 1st Logistical Command assets and required no additional space authorizations from higher headquarters. The standardization concept envisions the cross attachment of unit elements to meet tactical or environmental needs rather than tailoring of entire units due to the long lead time required to process authorization documents. This concept leaves only one alternative to meet specific support increases, that being the establishment of cellular teams from the 500 series TOE with identified trade-off spaces from non-standardized 1st Logistical Command units.

2. (U) Another of the programs affecting the force structure is the Civilianization Program, officially referred to as Program 6, which was originally implemented on 1 January 1968, deferred on 1 February 1968 because of the Tet attacks, and re-implemented on 6 April 1968. 1st Logistical Command was assigned a quota of 5654 military spaces to be civilianized. The 1st Logistical Command final plan was developed in May 1968 and was based on data received from support commands and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, this Headquarters. 1st Logistical Command's method of reducing military spaces was a line by line substitution and by contracting. The line by line substitution method was used in all functional areas except maintenance, some transportation, and some petroleum units which were selected for contract replacement. There were 3336 spaces to be civilianized by line by line substitution, 850 spaces selected for contract replacement, and inactivation without replacement of 1467 spaces. (See Chart 2 and Inclosure 13). As of 31 December 1968, the replacement percentage, by the methods previously mentioned, was 90%.

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3. (C) In early 1968 because of increased enemy activity, it became necessary to increase United States troop strengths in both tactical and combat service support configurations. This was accomplished by redistribution of in-country forces and Reserve and National Guard units activated for deployment to the Republic of Vietnam. It was determined that the increased strength totals were a permanent requirement. The forty-one program 6 units scheduled for 1st Logistical Command ADCON/OPCON are shown at Chart 3 and Inclosure 14. The introduction of these units increased 1st Logistical Command's combat support capability to support the increased combat troop densities and provided skills from civilian industry that were not readily available previously.

4. (U) From 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969, 207 Purchase Requests and Commitments (PR&C's) were reviewed by Force Development Division to ensure that the requirements were valid ones. The review consisted of determining military capability to perform the requirements prior to recommending processing of the PR&C. During this period 85 in-country PR&C's and 122 out of country PR&C's were reviewed. Many of these contracts supplement military capability deleted or reduced by Civilianization (Program 6).

5. (U) On 20 November 1968 USARV announced a change in policy on temporary loan of equipment. Original requests for temporary loan to support requirements of a continuing nature will not be considered unless an MTOE/MTDA submission accompanies the request or an MTOE/MTDA which includes the requested equipment has been submitted to USARV. Requests for temporary loans for periods less than 180 days must be accompanied by a definitive statement explaining the time limit of the requirement. Such temporary loans are not renewable unless accompanied by an MTOE/MTDA. This policy has had the effect of sharply reducing the number of requests for temporary loans submitted to this headquarters.


6. (U) A total of 10 Government owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) TDA's plus MTDA's for Cam Ranh and Saigon Support Commands, Mortuary, Saigon, and Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command were processed and forwarded to USARV during the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969.

7. (U) During the ORLL period, 1st Logistical Command submitted ten MTOE to increase unit strengths, realign missions and capabilities, and add required equipment to support unit requirements. All MTOE strength increases were provided for through space trade-offs generated within 1st Logistical Command assets. MTOE submitted are at Inclosure 15.


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NUMBER 1ST LOG UNITS AFFECTED BY STANDARDIZATION




PROGRAM 6 CIVILIANIZATION PROGRESS



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PROGRAM 6 UNITS



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ANNEX E (C) ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, SECURITY, PLANS, & OPERATIONS,
Operations Division

1. (U) During the 92 days (1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969) of the reporting period, 1st Logistical Command continued to provide timely and efficient support to the Free World Military Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Highlighting this reporting period was the move of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from northern I Corps Tactical Zone (N I CTZ) to northern III Corps Tactical Zone (N III CTZ); continuing support to twenty major tactical operations; and operation of numerous Forward Support Activities.

2. (U) Reorganization of the Support Command Headquarters:

a. For the purpose of creating a more responsive organization, the headquarters of each support command have been reorganized. The headquarters organizations are primarily based on the Assistant Chiefs of Staff concept and are organized as shown in Figure 1, with minor deviations for local peculiarities.




Figure 1

*-Includes Retrograde Functions
**-Includes Disposal Functions
***-Cl IX at DSU Level

b. In addition to reorganizing the headquarters, it was found necessary in Cam Ranh Bay Support Command to reorganize certain major units. This was done to provide necessary command and control for outlying units and to accomplish required retail and post, camp, and station functions. Major units affected include the following:

(1) The 500th Transportation Group (Highway) was augmented to provide command and control capability for a petroleum and an ordnance battalion (See figure 2).




Figure 2

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(2) The 54th General Support Group was given command and control responsibility for five outlying Logistical Support Activities and for providing Installation Coordination for the Nha Trang area (See figure 3).




Figure 3

c. Other organizational structures specifically designed to more effectively meet the logistical support requirements in Vietnam are presently in the evaluation stage.

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3. (C) Operation Liberty Canyon:

a. Operation Liberty Canyon, the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from I CTZ to III CTZ, was carried out during the first 17 days of November. This move was described as the largest single tactical move of the Vietnam War. The operation commenced on 27 October 1968 with the arrival in III Corps of advance parties from the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). All available means of transportation were utilized as inter-service cooperation was maximized. 1st Logistical Command vehicles moved personnel and equipment to the air and sea ports in I Corps where the cargo was loaded into ships and aircraft for shipment southward. On arrival in III Corps, 1st Logistical Command assets were employed in unloading and moving the cargo to the areas of tactical employment.

b. Rapid and efficient logistical planning was required to receive the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and to permit it to embark effectively on its tactical mission. Stockage objectives at the supply points and Logistical Support Activities supporting the unit were revamped according to the particular requirements of airmobile elements. Land Lines of Communications which had formerly been classified "RED" were opened and "RUN" on a regular basis by 1st Logistical Command convoys.

c. By 17 November 1968, Operation Liberty Canyon was considered complete. The 1st Logistical Command mission in support of Operation Liberty Canyon was carried out successfully. Because of an extremely low level of enemy activity during early November, this command was able to concentrate its transportation assets in the specific areas of removal in I CTZ and deployment in III CTZ. Had actual tactical requirements placed a heavier burden on 1st Logistical Command assets, it is appropriate to question whether the support would have been capable of being as generous or as problem free.

d. Upon arrival in northern III Corps Tactical Zone the 1st Cavalry Division became operational in an AO of approximately 3000 square miles. The United States Army Support Command, Saigon and the 29th General Support Group intensively managed and configured their logistical support activities to insure that these activities were responsive to the particular needs of airmobile forces. The "throughput" concept was used to the maximum extent possible to insure that minimum stocks were maintained in forward areas.

e. The 1st Cavalry Division operated forward support elements along the Cambodian border at Katum, Tam Le Cham, Loc Ninh, and Song Be. Resupply of these Forward Support Elements was accomplished primarily by fixed wing aircraft (C-7As and C-123s). Supplies were picked up by the Division Support Command from Long Binh Army Depot and delivered to Bien Hoa Air Force Base for shipment to the Forward Support Elements (FSEs). Brigades of the division were located at 3 major bases: Tay Ninh, Phouc Vinh, and Quan Loi. 1st Logistical Command elements provided tailored logistical support at these locations.

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f. After the 1st Cavalry Division departed I CTZ, a comprehensive review of logistical support requirements and United States Army Support Command, Da Nang's capabilities was conducted by Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. In connection with this study and the increased emphasis on resources management, a battalion size force (592 spaces) was relocated from I CTZ to meet higher priorities in other areas. The 572nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck), the 377th Light Maintenance Company (DS), the 534th Construction and Fortification Platoon and the 99th Ordnance Detachment were transferred to insure full utilization of these units and to reduce shortfalls in capabilities at the gaining support command.

4. (C) Tuy Hoa/Vung Ro Bay: In keeping with the Commanding General's emphasis on conserving assets, enhancing security posture, and continuing to provide support, a study was conducted on the feasibility of reducing the 1st Logistical Command assets in the Tuy Hoa/Vung Ro Bay area. Primary consideration was given to force reduction without degrading the logistical support provided. Among the factors considered was that the 1st Logistical Command assets in the area serve another role besides that of logistics; specifically, that of the area coordinators. As such they are responsible for local defense and routine installation type functions for all units at their location. Any major reduction of force by 1st Logistical Command would create a vacuum not readily replaced. Limited scaling down is being conducted by the responsible support command and recommendations for further reduction have been presented to the Commanding General.

5. (U) Utilization of the GOER Company (Provisional) in Chu Lai:

a. On 22 October 1968 the Americal Division, located at Chu Lai, requested the Provisional GOER Company be assigned to them for the duration of their monsoon season. The first part of the monsoon in early October had been severe, and experience from the previous year had shown that this unique vehicle could negotiate the difficult terrain during the wet season.

b. The GOER Company departed Qui Nhon on 8 December 1968 and arrived at Chu Lai the following day with orders to remain for the duration of the monsoon. However, by this time the worst of the rains had ended. While attempts were made to properly utilize the GOERS, road conditions sufficiently improved and roads could be travelled by conventional vehicles. Thus the GOER requirement was soon non-existent. This, joined with considerable maintenance problems, caused little use of the GOERS by the Americal Division. Thus, on 13 January 1969, they requested the return of the company to Pleiku, and the GOERS departed Chu Lai on 31 January 1969.

6. (C) Project Duffel Bag:

a. Another area in which 1st Logistical Command has been and is, playing an important role is Project Duffel Bag. Duffel Bag is the code name for a series of electronic devices used to locate the enemy by seismic, acoustic, magnetic, and infrared disturbances. The information is both of intelligence and/or immediate tactical value. The devices can be

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emplaced to determine areas of high activity and infiltration routes or they can aid in static defense and patrolling.

b. At the beginning of this report period, Duffel Bag was still a small experimental project with a volume of only 200 sensors per month. Because of the possible benefits gained by use of these items in Southeast Asia, normal research and development lead times were scrapped; vendors were tasked, and test models were shipped (with only a cursory evaluation in Panama) to this theater for field use and evaluation. The first items were of many different types and often of questionable reliability. This was expected by the Defense Communication Planning Group (DCPG).

c. Based on results, response of units to these experimental items has grown from initial coolness to enthusiasm. Demand is now far greater than the production base can supply and this situation is expected to continue for another three to six months. Currently, all items are controlled by COMUSMACV and are allocated on a priority basis to the using units as the sensors become available in theater.

d. The 1st Logistical Command has been charged with support of the program. All sensors are received from CONUS, tested, repaired if necessary, adjusted, and shipped to the units. Unserviceable items received from units are repaired if possible, or evacuated to CONUS.

e. The problems with the sensors are many, but 1st Logistical Command has been able to expedite material to units in a time frame that is equal to or better than that for combat essential supplies. Some of the major difficulties faced are:

(1) Most of the items currently in the system were designed as expendable. The Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG) has now reversed this position on some items. However, repair parts are largely unavailable. In some cases repair parts contracts have still not been awarded.

(2) Unproven designs, especially in Helosid (Helicopter-delivered Seismic Intrusion Service), have been and are still unreliable. The Helosid has approximately a 40% rejection rate upon arrival from CONUS. In addition, using units have reported that 50% of the Helosids they receive do not function after employment. Maintenance of non-standard items such as these is costly and time consuming. DCPG liaison personnel and vendor technical representatives are constantly advised of problems by 1st Logistical Command's Cam Ranh Bay facility.

f. An ad hoc group and facility have been formed of 1st Logistical Command signal personnel to handle Duffel Bag equipment. With little experience and equipment, this initial group of 23 men has done an outstanding job of supporting the program. The base of experience during

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the first six months of the program has established the ground work for future planning. However, the ad hoc organization and facility at Cam Ranh Bay are rapidly becoming inadequate to cope with the increasing volume of the program.

g. To meet with the ever changing situation and increased volume of activity, the 1st Logistical Command has started planning in January 1969 to revise the organization and construct new facilities. A volume on the order of 400% greater than the capability of the present organization is expected within the next six months.

7. (C) Cam Ranh Bay - Phan Thiet Convoy:

a. On 28 January 1969 at 1420 hours a convoy departed Cam Ranh Bay for Phan Thiet with an overnight stop at Phan Rang. This was the first convoy to be run from Cam Ranh Bay to Phan Thiet since June 1968 and was requested by I Field Force Vietnam (IFFV) for the purpose of opening QL 1 to Phan Thiet.

b. The convoy consisted of Class I, II, and IV cargo only and was composed of 30 vehicles, only 15 of which carried cargo. The remainder consisted of control and hardened vehicles and gun jeeps. Additional security was provided by eight gunships and a destroyer from offshore.

c. The return trip was made in one day as the convoy departed Phan Thiet at 0800 hours, 30 January 1969 and closed at Cam Ranh Bay at 1715 hours on the same day. There were no accidents or incidents on either leg of the convoy and present plans are to run convoys along the same route in the future at a rate of approximately two per month.

8. (U) Redistribution of Supply Activities: On 1 December 1968, the redistribution of supply activities between U.S. Army Support Commands Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay was concluded and the boundary line between the areas of responsibility of the two support commands was adjusted. The following changes in areas of responsibilities were made:

a. United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, was assigned responsibility for 1st Logistical Command activities and units in the Vung Ro/Tuy Hoa area.

b. Administration of the Class III Supply Points at Cheo Reo was transferred from Cam Ranh Bay Support Command to Qui Nhon Support Command.

9. (U) Stock Status Supervision of Supply Classes I, III, and V:

a. In keeping with the command policy of maintaining the stockage of Classes I, III, and V at the minimum required level in forward areas, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans, and Operations, in conjunction with the respective commodity managers, has initiated an intensive management program.

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b. The management program, Trim Down/Tuck In, began on 1 October 1968 with four main objectives. They were to reduce stockage objectives/days of supply at Logistical Support Activities (LSAs), forward support activities (FSAs), and supply points for Classes I, III, and V; develop a movements control program to control transportation assets and convoy requirements; reduce personnel requirements and reduce security requirements for personnel and material to be protected at those activities. It was determined that stockage objectives or days of supply at 1st Logistical Command support activities would consist only of demand supported items. Information is received daily from 1st Logistical Command LSAs and FSAs and used to more effectively manage stocks by increasing or decreasing on hand stocks, based on personnel and equipment densities supported. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Transportation has developed a Movement Control Program which will insure that only convoys with essential, demand supported items move. This prevents the movement of non-essential items, lessens the exposure of men and material to enemy attack, and frees transportation assets for priority requirements. With the reduction of stockages and the controlled movement of equipment and supply convoys, it is anticipated that fewer personnel will be required to perform supply support functions. In addition, when the stockage reductions and control of convoys is fully implemented, fewer security forces will be required for protection of personnel and material. In conjunction with the four objectives, each 1st Logistical Command support activity is being examined as to its essentiality, possible reduction in the quantity of support provided, or complete elimination, if support is available from another source.

c. The basic design of the program is to maintain each supply class in forward areas at the minimum required level with a greater reliance on thru-put as lines of communication are becoming more reliable and requirement determination becomes more accurate. Experience factors, local situation, and contingencies are the keys to determining requirements and stock levels are changed based on situation changes.

d. The stock levels are determined by commodity managers. On a daily basis, the issues and receipt figures of Classes I, III, and V are received from each Support Command by the Logistical Operations Control Center in Security, Plans, and Operations. The issues and receipts are compared against stockage objectives, safety levels, and average daily issues over a sixty day period. In addition, issue trends are charted and stocks above stockage objectives or below safety levels are specifically noted on a daily basis. Daily observation of these areas provide a ready reference initiating corrections, either by increases or decreases, in stocks as required.

e. The overall system provides for managing the stockage of Classes I, III, and V at the level which will result in the most effective management and the minimizing of the requirement for both personnel and equipment.

10. (C) Special Airlift Missions: During the reporting period, one

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Emergency Resupply and 39 Combat Essential Missions were flown. A total of 941 Short Tons of supplies were airlifted by special mission; 29 missions carried Class V supplies, 4 carried Class III, and the remaining missions carried mixed items such as radar sets, concertina wire, and generators. The chart at figure 4 gives a more detailed breakdown of amount and type of tonnage hauled.

SPECIAL AIRLIFT MISSIONS

	<u>Total</u> <u>Missions</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Class V</u> <u>Missions</u>	<u>Class V</u> <u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Class III</u> <u>Missions</u>	<u>Class III</u> <u>Tonnage</u>
NOV	15	376 S/T	11	280 S/T	1	44 S/T
DEC	13	450 S/T	9	288 S/T	2	98 S/T
JAN	12	115 S/T	9	104 S/T	1	4 S/T

Figure 4

11. (C) Airdrop Operations:

During the reporting period, one emergency airdrop mission was executed in support of U.S. Forces. A total of 16.75 Short Tons of Class V was airdropped using the 1528 Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System. The mission was flown to Thien Ngon, located in the III CTZ. No malfunctions occurred. The mission was rigged by the 109th Quartermaster Company (AD) at Cam Ranh Bay and flown by the 834th Air Division. The chart at figure 5 depicts the comparative tonnages for the past 18 months. The decrease is readily apparent. This decrease is attributed to the stabilization of activity for the period and the increased use of land lines of communication by all friendly forces.

AIRDROP TONNAGES




Figure 5

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12. (U) Reorganization of the Americal Division:

a. During the period September 1968 to January 1969, the 23rd Division (Americal) was reorganized under Standard Vietnam Concept. This concept basically includes maintenance of mission tailored maneuver brigades, less organic supply and maintenance battalions and reorganization of the division base under the ROAD concept. The Americal's previous combat service support organization consisted of a Supply and Maintenance (S&M) Battalion organic to each of the three brigades, and a reduced Division Support Command (DISCOM). The DISCOM's primary mission under this concept was to provide general back-up support to the S&M Battalion.

b. As a result of this situation and the concurrent build-up of I CTZ, the Americal Division assumed responsibility for support of some non-divisional customers within their area of operations. Program 6 logistical units were justified to alleviate this situation and arrived in-country during the time frame of the Division's reorganization. Units specifically justified for southern I CTZ included one Supply and Service Company (DS) and one Ammunition Company (DS). These units relieved the Americal Division of the support mission to non-divisional customers which was the only USARV recognized requirement resulting from the division's reorganization.

13. (U) Reorganization of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile):

a. The logistical impact of the 101st Airborne Division's current reorganization under the airmobile concept is under study by this command.

b. It is estimated that the overall personnel, aircraft, and artillery increase will cause the following daily increase in supply requirements:

- (1) Class I - 20%
- (2) Class III - 40%
- (3) Class V - 15%

The increase of logistical requirements indicated in the above percentage figures are significant when they stand alone. However, it is necessary to place them in their proper perspective. These changes in the division reorganization have not occurred spontaneously, but rather have been enacted gradually over a period of several months allowing the supporting forces to adjust with them.

c. Maintenance impact is expected to be minimal as the increase in artillery support should be offset by the decrease in the total number of transportation items supported by this command.

d. The largest impact on 1st Logistical Command assets has been felt

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in the area of motor transport with increases in Class I and V requirements. Though the Class III increase is substantial, much of that re-supply has been absorbed into the already existing pipeline facilities.

e. No other logistical impact has developed at this time.

14. (C) Four labor disputes during November briefly interrupted the support offered by 1st Logistical Command's civilian contractors. Difficulties with civilian contract employees (primarily local national personnel) were not limited to any specific geographical area; two of the strikes occurring at Vung Tau, one at Newport, and one in the Qui Nhon area. Close liaison between this command and its contractors remains fundamental policy. The command is endeavoring to increase labor-management harmony in order to avoid any jeopardizing of the logistical support of the war effort.

15. (U) Two tropical storms struck the coast of South Vietnam during the quarter. Both had dissipated before actually reaching land, and the only effects were brief interruptions in vessel off-loading at ports in the II, III, and IV CTZs and damage to the LST ramps at Phan Rang. The adverse effects at Phan Rang were minimized through the use of Army watercraft and rapid repairs of the port facility.

16. (U) In the first week of January, fires from the combustion of calcium hypo-chloride were reported at Cam Ranh Bay. These fires resulted from the improper storage of the chemical, allowing it to become wet, which caused the combustion. This was a lesson learned and action was taken to insure that all calcium hypo-chloride would be stored free of dampness thus eliminating future fires.

17. (C) At the start of the reporting period, six Forward Support Activities supported tactical operations. The Forward Support Activities and their locations were:

Duc Pho - BS 809383

LZ English - BS 845945

Dak To - ZB 016218

Ban Me Thout - AQ 878009

Phan Thiet - AN 801068

Phu Bai - YD 800160

a. On 14 November 1968 the Forward Support Activity (FSA) at Phu Bai was discontinued. With 1st Logistical Command assuming control of former Marine stocks at Phu Bai, the FSA at that location was completely phased

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out and a ISA established. 1st Logistical Command personnel at the Phu Bai ISA administer receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply and services including maintenance, laundry & bath, and graves registration.

b. An FSA was established at Dak To on 18 June 1967 to support the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division engaged in operation MacArthur. The Dak To FSA was reduced to a Class III Supply Point on 31 January 1969 when the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was relocated to Suoi Doi (BR 3045), 90 kilometers southwest of their previous location.

(1) There were no problem areas encountered during phase down operations. All classes of supply (I, III, and V) were reduced by attrition, thus minimizing back-haul requirements. Phase down operations started on 15 January 1969 when the Class I stockage objective was reduced from 7 days to 2 days, the Class III stockage objective was reduced by 50%, and the Class V stockage objective was reduced from a 6 day to a 3 day level. On 20 January 1969, the Class I stockage objective was reduced to one day and the Class III stockage objective was again reduced by 50%. Class V was held at a 3 day level until the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division moved to their new location.

(2) The brigade established a Forward Support Element at Suoi Doi thus negating any requirement for the 1st Logistical Command to establish a new FSA. The present concept of logistical support for the brigade is supply point distribution of Class I, III, Engineer IV, and V from the Logistical Support Activity at An Khe. Graves Registration service which was rendered by 1st Logistical Command at Dak To is now being provided from An Khe.

(3) The Class III supply point at Dak To is currently supporting two artillery battalions and one engineer battalion. It also serves as an intransit refueling point for all aircraft in the area. The supply point is operated by 5 enlisted men.

(4) The additional 74 personnel required to operate the FSA were returned to their TOE units. All FSA equipment was technically inspected at the 45th General Support Group prior to being returned to the owning unit. This was done to insure that the equipment was returned in a serviceable condition.

(5) All facilities that were left at Dak To were turned over to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

c. Forward Support Activities at both Ban Me Thuot and Phan Thiet were redesignated as Logistical Support Activities on 1 January 1969 because of their permanent nature.

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18. (C) During the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969 the 1st Logistical Command supported the following major operations:

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>OPERATIONS</u>	<u>INITIATED</u>	<u>TERMINATED</u>
I	Wheeler/Wallowa	11 September 1967	11 November 1968
	Burlington Trail	8 April 1968	11 November 1968
	Jeb Stuart	17 May 1968	3 November 1968
	Nevada Eagle	17 May 1968	In Progress
	Vernon Lake I	25 October 1968	2 November 1968
	* Vernon Lake II	2 November 1968	In Progress
	Comanche Falls III	2 November 1968	7 November 1968
	Marshall Mountain	10 December 1968	In Progress
	Hardin Falls	2 December 1968	In Progress
	Fayette Canyon	15 December 1968	In Progress
II	Cochise Green	30 March 1968	31 January 1969
	Walker	17 January 1969	31 January 1969
	* MacArthur	12 October 1967	31 January 1969
	Bolling	19 September 1967	31 January 1969
	* McLain	19 January 1967	31 January 1969
III	Toan Thang Campaign	1 June 1968	In Progress
	Phase II		
IV	Quy et Chien Campaign	17 June 1968	30 November 1968
	Kadzu	1 May 1968	20 November 1968
	Kadzu II	20 November 1968	16 December 1968
	Speedy Express Campaign	1 December 1968	In Progress

* Supported by Forward Support Activity

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19. (U) Operation Speedy Express (U). This item is classified SECRET and has been submitted under separate cover.

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ANNEX F (C) ACoS, SP&O, Training Division

1. (C) Operation BUDDY was initiated on 28 September 1968 by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command as a means of expeditiously expanding ARVN's logistical forces in order to insure their readiness to assume responsibilities connected with T-Day planning and MACV RVNAF improvement and modernization program. The operation involves training of ARVN individuals and or units through on-the-job training within US units and/or installations.

2. (U) A basic plan was developed in early October 1968 and forwarded to USARV and MACV on 9 November 1968 for concept approval. Also on 9 November 1968, the draft plan was distributed to each support command and principal staff agency within the headquarters for comments. An implementation schedule was developed simultaneously with the plan and provides for four major actions leading toward implementation of the plan within thirty days after receipt of approval from USARV.

a. Message to support commands: Purpose of the message will alert the support commands to the forthcoming implementation of BUDDY and encourage immediate coordination with key U.S. Advisors.

b. Basic plan to support commands: The basic plan will be finalized to the extent that comments from the support command and higher headquarters will be incorporated in the original draft. Detailed planning will then be dependent upon negotiations with ARVN and U.S. Advisors at the MACV level and key advisors at support command level.

c. Basic plan to USARV and working committee: A copy of the final plan will be presented in conference at USARV. The primary purpose of the conference will involve the establishment of a working committee with representatives from this headquarters, USARV and MACV in order to conduct initial negotiations with ARVN and reach agreements on procedures, requirements and overall objectives of the operation.

d. Issue implementing order: Upon review of the support command's supporting plans and dissemination of agreements established by the working committee, an implementing order will be issued.

3. (U) Each support command presently has on-going and/or planned programs which are considered part of Operation BUDDY. The majority of the training programs consist of on-the-job training arrangements made between local 1st Logistical Command unit commanders and U.S. Advisors.

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ANNEX G (C) USAICCV/ACofS, SUPPLY

1. (U) During this quarter, the Directorates of Food and POL were merged with the United States Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (USAICCV) to reduce duplication and improve the operational capabilities of these Directorates and Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply (ACofS, Supply). In order to avoid further duplication this report now encompasses the operations of the (USAICCV) and the ACofS, Supply. A number of aggressive projects were initiated and expanded during the period aimed at increasing the efficiency of the system. A series of Regulations were completed during this period designed to provide guidance and continuity for Depot and USAICCV operations. The order ship time study was continued during the period to provide for more accurate Requisitioning Objective computation throughout the theater. Conversion to the Standard Supply System Vietnam (3SVN) computer system was completed during this period. These and other significant activities will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

2. (U) On 1 November 1968, the Directorates of POL and Food merged staff functions and commodity management responsibilities with the USAICCV. The added directorates now have access to Automatic Data Processing (ADP) stock control while retaining direct lines to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command. This reorganization provides USAICCV/ACofS, Supply management capabilities over Supply Classes I, II, III, IV, VII, and IX, and provides the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command with a single individual responsible for supply management, storage and supply support for all the above classes of supplies. The Directorate of Requirements was organized under the material categories concept for implementation of 3SVN. As funding and stock control are organized under the material category concept throughout the Army supply system, this reorganization by the Directorate of Requirements brings the supply system in Vietnam into direct line with the Army Supply System as a whole.

3. (U) During this period many projects were initiated and completed which were designed to alleviate deficiencies noted in the supply system in Vietnam.

a. To correct the problem of excessive numbers of requisitions back-ordered at all echelons in the command, an intensive reconciliation program was developed entitled Project Rags. Project Rags required a two-fold reconciliation; one between DSU and using units and a second reconciliation between depot and DSU customers. The program was completed in late November 1968 and was very beneficial as a high percentage of backorder requisitions were cancelled. The results of this project show 467,007 DSU/GU requisitions reconciled with 141,022 requisitions cancelled of

which 97,901 were 90 days or older. The results at depot level show 167,520 requisitions reconciled with 79,276 requisitions cancelled of which 64,046 were 90 days or older. The amount of cancellations varied from 28% to 45% of the requisitions received at the four support commands. Project Rags has enabled the Command to reduce the amount of material being sent to the units which is no longer required, enabling greater satisfaction on those items wished.

b. Interest in the high rate of zero balances led to the establishment of the Demand Analysis Program which compared the number of lines stocked with the demand accommodation, stratified by the number of demands. The analysis was made by each depot and for the theater. Demand accommodation was computed for the items in each demand category on a cumulative basis beginning with more than 20 demands and proceeding to one demand. The initial study showed that approximately 5,000 lines accounted for 50% of the demand. Based on the analysis, the Commanding General accepted a recommendation to increase the stockage criteria from 3 demands to 4 demands. Under this program an inquiry program was run in December 1968 to identify and list the 5,000 highest demanded items in the theater ASL. This listing was compiled and distributed to the USAICCV commodity managers for their use in defining requirements for special managerial emphasis. This program will result in the reduction of theater ASL lines stocked.

c. The Command Phased Excess Program continued through the reporting period. Paragraph 19 of the last ORLL Report, dated 19 Nov 68, showed completion of this program through the first four phases. The results of phases V and VI follows:

(1) Phase V identified 79,006 lines of fringe excess. Of the lines identified 11,000 fringe lines with a value of \$3.4 million have been shipped.

(2) Phase VI identified 30,827 lines of stockage excess at the close of the reporting period. During this reporting period there was a recomputation based on 1.8 times the RO instead of 1 times the RO used prior to this report. This recomputation reflected a change in the retention level and reflected improved data on the Availability Balance File (ABF) due to Project Count. The data base was therefore more accurate reflecting a smaller number of lines and enabling the reduction of onhand tonnages in the theater to a more manageable level.

d. Numerous errors were observed in the NCR 500 ledger cards of the DSU/GSUs and it was decided that these must be purified. A 100 percent manual review of all ledger cards followed by a reconciliation of the dues-out files with the customers and the dues-in files with the depots

was initiated to correct these problems. The program was entitled Project Clean and a total of 190,000 cards were reviewed revealing errors which were corrected. The reconciliation resulted in the cancellation of 50,000 requisitions valued at \$38.7 million. The review of requirements resulted in the initiation of 12,000 new requisitions valued at \$3.2 million. This project was completed in November 1968.

e. Operation Stop/See was initiated in September 1968 to expand Project Stop. It was designed as a program for the selective cancellation and frustration of certain commodities being received in Vietnam beyond current requirements or the ability of USARV and 1st Log Command to handle and store.

(1) The items involved in this operation are such categories as office and billet furniture, office supplies, paper and mess products, and many items of Engineer Class IV commodities; bulky, "space eating" commodities; "nice to have" items, non-essential to the furtherance of the war effort and additionally, bulk items not currently needed nor needed in the immediate future.

(2) When the lists are compiled they are distributed to all major support and transportation headquarters in CONUS and the support commands in Vietnam. The CONUS headquarters are instructed to cancel all requisitions and frustrate all shipments on the Stop/See list. Support commands are instructed to inspect all incoming shipments for Stop/See items and return them without unloading if possible, if not, to stage them at the port for immediate retrograde.

(3) As of 31 January 1969 the Stop/See list was comprised of 116,061 federal stock numbers (FSNs) and the following actions had been effected: confirmed cancellations \$52,742,441; frustrations \$8,680,792; diversions/transhipments \$4,472,310.

f. The availability balance files and stock records of all echelons of supply activities within the 1st Logistical Command contained erroneous and incomplete data, which adversely affected logistical support to combat units and contributed to the accumulation of excess stocks. To remedy this situation Project Count was initiated in September 1968 and had a completion target date of 15 January 1969. The project entailed a 100 percent wall-to-wall inventory and location validation. The early completion of Project Count on 28 December 1968 marks the Army's first "perimeter to perimeter" inventory under combat conditions. The accuracy of the supply data base and confidence in the system was greatly improved, enabling the command to provide much better support to field units. This will enable a significant increase in demand satisfaction

and decrease in material release denials at each depot. As a follow-up to Project Count, Project Count II will be initiated during the next quarter.

g. It was observed that a direct line of communication from major commanders to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, was needed to facilitate coordination of supply and technical data and detect supply system faults at all echelons of supply. The Commander's Critical Items List (CCIL) was implemented by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command on 1 September 1968 to effect this coordination. The purpose of the CCIL is to have each major commander identify and report those items of supply or services which are adversely affecting the accomplishment of the unit's mission or which will become a problem of serious consequence in the near future. Once identified and reported to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, these items are thoroughly reviewed by the appropriate staff elements, or the respective item managers in the case of supply problems, and a report rendered outlining what supply or service actions will be needed to get the supplies to the unit. For those supply items identified by the item managers as critical theater-wide, command channel messages are dispatched to the respective CONUS supply source requesting assistance and expedited actions. Currently of the 26 units solicited, 20 are participating. While still new, this program has produced outstanding results in providing the best combat service support to the tactical units within USARV. As of 29 January 1969, 953 items had been reported by the units with 373 filled by 1st Log Comd, 58 with confirmed lift data, 70 deleted, 105 awaiting CONUS reply, 65 awaiting unit action, 279 being researched by USAICGV, and 3 being researched by USARV. With this program the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command is maintaining an overview of theater-wide assets which are presently hindering accomplishment of the tactical unit missions.

h. To preclude requisitioning of nonessential items, inordinate quantities and submission of requisitions with invalid data, Project Edit was initiated. In June 1968 a directive was issued for all DSU/GSUs to reduce the number of the lines on their ASL's by turning in non-demand supported mission essential line items to their supporting depots. In October 1968 a 3SVN conversion team visited 1st Logistical Command and found a lack of edit and review of input documents; a use of procedures that circumvented policies and procedures already established; a lack of edit and review of computer generated output management tools. These inefficiencies contributed to a high input error rate. Through Project Edit the above errors are being corrected, as it requires each of the echelons of supply, beginning at the Company level, to review all requisitions for essentiality and validity. As a further control it was decided by the Logistical Advisory Council chaired by the Deputy Commanding General that commencing with the end of February 1969 analysis and

update, a net increase exceeding 1% of the previous month's ASL line density must be explained. A 1% increase of lines added by itself is not conclusive; quantity and dollar value must also be a consideration. It was recommended that the ACoS, Supply develop a procedure for the "two man rule" for all "adds" to the TASL in addition to the 1% line "adds" based on the criteria of dollars and/or quantity. This project will reduce the number of lines on the ASL by eliminating some "nice to have" items, and will reduce the number of requisitions that are being processed that contain excessive quantities.

i. Certain items of equipment and supplies vital to combat or combat support operations in Vietnam were frequently in short supply at in-country DSU/GSUs and depots on a recurring basis. Project Fill was implemented in October 1968 to inform CONUS of these items of equipment and supplies, and to correct this short supply problem. The procedure is for the DSU/GSUs and 1st Logistical Command depots to identify and report to the USAICCV those PLL and ASL items which continuously reflect a zero balance and for which there is a high frequency of Red Ball or other high priority demands. Lists are consolidated by the USAICCV and forwarded to AMC, DSA, LCO-P and the NICPs on an accelerated basis. Currently 3100 lines are on the Fill list. On 2 December 1968, LC Regulation 700-27, "Project Fill - Reduction of Zero Balances for Critical Items (RCS AVCA GL-48)" was published which established policies and procedures for the specification and reporting of critical items. Through intensive management, this project will result in fewer high priority requisitions and will reduce zero balances due to improved supply status for the items on the list.

j. Excesses were being identified and shipped from forward units at the cost of considerable handling by the depots. Project Thru-Put was implemented on 23 October 1968 to reduce the handling of excess items being retrograded. 1st Logistical Command message 38308, subject: "Retrograde of Excesses", was sent to all subordinate commands and outlined the requirements for the retrograde of depot excesses and a procedure for the moving of excesses from all forward units direct to point of destination. The procedure established is for all forward units having excesses to notify the area support command and request assistance for identification and transportation of the excesses. Upon notification, the support commands furnish a special team to assist the units, and after an on-site review, support command representatives arrange for the delivery of critical supplies within the support command. For the supplies not required at the support command DSUs, a request is forwarded direct to the USAICCV for disposition instructions.

The USAICCV is then responsible for furnishing disposition instructions within 48 hours after receipt of notification. The disposition lists are returned to the Support Commands and the material in the units is packed and shipped either to an in-country depot, to a customer, or out-of-country. Thus, the term "Thru-Put" indicating direct delivery to final destination rather than having all material returned to the depot to be handled a second time. Project Thru-Put will have a favorable impact on T-Day Planning. The elimination of excesses will result in a more manageable level of supplies and equipment to be retrograded in conjunction with T-Day.

k. The initial phases of the Order Ship Time (OST) study were explained in paragraph 2, Section 2, ORLL dated 16 August 1968 and paragraph 22, Section I, ORLL dated 19 November 1968. To review the background of the study, prior to January 1968 USARV had an established Class II and IV Requisition Objective (RO) of 195 days of supply: 135 days Order Ship Time (OST), 30 days Safety Level (SL) and 30 days Operating Level (OL). A General Accounting Office (GAO) audit conducted in September - December 1967 studied the OST on a limited basis and recommended an across-the-board reduction to 105 days OST. Use of this reduced OST effected a reduction in the demand satisfaction which in June and July 1968 dropped to 45%.

(1) In August 1968 an OST study began with the intent of making a complete study of OST, stratified by Material Category (Mat Cat) and by depot. The OST was calculated by finding the number of days required to obtain the desired percentage of receipts and subtracting the SL. The SL and OL are established by regulation for Southeast Asia at 30 days of supply for each. Thus, the RO is calculated by adding the variable OST, SL and OL for each Mat Cat for each depot.

(2) In December 1968 a review was made of the variable OST being utilized within the USAICCV computer. Based on the previous two months review and the fact that the new supply system implemented 1 January 1969 required certain changes in the Mat Cat/depot OST matrix, a revision was made to the Mat Cat/depot OST matrix which reflected reductions in the OST. Continuing monthly reviews will be accomplished in order to reduce OST as changes are effected so that an economical, as well as effective system is established. Implementation of the new OSTs and the periodic adjustments have increased the demand satisfaction and will reduce the number of high priority requisitions.

l. The initial FIA report for USARV was computed in early January 1968. At that time there were over 79,000 FSNs in file that did not match the AMDF. Nearly 18,000 of these were invalid due to incompatibility between the FSC and FIIN, and over 50,000 no price records

were in file. This condition existed primarily because a system of File Stock Record Support, as required by AR 711-16, AR 711-25 and AR 735-35, had not been implemented in USARV. Project Update was implemented in November 1968 to remedy this situation.

(1) The primary objectives of Project Update are: to install a disciplined and command emphasized program to update and maintain all current catalog change data in stock records of the depots, DSU/GSU and TOE units on a monthly basis; to insure that the complementary requirement to maintain current catalog data in locator files, and on containers and bin locations, is effectively accomplished.

(2) Catalog change information is updated monthly at the USAICCV and broadcast to each in-country depot. In the past these data changes have not been furnished to DSU/GSUs, however capability to install Field Stock Record Support for depot customer organizations will occur with implementation of 3SVN. This will provide the supported units current catalog changes and additions or deletions to their ASL on a monthly basis, complete ASL listings together with a summary of updated interchangeability and substitute information on a quarterly basis, and a recap of all changes on a semi-annual basis.

(3) Much progress has been made in purifying the unmatched and/or invalid FSN's and no-price records in file at the USAICCV. For example, the volume of unmatched FSN's to the AMDF has been reduced from over 79,000 in December 1967 to about 42,000 at the end of January 1969. During the same period the no-price records in file have been reduced from over 50,000 to zero (0).

m. During Project Count, it was ascertained that a large percentage of the stock on hand at the depots was in less than condition A or in unclassified condition. Project Condition was initiated in December 1968 to place a more systematic emphasis on the condition coding of these supplies, and to purify condition data of materiel assets at each depot. Project Condition consists of two basic phases. The first phase is closely associated with Project Count II, the continuation of the effort to further purify and update all supply records, and will be implemented by Count II personnel during the physical count of supplies in storage. The task involved will be the separation of all stock counted into two categories; those which are obviously Condition Code A items and all others which will be designated as Code J. Phase II will consist of the condition coding of all incoming depot stocks as either code A or code K, code K being all receipts which are obviously not condition code A. Quality control technicians will inspect all J and K coded materiel to determine the correct condition code of the materiel. Materiel thus inspected and coded will be reviewed by stock control personnel to determine require-

ments and to recommend priorities for Care and Preservation. Materiel not immediately required by depot customers will be reported to the USAICCV, which will collate all data thus received and make determination of priorities for the theater wide Care and Preservation program. The actual implementation of Project Condition is scheduled for 1 February 1969.

n. Project Levels is a study designed to determine if DSU/GSU on-hand stocks can be reduced while supply support remains constant. The purpose is to reduce the stockage in order to reduce funding requirements for stockage, prevent losses through deterioration of excesses and decrease cost in terms of money and manpower for the storage handling, shipping and in storage maintenance of supplies.

(1) The 60 days requisitioning objective at the DSU/GSU level appears to be excessive. The initial objective of Level I is to reduce this requisitioning stockage objective by 25% or 15 days. If results are favorable and further reduction can be affected, levels will be reduced accordingly.

(2) Each support command will select a pilot model DSU/GSU to test the feasibility of reducing levels without significantly degrading customer support. Although the ground work has been laid implementation of Project Levels will be made during the next quarter.

o. Project Orange Ball was initiated to determine a more economical and efficient means of delivering dry batteries to the user. The initial efforts of the study were directed toward developing a system for delivering dry batteries directly from Japan to the using unit or supporting DSU in special refrigerated containers. After two test runs, the direct delivery system appeared to be logistically unsound for South Vietnam due to the lack of flexibility. The system now submitted to higher headquarters for final approval envisions a low volume high velocity supply line passing through Class I channels from the Command Depots to the using units. Refrigeration requirements will be minimized by the high velocity feature of the system since only the safety level of 15 days of supply at Command Depots would require refrigeration.

p. Variations in depot procedures and the need to standardize resulted in the publication and implementation of four regulations governing the various depot functions. Project Same, initiated in August 1968, has the intent of providing detailed guidance for standardization of depot operational procedures. The regulations published apply to all US Army Depots in the Republic of Vietnam and affect the USAICCV operations. They will be transferred into a chapter of the manual. Regulations published during the period were:

(1) LC Regulation 710-1 "Depot Operations Report" has the purpose to establish standards of performance within the command supply system and provide a method of obtaining management information for use in evaluation of supply performance.

(2) LC Regulation 740-2 "Depot Vehicle Park" has the purpose of prescribing policies, responsibilities, standards and procedures for the standardized operation of Depot Vehicle Parks and is intended to assure the positive control of materiel and the maintenance of that materiel in a ready-for-issue condition. This regulation applies to all Class VII materiel in storage or to be placed in storage.

(3) LC Regulation 740-3 "Depot Inventory Procedures" which has the purpose to establish policies, procedures and responsibilities for taking physical inventories of depot stocks and for making adjustments to the availability balance files (ABF) within the US Army, 1st Logistical Command supply system. This regulation applies to all commodities, except ammunition, bulk petroleum, medical, missiles, aviation and cryptographic supplies. Class III packaged products will be inventoried as prescribed in LC Regulation 700-12 "Petroleum Distribution".

(4) LC Regulation 740-4 "Care and Preservation of Supplies and Equipment" is currently being published. The purpose of this regulation is to implement TM 38-230 and TM 743-200 and provide basic instructions, policies, and responsibilities for the establishment and implementation of a standard care, preservation, and maintenance program of supplies in storage, to assure that supplies are maintained in a serviceable condition. It further provides instructions for packing, marking and utilizing general supplies for shipment. It is mandatory that all supply activities responsible for the storage of supplies and equipment incorporate a care and preservation, and maintenance program into their overall activities.

(5) Work was either initiated or continued during the quarter on "Shipping Procedures", "Locator System/Procedures", "Dry Battery Storage", and "Depot Receipt Procedures".

4. (U) Testing of the USAICCV 3SVN system was conducted throughout the quarter and completed on 12 December 1968, with the action of the USAICCV 3SVN design team from US Army Depot (USAD), Cam Ranh Bay. Final tests and modifications were completed on site at the USAICCV on 26 December 1968 and the file conversion begun on 27 December 1968. Conversion to the 3SVN computer system was completed on 31 December 1968 without incident and the USAICCV commenced its first basic cycle under this system on 1 January 1969. As of 15 January 1969 all 1st Logistical Command depots were operational under the 3SVN system, and the conversion was completed with minimal problems.

a. With 3SVN, we now have the capability to implement among other procedures a mechanical application of Interchangeability and Substitution (I&S) data, a modified FIA accounting capability, and the maintenance of condition code on items in stock. Presently, high priority cycles are being processed daily and the basic cycle is being processed approximately every other day. Replenishment cycles will be run approximately every two weeks. During the first cycle processing under 3SVN the Cam Ranh Bay depot released 1,700 backorders and the Qui Nhon depot released 2,114 backorders by processing the requisitions against the I&S file.

b. As a by-product of 3SVN conversion the invalid stock numbers in the USAICCV ABF were listed for research and correction. This action was a continuation of a project implemented to purge the USAICCV ABF prior to implementation of 3SVN. Of 46,000 candidates for correction, 15,000 were altered appropriately and re-entered to computer files during the quarter.

c. Many changes were needed in the procedures used throughout the USAICCV as a result of conversion to 3SVN. "Hand-carried" requisitions for combat essential items which had been processed on a post-post basis must now be processed on a pre-post basis, where the requisitions are entered to the work cycle after being key punched. The advantage of the new system in connection with Red Ball demands was its improved edit capability. Controls and procedural changes are being established to continue the type of monitoring of these requisitions which existed prior to the 3SVN implementation.

5. (U) Planning continues in anticipation of the arrival of an IBM 360-50G computer and ancillary equipment early in April. The currently installed IBM 7010 computer continued to be utilized at capacity throughout the reporting period and again the time available was insufficient to complete all requested special reports. The new 3SVN system coupled with this planned expansion of our computer equipment will provide the much needed tools for support level necessary for this Command's operational needs.

6. (U) During the months of November and December, the Support Commands submitted Purchase Requests and Commitments (PR&C) to cover contractual services required in FY 70.

a. The following PR&Cs have been received, processed by the ACofS, Supply and are in various stages of staffing within 1st Logistical Command:

- (1) Care and Preservation, Long Binh.
- (2) Engineer Construction Material Yard, Long Binh.
- (3) Care and Preservation, Qui Nhon.
- (4) Engineer Construction Material Yard, Qui Nhon.
- (5) Care and Preservation, Engineer Construction Material Yard and Motor Vehicle Park, Cam Ranh Bay. The Cam Ranh Bay PR&C lists all functions to be included in the FY 70 Procurement.

b. During the reporting period, the Cha Rang Engineer Construction Material Yard (ECMY) of the Qui Nhon Depot complex came under contract to Philco-Ford Corporation. Considerable problems were encountered in getting this contract off the ground as equipment resources were insufficient to do the job. To alleviate the immediate unsatisfactory condition, Han Jin trucking Company has been authorized verbally to load and unload all vehicles over and above Philco-Ford's capability. A recommendation has been forwarded to modify both contracts to permit Han Jin to load and unload all vehicles within the ECMY over and above Philco-Ford's capability.

c. A management Survey of non-Standard Repair Parts Depot and Engineer Construction Material Yard operated by PA&E at Long Binh and Saigon was directed by the Commanding General as a result of an audit conducted by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). This audit basically questioned the workload versus personnel authorized to accomplish the same. The management survey was designed to study the staffing patterns, functions, and workloads with a view towards finding possible manpower savings. A similar survey was conducted at PA&E Engineer Construction Material Yards at Long Binh and Vung Tau, resulting in a recommendation to reduce the staffing 24.3%.

7. (U) Prior to December 1968 no permanent or concise record was kept on reefer ship data other than schedules arrivals and departures. As a result, it became necessary to do extensive research when drawing up fact sheets and messages in response to queries from other command. Starting in December 1968 detailed accounts of all pertinent data on incoming reefer vessels were kept, to include RDD, S/T projected and actual arrivals and departures. This information has proved invaluable in saving man hours of research in subsequent queries about reefer vessels in RVN.

8. (U) A letter of Instruction concerning Commodity Support for the Chieu Hoi Program was published on 12 December 1968. This office devised policies and procedures for commodity support of the Chieu Hoi Program. The LOI instructed that supply support be given to armed propaganda teams who return to the field to induce other enemy soldiers to defect. Liaison was established with all officers and commands that were affected.

9. (U) Due to the shortfall of milk produced by the Foremost Dairy at Saigon in support of III & IV CT daily air lift of milk from the Meadow Gold Dairy at Cam Ranh Bay to Vung Tau, Cam Tho and Phuoc Vinh was implemented in December 1968. The previous sea van shipments of milk to Saigon and Vung Tau from Cam Ranh Bay was discontinued effective with the vessels sailing 30 January 1969. Foremost's present production capability together with the air shipments to the aforementioned destinations will provide sufficient milk to meet menu requirements in II & IV CTs.

10. (U) A fire at the bakery at Long Binh destroyed two ovens, three proofing cabinets and approximately 25% of the building; however, there were no injuries to bakery personnel. A rebuilt oven from CONUS was received on 21 January 1969 which will make up for some of the production lost due to the fire. The cause of the fire is unknown, but it is believed the proximity of the fuel source to the ovens may have been responsible. The fuel supply for ovens at the bakery will be elevated to minimize the possibility of a fire in the future.

11. (U) On 12 January 1969, 31 AR/AAV, M551, General Sheridan vehicles arrived in RVN, for deprocessing at the Long Binh Depot, in preparation for subsequent delivery to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 25th Infantry Division. In conjunction with the arrival of these vehicles, a New Equipment Training Team arrived for use in training the unit operating and maintenance crews. The introduction of this vehicle is the result of an intensively planned and intricately coordinated program that has provided for a smooth transition for deployment of the vehicle to combat units. With minor exceptions, the details of the M551 project were executed with a high degree of military efficiency. Upon arrival in Republic of Vietnam (RVN), demonstrations of operational capabilities of this vehicle were provided for virtually all commanders concerned, and exchange of control is proceeding ahead of schedule.


12. (U) A cost reduction savings in the amount of \$2,803,335 was submitted for validation. This savings was realized due to action by the Director of Food which reduced a portion of the order-ship time for non-refrigerated substance. The reduction was accomplished by reducing the mailing time by five days and aligning the days required for the

CONUS positioning time with the days required per the Oversea Requisitioner's Handbook. This resulted in a further reduction of 12 to 13 days contingent upon the category of the item.


13. (U) A Local National Data Processing Intern Program commenced within the command during May 1968. Under this program eight qualified Vietnamese civilians were hired to undergo an 18 month combined, formal and on-the-job training program to fully qualify them for positions as Computer Console Operators, Computer Programmers and possible Computer Systems Analysts. This program was initiated to help alleviate the shortage of Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) personnel that is continually experienced. The five Vietnamese data processing interns who have continued in the program are now in Phase III (Programming) of their training. During this reporting period they have become proficient to the degree wherein they are frequently employed in developing actual production programs rather than merely participating in training exercises.

14. (U) The charts below relate the following: Red Ball requisition activity shows the number of Red Ball requisitions processed compared with the number passes; redistribution of supplies reflects the cumulative lines and dollar value of supplies distributed among the in-country depots; depot tonnage Class II & IX shows the tonnage on hand, shipped and received; depot tonnage Class IV shows tonnage on hand, shipped and received; operation Stop/See accomplishments reflects the lines offered and the cumulative values of cancellations, frustrations, diversions and transhipments.

RED BALL REQUISITION ACTIVITY





REDISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES



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DEPOT TONNAGE CLASS II & IX



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STOP/SEE ACCOMPLISHMENTS

AS OF 31 JAN 69

NUMBER OF FSNs 116,061

RESULTS

CONFIRMED CANCELLATIONS \$52,752,441

FRESTRATIONS 8,680,792

DIVERSIONS TRANSHIPMENTS 4,472,310

TOTAL \$65,895,543

15. (C) Enemy action continued against petroleum installations and facilities during the quarter ending 31 January 1969. It was especially significant in Qui Nhon Support Command. An enemy mortar attack on the An Khe Tank Farm on 11 Nov 1968 destroyed four transfer pumps, one 10,000 bbl diesel tank, and the manifold in addition to causing damage to three other tanks. However, the capability of pumping bulk petroleum to Pleiku via the An Khe - Pleiku pipeline was maintained. Tank Farm #2 in Qui Nhon was attacked on 3 Jan 69 by sappers, rockets, and small-arms fire. The attack wounded four 1st Logistical Command personnel and damaged one 10,000 bbl avgas tank and destroyed the manifold, a 250 bbl service tank, and one pump. The Qui Nhon - Phu Cat Air Force Base pipeline was damaged so frequently and extensively during the month of January that resupply of JP-4 to Phu Cat was severely hampered. On 24 January an unknown explosion dropped two of three spans of bridge #302 which caused a 48 hour shutdown on the pipeline from Qui Nhon to Phu Cat and An Khe. The Shell tanker HELISOMA was damaged on 22 December 1968 at Nha Trang Harbor resulting in the incapacitation of the fully-loaded vessel for several days.

16. (U) Progress continued on construction of POL facilities despite some delays. The 250,000 bbl tank farm at Vung Tau was completed with the rehabilitation of two existing 10,000 bbl tanks in November and the completion of the three new 50,000 bbl tanks in December. However, two of the 50,000 bbl tanks are not completely operational due to missing PV breather valves which were ordered from CONUS in October.

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17. (U) The Cam Ranh Bay T-5 terminal facility neared completion. The testing of the 8" and 12" pipeline systems was completed during November and December. The T-5 jetty was operationally ready to receive a 220,000 bbl tanker on 30 January utilizing a temporary mooring system in lieu of the mooring dolphins whose construction has been delayed by higher priority engineering projects. This facility will be capable of discharging a T-5 or a T-2 tanker and backloading one T-1 tanker simultaneously, resulting in reduced vessel charges.

18. (C) The 13,000 bbl tank farm at Phu Hiep was completed and water-tested in December and will become operational when it is manifolded into the Vung Ro Bay - Tuy Hoa pipeline. The Vung Ro Bay - Tuy Hoa pipeline was relocated to follow Route 1; the new route will provide greater security to the line and maintenance crews.

19. (U) The Tan My - Hue - Quang Tri pipeline was declared completed by the Navy on 17 November. However, due to pumping problems and lack of testing, the line did not begin operations until 19 December. The official Army ceremony for acceptance of the pipeline occurred on 10 January 1969.

20. (U) The Petroleum Directorate assumed the mission of procurement inspection in Vietnam from the Navy effective 1 January 1969 in accordance with a recent Department of Army directive. This mission is performed under the provisions of Defense Fuel Supply Center contracts. The scope of these contracts includes fourteen packaged lubricants which are blended by the commercial oil companies at their Nha Be terminals. USARPAC was granted two additional spaces and hiring authority for the recruitment of two procurement inspectors. One GS-11 Department of the Army Civilian has been hired from in-country sources, and the other space is temporarily being filled by an E-7 military inspector with an MOS of 92C, pending USARPAC/AMC recruitment of the second inspector.

21. (U) Command emphasis has been initiated to improve accountability procedures for petroleum products. All petroleum accounting procedures have been reviewed recently to insure that all contract deliveries to the military are being completely fulfilled. A credit card system had been implemented for fuel deliveries and should be fully operational by March. This system, combined with military police spot checks of deliveries, should discourage or eliminate possible thefts of military product in Vietnam.

22. (U) Consumption of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) has increased during the quarter from 210,000 gallons to approximately 300,000 gallons monthly. This increased consumption is the result of increased LPG service to divisional base camps and Thailand Forces in III and IV CTZ. 100 additional 500 gallon

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LPG storage tanks and 2000 cylinders have been requisitioned by the Army Inventory Control Center.

23. (C) Eight 12-point Helicopter Refueling Systems were received from CONUS for use by Army Forces in Vietnam. The principal components for each system include one 350 GPM pump, one 350 GPM filter-separator, and one 50,000 gallon collapsible tank. To date two of these systems have been released by USARV, G-4: one to the 164th Combat Aviation Group in IV CTZ and the other to the 101st Airmobile Division for installation at Camp Eagle in I CTZ. As plans for the installation of the remaining systems are in development phase, evaluation of the system's capabilities and shortfalls must await further field testing.

24. (C) In response to an urgent request for additional petroleum handling equipment to support Operation Speedy Express, timely support was received from AMC. The following items were airlifted to this command: one hundred 10,000 gallon collapsible tanks, eight 350 GPM pumps, and eight 350 GPM filter-separators. A substantial share of this equipment has been loaned to the 164th Combat Aviation Group. Generally, the status of depot stocks of petroleum handling equipment in RVN has improved markedly.

25. (U) A detailed analysis was made of the fourteen packaged petroleum items supplied from in-country contractors prior to the preparation of 1969 contracts and in response to the Army Petroleum Center's requested review of the possibility of replacing MILSTRIP requisitions of the same items in II CTZ by in-country contracts. The review revealed some packaged POL excesses in II CTZ depots which will be redistributed to meet III and IV CTZ requirements. It was recommended that II CTZ depots continue to be re-supplied from CONUS depots in order to insure a constant supply of these POL items from more than one source. The Army Inventory Control Center provided DFSC with projected II CTZ requirement for 1969. Reductions in the contract quantities were recommended for some products in III and IV CTZ and steps were taken to begin redistribution of II CTZ excesses to partially fill III and IV CTZ requirements.

26. (C) The Red Beach line in Qui Nhon was damaged twice during December and twice during January. It was washed out by tidal action on 8 January twenty-four hours after being repaired. It was decided that no further engineer effort be diverted to re-install this line again due to its continuous vulnerability to the elements. Greater engineer emphasis was placed on the early completion of the new 8" buried welded pipeline from the T-2 jetty to Tank Farm #1. The supply status of Qui Nhon Support Command was adversely affected during January as a result of the destruction of the Red Beach line. The alternate line from the T-2 jetty to Tank Farm #3 has been used continually although the discharge rate is limited. The T-1 tanker CHATTAHOOCHEE has been utilized as frequently as possible to supplement the alternate line with two 4" submarine lines in the outer

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harbor. However, the consumption rate in the Qui Nhon Support Command exceeds the capability to discharge through all alternate lines. Until the new 8" line is completed in February, the supply situation will continue to deteriorate. This situation has been further aggravated by excessive damage and pilferage on the Qui Nhon - An Khe and Qui Nhon - Phu Cat pipelines as well as the damage to Tank Farm #2 early in January.

27. (C) The supply of JP-4 at Tuy Hoa Air Force Base fell to an undersirable level during the period 25-29 November as a result of a combination of limited Air Force tankage, bad weather, and enemy activity. Actions being taken to preclude similar occurrences during the northeast monsoon season include the doubling of JP-4 storage by the Air Force and the use of an Army tug to assist in the berthing of POL tankers during bad weather.

28. (C) The commercial submarine line at Nha Trang was damaged on 1 December by the HELISOMA. The commercial pier was utilized until 20 December when Esso re-installed the submarine line. The construction of a reliable military submarine line has been submitted to Hqs USARV for approval. The supply situation at Nha Trang was degraded during the month of December due to the damaged submarine line and the incapacitation of the HELISOMA. All of these factors combined to cause extremely tight scheduling of petroleum vessels throughout II CTZ during the quarter.

29. (U) The MSTs tanker ALDERMINE arrived in-country on 5 November with 107,300 bbls of JP-4 which did not meet the permissible use limits for Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP). As in the similar case of the QUIOLLA in October, the product was accepted after the Department of the Air Force waived the standard RVP use limits. Subsequent movement and turbulence of flow brought the RVP within use limits. The Defense Fuel Supply Center at Washington, D.C. as well as the involved agencies of the Military Departments concerned were kept informed of the facts.

30. (U) Monthly bulk fuels consumption by US and Free World Military Forces in II, III and IV CTZ was as follows (Figures in thousands of barrels)*:

		OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
Saigon	JP-4	573.1	681.8	686.2
	AVGAS	92.4	127.0	113.9
	MOGAS	239.1	233.3	198.6
	DIESEL	342.5	297.4	401.8

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		OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
Cam Ranh Bay	JP-4	599.0	620.3	423.3
	AVGAS	53.8	56.3	42.7
	MOGAS	64.9	76.9	55.1
	DIESEL	98.0	106.4	84.7
Qui Nhon	JP-4	156.7	165.6	308.8
	AVGAS	31.3	28.6	32.2
	MOGAS	51.9	47.1	51.8
	DIESEL	97.9	72.9	104.7


* January 1969 data was not available at time of publication.

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
ANNEX H (U) ACOFS, MAINTENANCE

1. (U) During the 92 day period from 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969, certain items of equipment such as tanks, personnel carriers, self propelled and towed artillery achieved a level of operational readiness never before attained in a combat zone (see graphs in Section I, Part I). However, the operational readiness rates of some items of equipment did not attain this same level of excellence. Deadline rates fell below MACV standards in a number of areas due to constant usage, poor climatic conditions, and overage equipment. To alleviate this situation, several programs were initiated to improve the operational readiness of the equipment in the hands of the tactical units. Below are the operational rates for rough terrain and commercial forklifts, 20 ton cranes, full tracked tractors, tactical wheeled vehicles and generators:


MATERIEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT USARV WIDE AVERAGE MONTHLY OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES



MATERIEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT **USARV WIDE AVERAGE MONTHLY OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES** **COMMERCIAL FORKLIFTS**




CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT **USARV WIDE AVERAGE MONTHLY OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES** **CRANES, 20 TON, TRUCK MOUNTED & ROUGH TERRAIN**



CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT

USARV WIDE AVERAGE MONTHLY OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES


TRACTORS, FULL TRACKED




MOBILITY

USARV WIDE AVERAGE MONTHLY OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES


TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES



POWER GENERATING EQUIPMENT
USARV WIDE AVERAGE MONTHLY OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES
GENERATORS, UNDER 15 KW



POWER GENERATING EQUIPMENT
USARV WIDE AVERAGE MONTHLY OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES
GENERATORS, 15 KW AND OVER



2. (U) Repair and Return (R&R) Maintenance Support Program for M107/110 Artillery Weapons:

a. Increasing deadline rates, poor mechanical conditions of the M107/110 artillery fleet and lack of training and knowledge at the operator, organizational, and direct support maintenance levels necessitated the development of a planned program for maintenance.

b. An R&R program was implemented on 4 Nov 68 whereby the artillery batteries could bring their weapons to a direct support unit for the quarterly maintenance service. This R&R program was established in four support commands and 12 R&R locations. To insure the success of the R&R program, 14 supply points were established whereby all M107/110 artillery repair parts would be centrally located and in addition the artillery firing batteries were authorized a stockage of repair parts. A direct exchange media for higher dollar components was incorporated.

c. The R&R concept calls for the evacuation of a weapon to one of the 12 R&R centers for one week of intensified maintenance on a quarterly basis. The artillery crew will accompany the weapon and perform the service. Direct support unit personnel will advise, assist, and train the weapon crew. All necessary support maintenance will also be performed during this week.

d. The R&R program has reduced the deadline rate to a daily average of 5%, trained 497 personnel, serviced 71 weapons, and established repair parts demands at the user, support and depot levels.

3. (U) Project "Dog":

a. This project was designated for the primary purpose of identifying battle weary, troublesome and deteriorated equipment requiring excessive field maintenance and plan for its replacement or renovation. Another purpose is to determine where available assets should go to achieve the best overall improvement of equipment availability, and significant reductions in the maintenance effort. All major commands in USARV have been invited to participate in this identification program. Maintenance units are required to perform a technical inspection (TI) and furnish completed TI sheets and other identifying information (serial number, unit, etc) to this headquarters.

b. This program has provided the following benefits:

(1) Aided in the analysis of deadline rates.

(2) Used as means to establish the priority of replacement for equipment in the Closed Loop Support Program (Project MOT).

(3) Required maintenance units as well as using units to take a critical look at and identify troublesome equipment.

4. (U) Repair and Return Program for Radar Set AN/PPS-5 Components.

a. Maintenance units throughout USARV were accumulating unserviceable repairable components of Radar Set AN/PPS-5 as a result of units not having the test equipment and skills required for repair. Most of these components are in critical short supply in country and CONUS. The prime contractor for the AN/PPS-5 Radar Set also has the contract for repair parts required for normal provisioning to support radar sets in the Army inventory. Efforts to accelerate the repair parts delivery would delay the production of end items. Therefore, it was imperative that a repair and return program be established in order to maintain an acceptable operational readiness rate. In response to a request from this headquarters, USARV requested US Army Electronics Command (USAECOM) to establish a repair and return program. USAECOM established a program with Sacramento Army Depot (SAAD) on 4 Dec 68.

b. The effect this program has had on improving support is to provide a source for the repair of critical components required to maintain the AN/PPS-5 Radar Set.

5. (U) The Introduction of Jiffy Bags.

a. US Army Electronics Command (USAECOM) has established policy and procedures for the return of modules for Radio Sets, AN/VRC-12 Series, AN/PRC-74 and AN/PRC-25 to Sacramento Army Depot (SAAD) for repair and return to stock. These modules were not being returned promptly by maintenance units. An investigation by USAECOM revealed that the low turn in rate was due in part to packaging requirements required to send modules by registered air-mail to designated depots. To reduce the packaging addressing and program identification problems, preprinted envelopes with padding (Jiffy Bags) were procured in three sizes by SAAD. These "Jiffy Bags" have been distributed to direct and general support units.

b. Jiffy Bags are also used in the "Repair and Return" program for unserviceable components of Radio Set AN/GRC-106, Radar Set, AN/PPS-5, and Army Area Communications System (AACOMS) equipment.

c. The effects this program has had on improving support and the recovery of modules in critically short supply for repair and return to the supply system and improvement of operational rates for equipment supported by repair and return programs.

d. Improvement required will be to establish an automatic "Jiffy Bag" replenishment system for participating units.

6. (U) Jungle Fatigue Repair.

a. In May 1968 reparable fatigues were being burned by using units, rather than repaired due to lack of in-country repair capability. A program was established in which these reparable fatigues were stored until a contract was let for their repair. This contract was let on 6 Dec 68 and all unserviceable fatigues are now shipped to Boo Hung Sa, Ltd, in Saigon, Vietnam for repair.

b. Interest in the program and the level of reparable assets on hand have been deteriorating. The government would realize a substantial monetary savings if units turned in reparable for repair instead of burning them.

7. (U) Direct Exchange Program for Military Standard Engines.

The above program was initiated because of the lack of unserviceable assets being retrograded to CONUS. We were informed that the shortage was causing the shut-down of some CONUS repair facilities. The mil-standard engines are to be retrograded at a time between overhaul (TBO) of 1500 hours. By assuring the using units that a new engine can be obtained on a direct exchange basis, the program encourages them to turn in the old one when it reaches the TBO. The objectives of the program are to improve the command retrograde position, to permit DSUs to replace engines at the established TBO, and to reduce the number of Red Ball requisitions for these items. It is planned to expand this program to all support commands and to include all sizes of mil-standard engines as the assets become available.

8. (U) Maintenance Classes at the Headquarters of Addressograph-Multigraph (AM).

a. In the first quarter of FY 69, proposals for a maintenance contract for AM machines were negotiated. Due to the high cost of preventive maintenance, a Blanket Purchase Agreement for repair on an "as required" basis was established.

b. To establish in house preventive maintenance capability, the possibilities of contractor maintenance training were explored.

c. On 29 Jan 69 trainees from maintenance units within RVN began attending classes at the headquarters of Addressograph-Multigraph of Japan, Ltd, Tokyo, Japan.

d. These trainees will be used to train other qualified Army personnel in the techniques of preventive maintenance, as well as to maintain the sophisticated machines.

9. (U) The Closed Loop Support Program (CLSP) (Project MOT) Conference.

a. The Closed Loop Support Program (Project MOT) was designed to allow depot level repair/overhaul of USARV assets of selected communications and electronics components and equipment. The participation in this program by authorized units was such that optimum benefits were not being achieved. Off-shore facilities designated to support USARV for this program have reported short-falls in the programs due to nonavailability of unserviceable assets. An investigation by this headquarters revealed general lack of familiarity with the program on the part of project officers throughout USARV.

b. USARV G4 scheduled a conference for project officers on 17 Jan 69. All aspects of the CLSP were covered to include:

- (1) Policies and maintenance procedures.
- (2) Criteria for selection of equipment for exchange.
- (3) Benefits to be gained from maximum participation.
- (4) Overall effect on maintenance effort and deadline rate.

c. This conference was very effective in achieving a better understanding by project officers of policies and procedures governing the Closed Loop Support Program. Support will be improved by a better utilization of this program to improve the operational readiness rate and obtain depot level repair/overhaul of equipment.

10. (U) CMMI Inspections.

a. During the reporting period, the 1st Logistical Command Command Maintenance Management Inspection Teams conducted 57 annual inspections. Of these 28 were satisfactory and 29 were unsatisfactory for a total satisfactory percentage of 49%. The contributing factors causing the low percentage of satisfactory ratings are in the area of maintenance management and operations: log books improperly maintained, shop operations poor, safety, training and cross training programs inadequate, PLL not computed or maintained, and shortages and overages of equipment. A program of instruction for training unit personnel has been written. This program of instruction covers equipment serviceability criteria, operators maintenance, preparation for CMMIs, and an inspection of the unit by unit personnel using DA Pam 750-10, CMMI Criteria.

b. Twenty-eight Command Maintenance Management Reinspections were conducted of which 22 were found to be satisfactory for 79 percent passing. The units that failed these reinspections made little effort in taking corrective action after the initial inspection. The Program of Instruction mentioned in the preceding paragraph, if used by these units, will assist them in bringing their units up to the desired maintenance standards.

c. During the quarter, 493 roadside spot check inspections were conducted on 1st Logistical Command vehicles; 128 were found to be satisfactory for a 26% passing score. Almost all unsatisfactory results could be attributed to poor operator maintenance and organisational maintenance. This can be corrected by sound, thorough, preventive maintenance at the unit level. All units have received a copy of the 2404 prepared on each vehicle at the time of the inspection.


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ANNEX I (G) ACoFS, TRANSPORTATION

1. (C) During the period 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969, 1st Logistical Command transportation units handled 2,267,506 STONs of cargo.

Total Cargo Handled by 1st Logistical Ports



Thousands STONs



The above tonnages include military discharge, SeaLand discharge, military outload, SeaLand outload, and USAID handled. The downward trend beginning in October is due to the STOP-SEE Program and the selective diversion of incoming cargo. Utilizing the motor transport mode, this Command hauled an average of 491,812 STONs per month, 40,614 passengers per month and 27,304,582 gallons of POL per month with military assets. The commercial contract motor transport capability available to 1st Logistical Command transported an average of 286,479 STONs of cargo per month. The percentage of cargo transported within certain areas is as follows:


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■ - Percent moved by military.

□ - Percent moved by commercial contract.

During this period, the Vietnam Railway System carried a total of 75,993 STONs of cargo and an average of 54,000 LN employees per month from Chop Chai to Tuy Hoa AFB in support of US and Free World Military Assistance Forces.

2. (U) Port Operations. During the period 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969, port operations were effected by the following:

a. The new barge site at Bien Hoa was completed in November. This site operates in support of Bien Hoa Air Force Base and has a rated capability of 1000 S/T per day. Air Force Class V munitions which have been discharged from deep draft vessels to barges at Cat Lai are moved through the site and loaded aboard trucks for onward movement to the US Air Force and VNAF depots. The completion and subsequent 24 hours operation of this site permits both backload and discharge operational flexibility.

b. Due to operational requirements in the Delta, the 544th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) was reassigned to Vung Tau during the month of November. The company with 16 LCM-8s increased the daily lift capability of the 159th Battalion by approximately 500 STONs.

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c. The 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) also returned to its home port of Vung Tau on 26 December after serving in support of the Navy in ICTZ. The company received many plaudatory comments from the Commanding Officer of NAVSUPAC for their outstanding performance of duty while attached to that command.

d. As a result of the implementation of Project STOP/SEE this Command has been experiencing a sizable decline in CONUS/PACOM inbound tonnage. In October command ports discharged 483,000 STONS of CONUS/PACOM cargo while in January only 373,000 STONS were discharged. The average number of vessels enroute to RVN declined from an average of 116 per month June through September to 91 for the month of October through January.

e. Project Waterdat was during the month of January. The objective of this project is to improve the current data base concerning lighterage and port operations in order to more effectively manage marine assets and port operations. LC Regulation 55-5 has been revised to provide more guidance in compiling and reporting lighterage and port statistics. Equipment requirements versus actual port workload are being analyzed to determine what if any realignment of assets is necessary. The ultimate goal of the project is to reduce lighterage and vessel turnaround time.

3. (U) Highway Operation. To increase this Command's motor transport capability the conversion of the 5 light truck companies to medium truck companies has been completed, however, the Command does have an overall shortage of 23% of its authorized 12 Ton S&P semi-trailers.

4. (C) Rail. Important rail events for this period are:

a. (U) During this period the VNRS completed restoration of the Hue to Da Nang, and Qui Nhon to Phan Rang segments of the rail line. Support of Tuy Hoa AFB has recently been taken over by Qui Nhon Support Command and full advantage is being taken of this rail line to perform this mission. The completion of the Hue to Da Nang segment enables Da Nang Support Command to take advantage of this rate favorable mode and operations are expected to begin during February 1969, with approximately 3000 STONS monthly potential.

b. (C) Enemy sabotage increased during this period with 57 incidents reported compared to 33 during the last reporting period. This is an increase of 42%.

c. (U) Training of VNRS personnel on the maintenance and operation of US Army locomotives was completed during this period and one locomotive is now in service at the K-Docks in Saigon. Two locomotives are to be

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assigned to the Qui Nhon port and one to Nha Trang for switching services and as rail operations expand, the remaining six will be placed in service as needed.

d. (C) The amount of cargo being moved to Phan Rang by rail has increased steadily; at present, approximately 1000 STONS monthly is being carried to Phan Rang by rail.

5. (U) Movement Management Program. During the period the Command intensified its efforts in the movements management field. Efforts are being directed toward more effectively managing the flow of Army-sponsored cargo. Several projects have been implemented by the Command to improve movements management.

a. Project Logmove: The first step in effectively managing the flow of Army-sponsored cargo was the establishment of Movement Control Center (MCC) within each support command to function as the focal point for all Army shippers. Effective 1 September 1968, Headquarters, USARV directed all Army shippers to submit their requirements for all modes of transportation to their supporting MCC. This policy enables 1st Logistical Command to screen all requirements prior to submission of requirements to TMA. In conjunction with this action, Project Logmove was implemented in January 1969. The objective of the project is to provide an effective movements control organization in each support command. Guidance was provided to the support commands concerning movement control coverage desired. At the present time support commands are preparing their movement control organization requirements. As soon as the requirements are determined, they will be reviewed and validated by this headquarters. At that time personnel spaces must be obtained and TOE/MTOE action initiated to formalize these organizations. 30 April 1969 is the completion date for this project.

b. Project Flow: Phase I of Project Flow was initiated in late September 1968. Prior to that time this headquarters had closely monitored the identification of vessels destined for RVN ports, but little effort had been made to identify and coordinate the movement of tonnage by class of supply or by specific critical items of supplies aboard these vessels. Project Flow was implemented to attain visibility of all items in the pipeline between CONUS and RVN by specific item identification in order to provide positive management over their final destination and/or disposition. Phase I of Project Flow is the projection of tonnage destined for major RVN ports categorized by class of supply, port destination, and the approximate location between CONUS and RVN, expressed in time frames of 1-7, 8-14, 15-21, and 22 plus days out of port. The program also involves the identification of critical items designated by the CG such as tanks, APC's and SP artillery pieces. Data for Project Flow is obtained

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from MILSTAMP Cargo Traffic Messages, cargo manifests, weekly newsletters from Western and Eastern Area Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service. Data for the first 14 days is considered to be 85% accurate with the percentage falling thereafter due to non-receipt of input data. The majority of the data arrives between 14 to 20 days prior to arrival of vessels. Commodity managers are provided the data to analyze and recommend final disposition of cargo. Phase I has presented few problems. Phase II which has as the ultimate goal of specific item identification. This cannot be achieved with the present system. More noun nomenclature and FSN's are required on the manifests. In this connection a "supply" manifest test is being conducted between Cam Ranh Bay and Okinawa. A recommendation has been forwarded through command channels to expand this test to include CONUS POE's with shipments for Cam Ranh Bay.

c. Project Intransit: As part of Phase I Project Intransit was initiated to establish an effective traffic management system within RVN. It is specifically designed to detect bottlenecks and improve the flow of Army-sponsored cargo within RVN. The 1st Logistical Command concept of logistical support envisions a minimum amount of supplies on the ground reinforced by a constant flow from supplier to the customer. In effect, everything that is needed is either moving or actually being consumed. The first step under this project was the establishment of Movement Control Centers (MCC) in each support command. MCC's now monitor the requirements of Army shippers and discipline shippers on the use of the transportation system. Due to the vast amount of cargo moving within RVN, it is often difficult to determine which cargo is past its required delivery date (RDD) and which has been offered but has sufficient time to meet the RDD. In order to better manage the situation, a weekly cargo backlog report was devised. The report breaks out cargo to identify shipments past RDD, their destination, and class of supply. This facilitates detection of problem areas where emphasis is required to expedite movement. Another problem was large amounts of cargo remaining in ports for excessive periods of time. A monthly report was developed to identify cargo in port in excess of 2 weeks. Utilizing data from this report the headquarters has been able to direct efforts to move frustrated cargo to the consignee or to the depot if the consignee is unidentifiable. Order-Ship Time (OST) has been reduced for shipments moving by the command's organic highway and marine assets. This results in a greater sense of urgency for all priorities of shipments. A recommendation has been submitted to MACV requesting they revise their priority system. Efforts have been made also in educating shippers to forecast their requirements accurately. Greater accuracy in forecasting requirements will allow for proper planning of allocation and utilization of transportation assets. All of the actions have been implemented and efforts are being directed toward refining these projects and the overall

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management system.

d. Project Challenge: Every effort must be made to insure that critical supplies reach the customer on a timely basis. The large quantities of supplies moving in RVN plus the operational problems facing the transportation and supply systems have presented many problem areas. Two significant problems noted were an excessive number of unnecessary and non-essential shipments and misuse of the transportation system by placing higher priorities on shipments than is necessary. Project Challenge was initiated in an effort to ensure prudent use of the transportation system and eliminate unnecessary or non-essential shipments. The program consists of challenging, by supply and transportation agencies, of all questionable shipments with special emphasis on inter-depot, air, and convoy shipments. Large quantities of supplies which obviously cannot be used by the consignee in a reasonable time frame are prime suspects. Challenging is designed to achieve one of the objectives: cancel shipments not required, lower priority based on urgency of need, extend unrealistic RDD's, or schedule large shipments over a more reasonable time period. To assist in the program Supply Liaison Officers have been assigned to each MCC. In its present state the program can be considered highly successful. Procedures are being refined and standardized within the Command at this time. A requirement still exists for MILSTAMP to be changed to provide standardized procedures for challenging that would apply to all DOD sponsored shipments.

6. (U) Sea-Land.

a. Sea-Land containership service continued in operation on schedule with C4J vessels arriving about every 15 days at Cam Ranh Bay from CONUS. During the period 1 November 1968 - 25 January 1969 six C4J vessels arrived at Cam Ranh Bay. These vessels carried a total of 3867 containers (of which 658 were reefer vans), an average of 644 containers per sailing compared to the total vessel capability of 652 containers. As in the past, one C2 type ship (226 container capacity) provided shuttle service from Cam Ranh Bay to Saigon and Qui Nhon. Following is breakdown of the short tonnage and containers received during the period along with the subsequent distribution to the three support commands:

<u>TOTAL</u> <u>CONTAINER INPUT</u>	<u>AVG PER</u> <u>SAILING</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>SHORT TONS</u>	<u>AVG PER</u> <u>SAILING</u>
3867 (658)	644 (109)	51347	8558
<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>			
SGN 2256 (322)	376 (53)	30957	5159

CRB	823 (191)	137 (31)	11002	1835
QNH	788 (145)	131 (25)	9388	1564

() Indicates number of reefer vans.

b. In addition to the regular vessels, the Sea-Land vessel Los Angeles called at Qui Nhon on 10 December carrying 157 containers (30 reefers) with 2039 short tons. The Los Angeles usually operates between CONUS west coast ports and Da Nang but was routed to Qui Nhon to handle container traffic that normally would be routed to Cam Ranh Bay.

c. A fourth C4J vessel, the Trenton, was placed in the CONUS-CRB service arriving at Cam Ranh Bay on 7 January. The addition of the fourth vessel will reduce the time frame between vessels arrivals at Cam Ranh Bay from 15 to 12 days resulting in 30 sailings each year instead of the previous 24.

d. Two recommendations for improved/expanded service made by this headquarters were approved and implemented in late January.

(1) Extension of 30 miles limit: Agreement was reached with the contractor to provide certain delivery service beyond 30 statute miles from the containership pier. Locations to be served are Vung Tau, Dong Tam, Nha Trang, Phan Rang, and intermediate points along routes to each of these locations.

(2) Restuffing of containers: Agreement has been reached whereby CONUS inbound containers may be partially unstuffed, RVN generated cargo added, and then the container delivered to second destination. This applies to both dry and reefer containers. This will be extremely advantageous since a better mix of cargo can be shipped to Class I Supply Points, which in many cases, cannot consume entire container loads of one commodity.

7. (U) Military Containership Program (MILVAN). Notification was received from US Army Material Command (USAMC) in June 1968 that consideration was being given to establishing a MILVAN program to RVN using 20' x 8' x 8' containers. This Command concurred in the program and provided favorable comments and recommendations to the inquiry. A planning conference was held at Washington 28-31 October 1968 with an officer from Headquarters, USARV representing USARV/1st Logistical Command. As a result of this conference, it was learned the Military Containership Operation will start in April 1969 to Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay. At present, the command is establishing local operating procedures and planning the facilities that will be required; to include

hardstand, operation-maintenance buildings, wash facilities and loading-unloading docks at the depots.

8. (U) Roll On/Roll Off Program (RO/RO). Project MO-RO-RO was initiated during the month of January. The objective of this program is to maximize the use of the RO/RO concept for intra-coastal shipments. The first step of the project, which is in progress, is the determination of assets available for the RO/RO service (both trailer and marine assets). During the next reporting period the program and procedures will be developed and implemented based on available assets.

9. (U) Troop Movements. During the period 1,116 troops arrived by air as part of unit advance parties, main bodies and rear detachments.

10. (U) Special Assignment Airlift Mission Retrograde. The utilization of SAAM for retrograde cargo was implemented in late September 1968. During this reporting period nine aircraft were utilized for retrograde cargo. 283,860 pounds of retrograde Army cargo were shipped to Anniston Army Depot, Alabama and Red River Army Depot, Texas. Monitorship of incoming SAAM will result in continued use of this highly desirable mode of transportation of priority retrograde items.


ANNEX J (C) ACoS, AMMUNITION

1. (U) Ammunition Activity--General:


In-Country Stock Level Reduction: At the beginning of this reporting period, the total of ammunition stocks managed by 1st Log Command had climbed to an all time high of 268,000 serviceable STONS. Action was initiated to reduce the in-country stockage, since the intensity of combat had resulted in a reduction of ammunition issues, the reduction of requisitions permitted the filling of back orders because of increased CONUS production, and the storage capability was becoming saturated. A series of actions was taken concerning the cancellation of back orders, the cancellation of open requisitions, diversion of inbound shipments to fulfill requirements for the off-shore reserve as well as other USARPAC requirements, and transfers to ARVN from both in-country stocks and diversion of inbound USARV stocks directed to ARVN to fill outstanding requisitions. The net result of all of these actions permitted the reduction of the on hand serviceable tonnage to 188,000 STONS by the end of the reporting period. Acknowledgement is made that one of the most salient features which permitted this action to be accomplished without creating turbulence in the supply system was a high degree of confidence in the records maintained in country, the completion of the first perimeter to perimeter inventory, the logistics intelligence available on the ammunition pipeline, and the advance planning information on shipments to the theater. Without complete knowledge and visibility of the pipeline, to include what is on every ammunition ship and where it is stowed, these actions could probably have not been taken and results accomplished within such a short period of time. In conjunction with the actions outlined, an emergency rate review was conducted at the request of DA and the data base updated to permit an in-country review of the intensively managed items and a follow-on review in CONUS of all of the remaining items. These actions resulted in the establishment of a safety level based on intense combat rates and an operating level based on current issue experience to be known as a theater sustaining rate. These actions were followed by a semiannual rate review in January 1969. An additional action was the DA decision to revert to a bulk allocation system in support of 5th Special Forces rather than the USARV required supply rate. This series of actions resulted in the stockage objective being reduced from 255,000 STONS at the end of October to 245,000 STONS at the end of November to 202,000 STONS by December and 191,000 STONS by 25 January. The graphs below show receipt and issue activity and retrograde of ammunition:

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CLASS V RETROGRADE
PHASE I & II



CLASS V
RECEIPT AND ISSUE ACTIVITY



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2. (C) Supply Activities:

a. Total issues for the Calendar Year 1968 equalled 1,020,721 STONS, a dollar value of \$1,966,929,367.00, while total receipts were 1,040,522 STONS equal to \$2,005,091,675.00. Class V activity for the period 25 October 1968 to 24 January 1969 included 144,572 STONS of ammunition received and 206,329 STONS issued. A total on hand balance in the 1st Log Command as of 24 January 1969 was 188,130 STONS.

b. Cycle I of the 100 percent inventory of ammunition stored in theater was completed on 31 October 1968. The inventory revealed an accuracy level of 96.4 percent exceeding the command goal of 95 percent. The DODACs inventoried totaled 4,063 of which 1,748 required zero adjustment and 2,315 required adjustment. As a result of the inventory, a total adjustment (gains and losses) of \$19,914,000 was made which equaled 3.6 percent of the total dollar value of the inventory. The net dollar value of adjustments was a loss of \$874,000 which represented 0.158 percent of the total value of the inventory. Results of Cycle II, covering a period of 1 November 1968 to 15 January 1969 are still in the compilation stage. Cycle III began on 16 January 1969 and will continue through 15 April 1969. Increased accuracy is expected of the Cycle II and III results.

c. Rotation of ammunition stocks, a salient principle of ammunition supply, is being accomplished within the 1st Log Command, with a view towards increasing critical storage space, reducing explosive hazards, improving stock accounting, and preventing deterioration of slow moving stocks. To achieve this goal, the following principles were instituted:

(1) First-in/First-out: Prescribes that the first ammunition received will be issued first in order to turn over stocks and minimize loss due to deterioration. Exceptions will be for operational considerations only.

(2) Selective Stockage: Prescribes that items not listed in the support command stockage objective (SO) will not be stored in Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs) and Forward Support Areas (FSAs), items not issued for 60 days will be stored at depots only, slow moving items will be stocked in absolute minimum quantities and unserviceable and suspended stocks will be retrograded expeditiously from ASPs and FSAs to the supporting depots.

(3) Depot Managed Items: Prescribes that items required to be stocked in country, where issue experience is limited, will be withdrawn from forward locations, centrally located, and distributed by the support command depots.

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(4) Reduction of Line Items: A listing of 36 sub-Department of Defense Identification Codes (DODIC) was issued to all storage locations with instructions to issue these items in lieu of the prime DODICs in order to eliminate excess tonnage and minimize the number of inventory line items.

(5) Call Forward from Off-Shore: Commencing with the December requisition cycle, off-shore stocks recommended for rotation with priority to Ammunition Condition Code (ACC) "C" will be called forward only in lots of 100 or more and only those items which have a shelf life.

(6) Turnover Study: A monthly study which consolidates data, by installation, concerning issues, on hand quantity, stockage objective, and days of supply. The number of days for stocks to turn over and the number of turnovers are derived from this data. These turnover figures indicate which supply facilities have a high rate of issue in proportion to their on hand tonnage and which facilities have excess stocks on hand.

d. During the period July-October 1968, ammunition receipts exceeded issues. The imbalance between receipts and issues aggravated by the decline in ammunition consumption increased the on hand tonnage of serviceable ammunition. These conditions created a requirement for the following actions:

(1) A reduction in quantity of ammunition requisitioned was necessary and was accomplished as shown below:

	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>
Total tonnage requisitioned	57,346	51,013	12,526	82,454
Back orders and current requisitions canceled	86	162	908	0

Requirement for the increased requisitioning in December 1968 for receipt in March was dictated by an increase in issues of 75,223 STONS versus receipts of 58,987 STONS, forecasted receipts of 42,432 STONS versus estimated issues of 75,000 STONS in December and forecasted receipts of 28,933 STONS versus estimated issues of 60,000 STONS in January 1969.

(2) In addition to requisitions being canceled, vessel diversions to the off-shore reserves were necessary due to a lack of storage space and overstockage of various items within the 1st Log Command depots. During the period of 1 July 1968 through 31 December 1968, fifteen ships, for a total of 61,894 STONS, were diverted to off-shore reserves. Commensurate with the diversion policy and the requirement to balance stocks

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and reduce vessel turn around time because of port congestion, during the period 1 September 1968 through 20 January 1969, eleven vessels and a total of 30,217 STONS were diverted in country. Continued intensive management of inbound ammunition vessels and requisitions will be provided by the ACoFS, Ammunition, 1st Logistical Command, to achieve the ultimate objective of maintaining minimum balances on hand commensurate with complete, total support to the customer.

3. (U) Ammunition Operations:

a. Effective 12 November 1968, all Ammunition Ordnance Companies in country were reorganized from TOE 09-17E to the 09-17G series. In addition, the following inactivations, activations, and organizations became effective:

(1) 551st Ordnance Detachment (Ammo), Can Tho, Vinh Long, and Soc Trang, inactivated.

(2) 46th Ordnance Detachment (Ammo), Da Nang, inactivated.

(3) 59th Ordnance Company (Ammo), Cam Ranh Bay, activated and organized.

b. Twenty Class V installations were inspected during the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969 by the 1st Log Command Class V Technical Inspection Team. It was noted that significant improvements have been made in the storage areas as a result of increased emphasis on securing CONEXs, limiting pilferage, marking all suspended lots by encirclement with engineer tape, retrograde of suspended lots and excess, cleanup of classification yards and lot segregation. The technical inspection program since its inception has proven to be an excellent means of providing instructions on proper methods and procedures to include on the spot corrections.

c. In November 1968 a resources utilization report was initiated. Command emphasis on effective management of resources required that special attention be given to the efficient utilization of TOE ammunition personnel and materiel handling equipment (MHE). Command review and analysis of workload and asset dispositions will provide a basis for allocating units and equipment to meet demands. The report includes lifts of receipts and issue, both serviceable and unserviceable, that are actually handled at a particular location, rewarehousing, maintenance, and salvage. Results of two completed reports reveal that:

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(1) Of an average of 355,000 STONS lifted per month in all Class V installations, 95 percent of the available lift capability is actually utilized.

(2) Rewarehousing is equalling 25 percent of the average monthly tonnage handled.

(3) Cranes are providing approximately 25 percent of the total available lift while ammunition handlers and rough terrain forklifts provide 35 percent each.

d. Upon redeployment of the 1st Air Cav Div from the ICTZ to the III CTZ, two additional divisional ASPs were taken over by 1st Log Command units of the Saigon Support Command. Stocks on hand which had been previously issued from theater stocks were picked up as unit returns and reverted to management of 1st Log Command. These ASPs are at Quang Loi and Phuoc Vinh. Additionally, during this period, small ASPs in the Mekong Delta at airfields operated by the 164th Aviation Group were taken over by 1st Log Command units of the Saigon Support Command. These stocks which had previously been issued were reverted to management control of 1st Log Command. These were at small ASPs at Vinh Long, Can Tho, and Soc Trang. The ASP portion of the FSA at Dak To was closed during the reporting period.

4. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Activities:

a. EOD personnel responded to 5,126 incidents throughout Vietnam, made 1,575 liaison visits to supported units, and trained a total of 11,692 personnel during 287 Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance classes.

b. The 533d Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Control (EODC) moved from Saigon to Long Binh Post on 3 December 1968 in conjunction with Operation Move Out of Saigon Expeditiously (MOOSE).

c. The Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) Number 9-500D, standardizing all Explosive Ordnance Detachments, was submitted to Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) and was approved. It is now under consideration at Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC).

5. (U) Surveillance Activities:

a. The 1st Logistical Command Ammunition Inspector Course of Instruction commenced on 15 January 1969 at the 3d Ordnance Battalion, Long Binh. Course content includes military sources of information, ammunition documents, movement regulations, quantity distance and compatibility regulations, field storage, inventory procedures, loading techniques,

small arms and artillery ammunition, mines, firing devices, clearance devices, grenades and pyrotechnics, mortar ammunition, rockets, bombs, incendiary mixtures, chemical munitions, inspection of ammunition material, unit basic load inspection, inspection of chemical munitions, handling procedures, identification and investigation of malfunctions, foreign ammunition, ammunition maintenance, maintenance, planning, renovation line operations, depot renovation procedures, selection of destruction sites, methods of destruction, and salvage and disposal operations. The 9-17G series TOE authorizes each company two Surveillance Maintenance Sections, which requires a total of 68 military surveillance personnel. This requirement necessitated the formulation of the above course. Certain prerequisites were established to insure maximum utilization of the ammunition inspectors. Personnel must be a qualified Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) 55B, 55C, or 55F (the 55C is not to be from the Renovation Detachment), must be an E5 or higher, must have a maximum of six months remaining prior to DEROS upon completion of the course, and must be employed in surveillance activities upon completion of the course.

b. To improve storage and handling, safety, and control of suspended ammunition, eleven Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) surveillance personnel spaces were approved by a manpower survey. Personnel have been recruited and will arrive during the 3d Quarter Fiscal Year 1969.

ANNEX K (C) ACofS, SERVICES

1. (U) On 1 November 1968 the ACofS, Services office was formed as part of an overall 1st Logistical Command headquarters reorganization. The nucleus of the office came from the Directorate of Engineering, which supplied the Engineering Services Division, the Laundry and Bath Division, and the Administrative and Services Office. The Director and Deputy Director of Engineering became the ACofS and Deputy ACofS, Services. The Engineering Services Division incorporated the functions previously performed by three separate divisions under the Directorate of Engineering. The new division had only about one half the number of spaces as the three previous divisions and consequently could not perform its functions in as much depth as under the old organization. The division was organized with two branches: (1) The Plans and Construction Monitoring Branch and (2) the Programming and Design Review Branch. An evaluation is now under way to determine which functions, previously performed, are not essential and could be discontinued. The Laundry and Bath Division remained intact, while the Administration and Services Office added one typist. Three of the new divisions moved intact from other staff sections. The Sales and Disposal Division came from the Directorate of Retrograde and Disposal; the Graves Registration Division from the ACofS, Personnel; and the Food Service Division from the Directorate of Food. The only functions assumed by ACofS, Services that were not already consolidated in another section of the headquarters prior to reorganization were assigned to Installation Management Division. This division has staff responsibility for the overall internal support of subordinate units (seeing that units have the necessary resources to take care of themselves, and make proper use of their resources). The division has not fully met its responsibilities, since it has operated at between 15% and 40% of authorized strength during most of the reporting period. Most of the empty spaces were filled during the last two weeks of January, but it is not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the division at this point. Overall, the establishment of the ACofS, Services took place without significant problems. Minor adjustments in organization and staffing are now in the planning stage.

2. (U) A realignment of the priorities of construction by MACV and a philosophy of increasing austerity in construction, coupled with the limited construction resources available in Vietnam have resulted in delayed availability of many needed facilities under construction. In addition, many partially completed projects have been temporarily abandoned as engineer troops were committed to higher priority projects. The new and old priorities are as follows:

OLD

I. Combat Support

NEW

I. Combat/Operational Support

II. Operational Support

II. ARVN Force Expansion/MACV
Advisors

III. Minimum Essential
Requirements (MER)

III. Minimum Essential
Requirements (MER)

IV. Lines of Communications (LOC)

IV. Lines of Communications (LOC)

V. Base Construction (MCA)

V. Revolutionary Development

VI. Revolutionary Development

VI. Base Construction for US Forces
(MCA)

Most of the projects of 1st Logistical Command are funded with Military Construction Army (MCA) funds and thus fall in the category of "Base Construction". Consequently, this new priority list, if applied with all MCA projects classified as Base Construction, implies that 1st Logistical Command projects would be further delayed as the scarce engineer effort available is committed to higher priority projects. In order to compete more favorably for priority, USARV agreed to classify many important projects, MCA funded, as operationally required so that they could be placed in the "Operational Support" category. MACV has not yet accepted all projects which USARV has classified as Operational Support. To cope with the mounting problem, intensive efforts have been made, in coordination with USARV, to find means to obtain a larger share, for Army projects, of the contractor effort available in Vietnam. Some of the actions taken and underway are:

a. The drafting of strong statements of the impact that any further delays of the top ten 1st Logistical Command projects would have on logistical operations. This resulted in six of the 1st Logistical Command being selected among the USARV top ten projects. The 1st Logistical Command projects selected and the USARV priority accorded to them are: (3) Qui Nhon Cold Storage Warehouses, (4) Classification and Salvage (CC&S) Facility, Long Binh, (5) Water Treatment/Distribution System for CC&S Facility, Long Binh, (6) Long Binh Cold Storage Warehouses, (9) Cat Lai Mooring Buoys, (10) Binh Thuy Logistic Support Activity (LSA) Facilities.

b. The submission of similar statements on impact for 1st Logistical Command projects pending in the Qui Nhon Area. These statements were used by USARV in securing MACV agreement to mobilize contractor forces in the Qui Nhon area to complete the projects.

c. The listing, by priority of all 1st Logistical Command waterfront type projects together with impact statements. This list and statements

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will be used by USARV to request that MACV mobilize additional contractor waterfront capability. These projects can then be completed concurrently with the higher priority projects to which the engineer troop units were diverted.

d. The making of an exhaustive review of all 1st Logistical Command projects to identify those projects which have operational impact or that support T-Day plans. When completed, the review will result in an overall priority list which will allow continual evaluation and management to respond rapidly to requests by MACV and USARV for information on the criticality of the different projects, their impact on operations or plans, and their relative importance.

3. (U) During this quarter extensive research, drafting, coordination, and editing produced 1st Logistical Command regulation 420-4, Obtaining OMA-Funded Construction Support. Experience has shown that definitive guidance for obtaining Operation Maintenance Army (OMA) construction is not available and that subordinate units are confused and frustrated by the apparent maze of processing channels, adding unnecessary delays to the normal processing time involved in securing minor construction support. USARV Reg 420-4 gives only broad general guidance with respect to obtaining OMA-Funded construction support, and coordination with both USARV and US Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam (USAECAV) indicated that no detailed guidance was immediately contemplated. The task of providing the users with step-by-step procedures for solving the OMA construction puzzle was undertaken by this headquarters with separate treatment given to the special cases of OMA work in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) and requesting Southeast Asia (SEA) huts for self-help construction of temporary billeting. After coordination of the draft with USARV Engineer Facilities Services Division and USAECAV Real Property Management Activity, LC Reg 420-4 was published. Although 1st Logistical Command units are subject to dual approval requirements - administrative approval in logistical command channels and technical-final approval in USAECAV channels the step-by-step explanation of processing steps and procedural requirements offered by LC Reg 420-4 should materially assist in reducing the delays and confusion previously experienced by requesting organizations.

4. (U) One of the continuing goals of the Engineering Services Division is to provide assistance and technical guidance in the accomplishment of engineer-oriented tasks which logistical units might reasonably be expected to accomplish on a self-help basis to make their operations more efficient. A primary additional benefit from self-help accomplishment of this nature is avoiding the further diffusion of already scarce engineer construction effort. One of the primary vehicles for accomplishing this goal is the periodic publication of Engineering Information Letters with

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distribution to all subordinate units. Sources of information include technical manuals, field notes from the engineer battalions operating in RVN, and suggestions and specific problems from subordinate units. Three letters were published during the last quarter. Engineering Information Letter #2, 2 November 1968, titled Expedient Peneprism Distribution, explained to subordinate users the use of a 3/4 ton truck and two barrels of peneprism as an expedient distributor for use in the palliation and control of dust on unimproved hardstands, roads, and helipads. Engineering Information Letter #3, Construction of Ice Transportation Boxes, dated 9 December 1968, outlined the construction of a simple, utilitarian canvas-covered box for use by units in organic transport for delivering ice from pick up points to unit messes without excessive melt loss and contamination by dust and road grime. Letter #4, 11 January 1969, titled Installation of Matting, described the proper procedures for laying solid steel planking (MSA1) to secure a tight, even surface for temporary hardstand. Continued emphasis will be placed on disseminating the discovery of better ways to accomplish required tasks, particularly in response to specific problems revealed by operations in the field.

5. (U) Of concern to the command has been the detection and either controlled detonation or deactivation of enemy mines to which logistical convoys are frequently exposed. A survey was made of all available information from the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), and the US Army Combat Developments Command Liaison Detachment to USARV on detectors and antimine devices available or in development. This survey resulted in a decision to write a letter to USARV on 18 December 1969 outlining the needs of the command which will not be met by the devices reviewed. In addition, the command started to maintain data on mining incidents experienced by the command. This data, when correlated to location, will be used to identify road sectors which should be selected for early paving or extensive clearing operations. On 9 January 1969 at the direction of the Deputy Commanding General, USARV, a meeting was held at USARV to initiate a project to fabricate and test a field expedient antimine roller. The shops of all 1st Logistical Command units were offered in support of this project. On 10 January 1969 supplies were provided to the 46th Engineer Battalion which has been tasked to construct the first test model. The command will monitor the tests to be conducted during the month of February, and will assist as required.

6. (FOUO) As a result of a country-wide inventory of base power generators made by this headquarters, several surveys of electrical power made by the USAECAV and letters from the field complaining of the lack of electricity and generators, a task force was formed to investigate the generator situation in country. This task force was composed of representatives of the ACofS, Services; ACofS, Maintenance;

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ACofS, Supply/ICCV; the Army Materiel Command Customer Assistance Office, Vietnam (CAOV); and USAECAV. The initial meeting of this group was held on 20 November 1968. It was decided that the area of concentration should be the repair and maintenance of those generators already in country rather than an attempt to obtain new generators, which was to be accomplished as a separate action by USAECAV. A pilot inspection team was organized under the control of USAECAV but composed primarily of CAOV personnel. This team inspected the Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) operation, maintenance, and repair of generators in the Qui Nhon area. It was found that none of these operations was acceptable. It was then decided that USAECAV should continue inspections and an all out effort be made to improve the PA&E generator operations. The 1st Logistical Command is to render assistance in the maintenance and repair parts fields as requested by USAECAV.

7. (C) In December 1968 and January 1969 a study group formed by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, investigated the operations of the 1st Logistical Command at Tuy Hoa and Vung Ro Bay. The group, composed of the ACofS, Transportation and representatives of the ACofS, Services and Security, Plans, and Operations, was to make recommendations on ways to streamline the present operations and to reduce the size and scope of these operations. The functions of the ACofS, Services representative were in the engineering field. Among the recommendations were to rely more on the road and railroad from Qui Nhon for provision of supplies, to conduct logistics over the shore operations at Tuy Hoa, and to investigate the feasibility of construction of an offshore submerged Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) pipeline to discharge tankers. If these can be accomplished, the port at Vung Ro Bay could be eliminated. Ultimately it is expected that the operations of the 1st Logistical Command in this area can be reduced to a Forward Support Activity (FSA) located in the Tuy Hoa Airbase. The study was published on 24 January 1969 and action transferred to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans and Operations.

8. (FOUO) The Installation Management Division is conducting a study of the generation of industrial gases by in-country Engineer gas generating detachments. There are currently five such units; three which produce oxygen, acetylene, and nitrogen and two which produce carbon dioxide and dry ice. A third of the latter type is to arrive in country during the third quarter, fiscal year 1969. The mission of these units is to provide their respective gases to all US Army units in II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones. However, much of the required gas has to be obtained through local contracts, blanket purchase agreements, and out-of-country procurement. The primary reason that the detachments have not been able to provide the quantities of gases required is the condition of their equipment, which is of early 1950's vintage. This age also has an effect

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on the availability of repair parts and replacement components. The equipment is being replaced slowly by newer, rebuilt units. All three acetylene plants are operational. Two of the three oxygen units are producing, but neither carbon dioxide detachment has produced effectively for about eight months. Nitrogen and dry ices are normally not produced. The detachments are organized to generate the gases and to operate direct exchange points for customers. However, in addition to this they are performing the depot functions of issue and storage of depot stock. Representatives of this office have visited each unit in conjunction with the current study which is to be published in early February.

9. (C) An initial study of the fire prevention and protection posture of the 1st Logistical Command ports was made by the 1st Logistical Command's Officer-in-Charge of the US Coast Guard Port Security and Waterways Detail (PS&WD). This study was forwarded to the USAECV for their review and evaluation. After a lengthy study of their own, USAECV returned the correspondence with somewhat different recommendations. Those of the PS&WD were of an immediate and expedient nature, whereas those of USAECV were deliberate, more elaborate, and more expensive. On 27 December 1968, a meeting was held to discuss the problem and to decide on a course of action without further time consuming correspondence. Represented at this meeting were the ACofS, Services; the ACofS, Transportation; PS&WD; and USAECV. It was agreed to use a plan similar to the recommendations of the PS&WD. This includes the use of portable pumps which would be pre-positioned for use on available harbor craft, the training of port personnel in fire protection and fighting procedures, and the emphasis of fire prevention by port authorities. It was further agreed that the primary responsibility for the fire posture at the ports rests with the installation fire marshal; therefore USAECV will coordinate closely in this matter. The ACofS, Services will coordinate the action.

10. (C) About twenty-five Program Six reserve units were visited by members of the Installation Management Division on Project Welcome Wagon. This project, a follow-up to ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations (SP&O) Project Ready, was to determine the adequacy of facilities and internal operations of these new units and to insure that they knew how to obtain the services and support required. All units in I and II CTZ's were visited between 30 to 60 days after their arrival in Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Generally it was found that the units had been adequately provided for by their parent and host units. The facilities for these new units were adequate, being on the whole as good or better than those of the other units in the area. Three major problems were discovered. Communications, particularly telephonic, were so poor as to hinder operations. Engineer support, particularly Repairs and Utilities (R&U) and new construction, was not at all responsive, and

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many of the units did not know how to obtain the required support. These two problems occurred primarily in I CTZ. The most serious problem concerned the host unit program. Prior to arrival, most of the Program Six units did not know, and were not contacted by, their host units. In some cases, the host units did not know that they were such until well after the arrival of the new unit. Usually the next higher unit assumed responsibility for the new unit, but this was not effective when the senior unit was also a Program Six unit. The lack of a host unit caused problems both in the US and in the Republic of Vietnam. Without prior correspondence with a host unit, the new unit generally was not fully aware of the conditions to expect upon arrival and not as fully prepared as it could have been. Upon arrival, the new unit usually had some unit to assist it, but often the advance party had to make most of the preparation which should have been done by the host unit.

11. (U) One of the major problems in the Food Service Division is working out a suitable system for providing the "A" ration to the small number of crew members on the harbor crafts at Vung Tau. The normal size of individual issues is too large for the few men on the harbor crafts. The available space on the crafts was not large enough for standard sizes of refrigerators or freezers required to store perishable foods. The Foods Division was contacted and an agreement was reached to provide smaller units of issue more suitable to the requirements of the crews. Small size refrigerators and freezers were located for issue. A 1st Logistical Command Regulation 30-42, Monetary Ration Allowance, has been written and is presently at the printer. This regulation will provide a system that crafts can purchase food from available Class I points. The 4th Transportation Command in Saigon is using such a monetary ration allowance system and it has been satisfactory for all concerned. Arrangements have been made for concerned personnel at Vung Tau to visit the Food Advisor at the 4th Transportation Command for a training period.

12. (U) After negotiations of more than 2 years, the Governments of the United States and South Vietnam concluded a country to country agreement on property disposal. The agreement, finalized on 9 November 1968, provides a basic understanding between the governments and establishes a base from which the details of daily operations can be worked out.

13. (U) During December a command decision was made that all sales for long term contracts will be on a competitive bid basis, rather than sole negotiations. This is expected to bring a greater percentage of returns to the Government. Also to preclude problems of unsatisfactory contractor performance due to financial limitations or equipment and personnel shortages, pre-award surveys will be conducted and awards will be based on the results of the surveys as well as on the highest bids.

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14. (U) During this reporting period of 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969, while continuing to implement the management tools and policies mentioned in Part 1, the total command-wide inventory of Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP) has continued on its downward trend going from approximately 80,000 Short Tons (s/t) at the beginning of November to about 71,000 s/t at the end of January. Proceeds during the three month period is expected to total \$914,401.99 on 14 sales.

15. (U) Although the general property disposal trends seem to be showing favorably on the Property Disposal Operation (PDO) mission, we will continue full implementation of the programs as listed in Part 1 and make revisions in policy where needed to insure that the situation continues to improve and the property disposal mission in Vietnam is most successfully completed. There are, however, two problem areas not previously mentioned that if corrected could add sufficiently to the effectiveness of the disposal program:

a. Lack of PDO trained EM: Because there is no provision made to assure that the property disposal facilities receive enlisted personnel trained in property disposal, the disposal function suffers through disorganization, improper segregation and improper or inaccurate records. Even when there is an EM trained in property disposal available, there is now no table of distributing allowance (TDA) or other provisions made to assure his assignment to a property disposal slot and he is more likely to be placed in a position with higher priority. It is suggested that particular individuals be designated for PDO and that they be sent to take the Ft. Lee, Virginia Quartermaster's School in PDO, after which they should be assigned to a property disposal function in Vietnam. This would thus eliminate many of the errors committed by yard personnel because of ignorance of metal class, segregation, etc. It would also correct the haphazard attempts at training personnel once they had arrived to perform a job.

b. Lack of Specialized Scrap Handling Equipment: It is important, from the economic view point that the property disposal program in Vietnam aims at securing maximum production efficiency with minimum labor cost. The over-attention of property disposal yards due to the great quantity and bulk of scrap metals and the inability of purchasers to remove sufficient quantities of material, dictate the need for specialized scrap handling equipment for installation in PDO Yards throughout country. After receipt of this equipment the PDO will reduce costs, increase production efficiency, reduce acreage, and bring higher returns to the U.S. Government. The following specialized equipment is on order for installation in the property disposal yards throughout Vietnam and will aid in alleviating the congestion and removal problems as explained:

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(1) Automatic metal balers and hydraulic Baling Presses will be used to compress low density, high volume type scrap into bundles or bales. When compressed this scrap will occupy about one fourth of its present volume. Also, the sales price of prepared scrap is from 25 to 50 percent higher than that of unprepared materials.

(2) Alligator shears will be used to prepare heavy steel and to separate non-ferrous attachments from ferrous scrap, thus assuring higher revenue returns.

(3) Magnet-grapples, power plants, and tagline winders will be mounted on cranes to be involved in loading and off-loading scrap and ferrous scrap metals which are presently being handled physically, thus assuring tremendous savings in time and labor costs. Another advantage to having this equipment is that it can be employed to resituate yard scrap piles to cover smaller areas.

(4) Drum deheaders will be used to remove the lids off 5 gallon drums so that the drums can be used for purposes other than for which originally intended. Drums are presently being deheaded by hand.

(5) The textile and cardboard baling presses are required in processing of Electric Accounting Machine cards and other scrap paper products.

(6) Cable strippers will be used to remove lead covering from copper wire thereby increasing the sales price of copper from 25 cents per pound to approximately 35 cents.

(7) Sweaters or smelters will be utilized in reducing bulky aircraft residue and other aluminum scrap to ingot form for ease of shipping, conservation of storage space and increased selling prices.

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ANNEX L (C) ACoS, PERSONNEL, Plans and Programs Division

1. (U) Program Six Civilianization

a. The Civilianization Program was initiated on 1 June 1968 with the objective of replacing 3,336 1st Logistical Command military spaces with 4,608 Local National spaces. By month, the projected number of military spaces to be lost and civilian spaces to be gained (cumulative) was as follows:

	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
Civilian Spaces Gained	565	1057	1461	1878	2434	3030
Military Spaces Lost	403	764	1062	1358	1759	2149

	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY
Civilian Spaces Gained	3455	3773	4065	4303	4439	4608
Military Spaces Lost	2465	2705	2907	3094	3201	3336

b. During the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969, a total of 1,285 Local National civilians were hired under this program bringing the actual number of civilians hired to 3,513 or 78 percent of the total objective of 4,608. This is as opposed to a projected figure of 3,773.

c. Problem areas encountered in the civilianization program were the national draft, competition for available personnel, and the widespread lack of basic skills. The use of female employees in positions normally considered as male positions has been encouraged and has helped alleviate the shortage of personnel. Project SKILLS II, a training program for Local Nationals, has also been implemented to provide employees with basic skills and a fundamental knowledge of the English language.

2. (U) Project SKILLS II.

a. The scheduled monthly civilianization of military spaces under Program Six necessitated the establishment of a Local National in-house training program to supplement the varied courses being offered in the Saigon-Long Binh area by the Central Training Institute (CTI), Office of the Civilian Personnel Director. Accordingly, Project SKILLS II was initiated on 2 October 1968.

b. Initially, the program is designed to teach those basic courses necessary for job accomplishment such as Conversational English, Basic Typing, and Material Handling Equipment Operator. Later, more advanced

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courses will be conducted (some intermediate and advanced courses are already in progress). Project SKILLS II is a joint effort using the combined resources of the support commands and the Area Civilian Personnel Offices. The CTI has provided support primarily in the Saigon-Long Binh area.

c. A synopsis of the progress of Project SKILLS II by support command is as follows:

(1) Saigon: Due to the extensive training facilities in Saigon and Long Binh, a large number of local National employees received by Saigon Support Command are already school trained. Forty-seven employees from Saigon Support Command are presently enrolled in courses offered by the CTI and 158 are receiving training through OJT programs. In the Vung Tau area the 53rd General Support Group established schools to train clerk-typists, auto mechanics, bus drivers, and painters. Twenty-nine students have received training in these schools.

(2) Cam Ranh Bay: At the time Project SKILLS II was initiated, reports received by this headquarters indicated that training requirements were greatest in the Cam Ranh area. It is in this area that the most comprehensive training program has been established. Training courses conducted are as follows:

Training Completed

<u>Number of Classes</u>	<u>Total Number of Employees</u>	<u>Course</u>	<u>Length</u>	<u>Conducted By</u>
2	14	MHE Operator	3 Weeks	USAD-CR
1	13	Card Punch Operator	3 Weeks	USAD-CR
2	60	Conversational English	6 Weeks	CPO
3	50	MHE Operator	2 Weeks	CPO/USAD-CR
1	1	Clerk Typist	8 Weeks	CTI
1	19	Advanced Clerk Typist	4 Weeks	CPO
2	34	Conversational English	6 Weeks	CPO/USASUPCOM

Training in Progress

<u>Number of Classes</u>	<u>Total Number of Employees</u>	<u>Course</u>	<u>Length</u>	<u>Conducted By</u>
1	25	Conversational English	8 Weeks	USAD-CR
1	10	Advanced English	8 Weeks	USAD-CR
2	8	MHE Operator	3 Weeks	USAD-CR

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<u>Number of Classes</u>	<u>Total Number of Employees</u>	<u>Course</u>	<u>Length</u>	<u>Conducted By</u>
1	5	Card Punch Operator	3 Weeks	USAD-CR
1	21	Basic Typing	9 Weeks	CPO
1	26	Intermediate Typing	4 Weeks	CPO
1	25	Conversational English	6 Weeks	CPO/USASUPCOM
1	25	Advanced Conversational English	6 Weeks	CPO/USASUPCOM

Training Planned

<u>Number of Classes</u>	<u>Total Number of Employees</u>	<u>Course</u>	<u>Length</u>	<u>Starting Date</u>	<u>Cond. By</u>
1	25	Conversational English	8 Weeks	Unk	USAD-CR
1	8	MHE Operator	3 Weeks	Unk	USAD-CR

(3) Qui Nhon: The 5th Transportation Command, the 19th S&S Co, and the 304th S&S Co are presently conducting large scale OJT programs for Local Nationals hired for heavy labor skills such as supply handlers, cargo handlers, warehousemen, etc. Twenty Local National employees have completed a military correspondence course and another class of twenty started on 20 January 1969. Two Local Nationals have completed a nursing aid training course. A class for twenty-five fork lift operators was scheduled to begin in the latter part of January and classes in English language and typing are scheduled to begin as soon as sufficient nominations are received.

(4) Da Nang: Approximately seventy Local National employees have been trained in supervisory development, English language, and basic typing courses offered by the Navy. A new training facility has just been established at China Beach. The depot at Da Nang is conducting OJT programs in supply procedures and basic warehousing. In addition, plans are being formulated for the establishment of basic English language courses at the depot. On 11 January 1969, representatives from the Naval Industrial Relations Department gave a 90 minute briefing on Civilian Personnel Management to representatives from Da Nang Support Command units employing civilians. Sixty people attended the briefing. USASUPCOM, Da Nang is receiving outstanding support from the Naval Support Activity.

ANNEX M (U) ACofS, PERSONNEL, Personnel Management Division

1. (U) Infusion.

a. From September to November 1968 the 1st Logistical Command received 25 Reserve/National Guard units totaling approximately 4,000 personnel. In order to prevent these units from leaving in mass as they had arrived, an infusion program was established. The personnel of these units had to be infused in such a manner that the unit's mission capability was not affected and that the units to be infused with would not have any rotational humps. The effect of infusion on the morale of the Reserve/National Guard units also was taken into consideration.

b. A tailored unit infusion plan was developed by the infusion officers of the support commands in conjunction with the 1st Logistical Command infusion officer and ACofS, Personnel. This infusion plan was designed to meet the problems involved with infusing the Reserve/National Guard units. To maintain each unit's mission capability the key personnel will be infused as late as possible. To help negate the effect on morale an exception was granted by Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam to their policy of 50% infusion by the end of the unit's sixth month in country. Also, a plan has been suggested whereby all Reserve/National Guard personnel would be returned to their original units for rotation. Careful attention was given to the selection of units to infuse with and in some cases units from outside the support command were selected to prevent rotational humps from developing.

c. A separate infusion plan was developed for each unit to insure maximum control of the infusion process and to maintain unit integrity as long as possible.

d. The 1st Logistical Command's tailored infusion plan took effect on 15 January 1969. To date there has been no reported infusion under this program; however, the command infusion officer will monitor the infusion process carefully to insure success.

2. (U) Noncommissioned Officers Logistics Program (NCOLP).

a. At midyear 1968, it was determined that new emphasis was needed on the Noncommissioned Officers Logistics Program (NCOLP). New positions were not being identified nor were personnel being requisitioned for the positions already approved.

b. New guidance in the form of Change # 22 to AR 600-20C updated the MOS's involved in the program and reemphasized the prerequisites

for entrance into the program. In order to get the NCOLP on the move the Commanding General directed all commanders and staff officers to review the key positions in their organizations, especially those which deal with major logistical missions, i.e., depot functions, division support functions, and other major supply and maintenance operating agencies.

c. In conjunction with the Commanding General's directive a publicity campaign was developed to emphasize the NCOLP. Flyers were printed and distributed to the support commands, fact sheets were written for presentation at command information classes, and an article was written for publication in the 1st Logistical Command Periodic Personnel Report.

d. As a result of the Commanding General's directive and the publicity program the depots at Qui Nhon, Saigon, and Cam Ranh Bay submitted 63 newly identified positions which were approved by the Department of the Army. This brought 1st Logistical Command's approved NCOLP positions up to 107. The NCOLP has been hampered by the fluctuation in the command's authorization documents. Some identified and recognized positions were abolished by changes in Tables of Distribution and Allowances and/or Tables of Organization and Equipment. Modified Tables of Distribution and Allowances and/or Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment action has created new positions not yet identified. As the situation stabilizes more positions will be identified and approved. The 1st Logistical Command has over 11,700 personnel assigned in the 23 pertinent MOS's. Not all of these can be NCOLP positions; however, the 107 figure is certainly too low. This point was presented to the support command Assistant Chiefs of Staff, Personnel at an ACofS, Personnel conference. Eight new positions have been added to those identified and are being forwarded to the Department of the Army for approval. The Adjutant General has and will continue to requisition personnel for the approved NCOLP positions.

3. (U) Operation Talent.

a. Operation Talent was established by the Commanding General's direction to identify Reserve/National Guard personnel with critical skills. As this is a voluntary program, personnel are reassigned only with their concurrence. Of the 412 personnel identified, 44 have been transferred to new assignments. The major problem involved is unit loyalty. These personnel arrived in Vietnam as a unit and most often prefer to remain with that unit. With the implementation of the infusion plan, however, an increase in Operation Talent reassignments may occur.

ANNEX N (U) ACoFS, PERSONNEL, Personnel Services Division

1. (U) Army Education Program.

a. The Command Education Program of General Educational Development (GED) faced many problems and challenges when it was first conceived and authorized within the command. This was the first time that educational activities were to be attempted during combat operations and many aspects of the program suffered as a result of low priorities and an adherence to mission-essential attitudes. However, with command support and diligence on the part of Education Services Officers (ESO), the rudiments of the program gave way to a firm, overall program designed to educate for change. Goals of the program are designed to take the man from his present educational level and move him, at his own speed, and at his own selection, from where he is to where he would like to be. This includes a completion of grade school, learning to read better, acquisition of skills for use in his MOS, completion of high school, college entrance tests, college resident coursework, completion of college degree work, and testing for entrance into graduate degree programs.

b. Education programs sustained by command support have shown good morale building possibilities. It is not enough that we provide policies and authorize use of funds for the GED program of military personnel on active duty. We must broaden and strengthen the opportunities so that our personnel may in a very real sense continue their education that may have been interrupted by military service. It has been shown that education is necessary, even in this unique counter-insurgency environment, for the following reasons:

- (1) Education enables the men to perform their military assignment more effectively.
- (2) Prepares them for advancement and retention.
- (3) Gives them the opportunity to continue their education.
- (4) Prepares them for continuing their education when released from the service.
- (5) Increases their value to the society in which they will live.

c. Army Education Centers (AEC) throughout the command were of poor quality and in many instances frequent moves and a worsening of mission problems caused AECs to be abandoned or used for other purposes. Portable buildings alleviated this condition and led to increased effort by newly

assigned ESOs to get a program under way. Participation climbed because at each AEC there is no shortage of military personnel who need and want our services and can benefit from them. The ratio of centers to the number of troops and the ratio of educators to the total troops, is much higher in Vietnam than it is in CONUS. Consequently, many AECs are crowded at certain periods and a real effort must be made to handle the number of men who wish to be served. This problem is being solved by a judicious assignment of professional educators at AECs where they can do the most good and accommodate the largest number of troops.

d. Each ESO has set individual goals for his AEC in consonance with the objectives set by higher headquarters. These goals must relate positively to the structure set by the 1st Logistical Command. The GED services plan set by AR 621-5 has been prepared by ESOs and includes their objectives and goals. Other instructions presented by the Education Director call for ESOs to devise policies and plans so as to give increased emphasis on certain areas that need improvement. These areas are as follows:

- (1) Participation by enlisted personnel without high school diplomas or with GT scores below 90.
- (2) MOS-related training for military personnel by means of group study classes.
- (3) Remedial courses for personnel who have failed parts of the HS GED.
- (4) Effective counseling for all incoming personnel concerning their plans for utilizing the educational facilities available.
- (5) Publicity and promotional efforts designed to acquaint 1st Logistical Command personnel with the advantages of participation in the GED program.

e. Each AEC must have a fully-qualified professional educator on duty overseeing the program and managing the educational plan designed to assist military personnel in reaching their educational goals. A foreign language capability is a distinct possibility for military personnel assigned to Vietnam. AECs are now equipped with language laboratories and language classes in several languages, are being conducted frequently. The fully-equipped language laboratories at Cam Ranh Bay are now giving conversational Vietnamese capabilities to approximately fifty persons each month.

f. Many high school academic subjects generally available in civilian schools are offered during off-duty hours at the AECs in the 1st Logistical Command. These courses are designed to prepare military personnel for completion of their high school requirements and for remedial

work prior to taking the high school equivalency tests. Some of the courses being offered are as follows: English I & II, Social Studies, Mathematics, General Science, Reading Improvement, Business Law, Algebra, and Government.

g. Courses in support of MOS-related programs are taught at most AECs and have had a commendable effect on the increase in skills acquired by military personnel. These courses include the following: Typing I & II, Mathematics, Computer Science, Auto Mechanics, and Fundamentals of Radio.

h. The college-resident course program includes classwork designed to enable military personnel to complete their two year college requirements or to finish their baccalaureate degree. Courses are offered through the special overseas branches of the University of Maryland and include the following: Business Administration, Economics, English, Government and Politics, History, Foreign Languages, Mathematics, Psychology, Sociology, and Speech.

i. Publicity has been found to be the one most effective means of getting information to the troops about the benefits and opportunities available in the 1st Logistical Command GED Program. To this end, all media have been employed on a continuing basis and include notices in official publications, signs, posters, flyers, handbills, cartoons, large base signs, radio, television, command briefings, commanders meetings, and personal interviews. The impetus given to the use of publicity assisted the 1st Logistical Command in increasing its participation rate starting with the first of a series of command-directed announcements made in 1968.

2. (U) Project Smart.

a. Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command Circular 700-1 is the basic document creating the Project Smart concept throughout the command and requires the establishment of Project Smart Councils in all units of battalions, groups, and support commands. Each Council is responsible for screening ideas submitted by members of the unit. Ideas of wider divergence are forwarded through channels for resolution.

b. The Council at Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command operates for all of the command under the intent of the circular. Its function for the Headquarters is contained in LC Memo 700-1. It is expected that ideas generated at battalions and groups would be passed to the Council at Headquarters for review and possible command-wide adoption.

c. Acceptable ideas are submitted on notes or letters or by telephone and then forwarded directly to the office of primary interest for review

and possible adoption. When an idea is determined to meet the criteria of the other suggestion-type programs, the Recorder is responsible for seeing to it that the originator of the suggestion gets the forms and instructions needed to make a formal input to the appropriate committee.

d. Publicity plans for Project Smart call for letters to all commanders, posters, and notices in daily bulletins. The Information Office has been asked to suggest means to increase the effectiveness of publicity for Project Smart.

3. (U) Accident Reduction.

a. A review of the 1st Logistical Command's accident statistics for October revealed that the command accident rates were higher than September as a result of Army motor vehicle accidents, burns, injuries, gunshot wounds, and drownings.

b. The following actions were implemented to reduce this unfavorable trend:

(1) This headquarters ordered a large quantity of safety education materials to be distributed to subordinate units.

(2) Safety was included in the Command Personnel Activity Review Board Meetings.

(3) Safety fact sheets were distributed at Commanders' Conferences.

(4) The month of January was designated for Project Safety "Up-Tight" to emphasize all aspects of safety throughout the command. Commanders were directed to implement stringent measures to reduce the number of accidents. Each support command and all units reporting to this headquarters were required to make daily telephonic reports to the Command Safety Officer reporting the number of recordable accidents and injuries.

(5) Command letters were sent to each major subordinate command, directing an all-encompassing and well-supervised Safety Program be implemented at the company and small unit level of command.

4. (U) Know Your Men.

a. Of the 11 principles of leadership, as outlined in FM 22-100, the most important one as it relates to morale and welfare is "Know Your Men, and look out for their welfare." Under the pressures of the combat environment in which men of this command live, this principle is not always abided by completely. Adherence to the principle of knowing your men and looking out for their welfare is most important at all times and

especially in a combat situation. Each and every individual in this command must know that someone is concerned with his welfare, that someone cares about him as an individual and not simply as a tool with which to get a mission accomplished. With complete adherence to this principle the incident and accident rate of the command should decrease, the morale and esprit de corps of the organization should increase, and a corresponding improvement in overall efficiency should be realized.

b. Policy: As a minimum, the following has been accomplished at all levels of command within the 1st Logistical Command from 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969.

(1) Each new member of an organization has received an initial briefing which explains the overall purpose of his being in the Republic of Vietnam, what morale and welfare activities exist for his benefit, and where he can go to solve any problems that might arise during his tour.

(2) Each soldier has been instructed as to who his leaders are, what his job is and how it fits in with the overall effort of the 1st Logistical Command in the Republic of Vietnam.

(3) An "open door" policy has been established to insure lines of communication are kept open between subordinates and commanders. Frequently, just the opportunity to discuss a problem is sufficient and many times will provide the soldier with a solution to his current difficulty. A leader is able to achieve a greater understanding of his men if he talks with them.

(4) Matters pertaining to an individual's vital needs have been explained to him. These items include pay, promotion, billeting, clothing, and messing. Any reasonable complaint, due to lack of efficiency or desire from personnel responsible to provide a service, is corrected by the commander concerned as soon as practicable.

(5) Each leader has been inculcated with the idea that he must know the needs of his men and must strive to satisfy these needs. Only in this way can a soldier be properly motivated to do his job. Job satisfaction and acceptance by groups and individuals are basic needs of most people.

c. Responsibilities.

(1) A Personnel Activities Review Board under the chairmanship of the Deputy Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, meets monthly to discuss trends in the area of morale and welfare, discipline, law and order and provides guidance to the commanders.

(2) Under the provisions of LC Reg 600-30, Character Guidance Councils have been organized down to battalion level in order to provide policy guidance related to Project Know Your Men.

(3) Under the provisions of LC Reg 28-9, Morale Councils have been organized down to battalion level in order to direct action in matters pertaining to Project Know Your Men. Under the guidance of Morale Councils, (LC Reg 600-20) NCO councils of E-5's, E-6's, and E-7's have been established at company level in order to provide information upon which the Morale Councils can act.

(4) Under the provisions of LC Reg 28-8, an Equal Opportunity Council has been organized at support command level and at those sub-area commands not collocated with a support command, to review actions pertaining to Project Know Your Men and to insure that they are adequate and impartially applied. Under the guidance of the Equal Opportunity Council, Watch Committees have been organized down to battalion level in order to police actions of personnel and to provide information upon which the Character Guidance, Morale, and Equal Opportunity Councils can act.

(5) Under the provisions of letter, AVCA GP-PS, this headquarters, Subject: Morale Survey Indicators, dated 30 September 1968, Morale Surveys of all units down to company level are being maintained at all levels up to support command in order to provide commanders with immediate information concerning the morale and welfare of the men under their command.

(6) The chart at the Appendix indicates the relationships of councils and committees discussed above and the channels of communication between them.

d. Procedures.

(1) Character Guidance Councils meet once each month. Minutes are forwarded through channels to reach this headquarters NLT the 15th of each month.

(2) Minutes of Morale Council meetings incorporate the minutes of NCO councils and are forwarded through channels to reach this headquarters NLT the 10th of each month.

(3) Minutes of Equal Opportunity Council meetings and Watch Committee meetings are forwarded to reach this headquarters NLT the 25th of each month.

(4) In all cases, problems of immediate importance are sent to this headquarters as they occur.

ANNEX O (C) AGofS, PERSONNEL, Civil Affairs Division

1. (U) The civil affairs activities of the 1st Logistical Command are designed to provide technical and material support to the Government of South Vietnam in its effort to rebuild the nation. The activities are designed to improve the living conditions of the population and to gain and maintain the loyalty of the people for their government. The civil affairs activities of this command include both civic action and community relation type programs. These programs are long-term in nature and consequently the results can't be measured on a periodic basis to show the exact degree of achievement. Primarily, these programs are designed to encourage the Vietnamese people to "help themselves." Special programs which this command has initiated are discussed in the following paragraphs.

2. (U) The program designed to support Vietnamese Scouting is continuing to develop as a larger number of Vietnamese youths are being reached. The objectives of the program are: to promote the development of leadership, national identity, and social consciousness among the Vietnamese youth; to encourage cooperation and mutual understanding between the Government of South Vietnam and the youth of the nation; and, to assist in the development and strengthening of the Vietnamese Boy Scout Association and to encourage its participation in construction, social action, and nation building activities. The Vietnamese Boy Scout Association provides an excellent opportunity to assist the Vietnamese in developing a stable future through the development of their youth. Presently, there are 42 Explorer, Boy, Girl, and Cub Scout Troops being supported by this command. The support of scouting, as well as other youth activities, is an area for which this command is well suited due to the large number of military personnel with scouting and youth activity backgrounds and because of the stabilized locations of the logistical base areas.

3. (U) A second program which this command has developed is that of providing support for the Vietnamese Animal Husbandry Program. In the past, when foodstuff was condemned by the veterinary food inspectors, it was taken to the sanitary fill area and destroyed. In many instances the condemned food was fit for human consumption. However, due to its storage, the taste and appearance had reached a point where it no longer met the standards established in AR 40-656. The animal husbandry program consists of donating the condemned foodstuffs from ports and the edible waste from mess halls to the Vietnamese for animal consumption. The Vietnamese are presently establishing Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) military farms for the purpose of providing proteins which can be used to supplement the soldiers diet. The main reason for the success and growth of this program is that the logistical base areas have a continuous

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supply of condemned foodstuff as well as large quantities of edible garbage from its numerous mess halls. Thus the command is in a position to contribute significantly to the development of the animal husbandry program. In addition to the ARVN farms, there are numerous small farm cooperatives and institutions engaged in small scale animal raising within the vicinity of the logistical base areas.

4. (C) The Long Binh Post People-to-People Program, which was implemented in September of 1967, has continued to progress as planned. The US Army Support Command, Saigon is responsible for 48 hamlets with a population of 153,000 people in the Cong Thanh and Duc Tu Districts of the Bien Hoa Province. The program, designed to create a friendly buffer around the Long Binh area, involves weekly hamlet visits and the conduct of an intensive civic action program in the districts adjacent to the Long Binh area.

5. (C) As an outgrowth of the success of the Long Binh People-to-People Program, this headquarters has developed a similar program for the major logistical base areas throughout the country. This plan, which was implemented in USARV OPLAN 81-68 (Campaign Plan) and LC OPLAN 1-68, gives responsibility to this headquarters for the coordination of all military civic action conducted by subordinate commands and other USARV units located within major logistical base areas. This includes support commands, sub-area commands, and contiguous population centers within a minimum radius of 11,000 meters. The program was put into effect on 1 May 1968 and initial reports indicate that the program is progressing well. The program has reduced duplication of effort and waste of resources, two of the main problems in the past.

6. (U) The command civil affairs statistics for the period were as follows:

a. Total number of man-days (10 hours) personnel of units engaged in civic action activities: 7,582

b. Cost of civic action projects:

(1) Cost of supplies contributed from military resources for civic action projects: 12,682,504 \$VN

(2) Expenditures from the US/FMAF Civic Action PSYWAR Fund: 1,349,453 \$VN

c. Voluntary contributions:

(1) Collections: 2,814,846 \$VN

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(2) Expenditures in support of civic action: 3,227,757 \$VN

d. Percent of US Military civic action activities conducted jointly with:

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CRB</u>	<u>QNH</u>	<u>DNG</u>
Other FMMAF	13.5%	43.3%	18.0%	0.0%
RVNAF	15.0%	9.0%	11.0%	0.0%
US Civilian Voluntary Agencies	5.0%	3.0%	4.0%	5.0%

e. Average percent of self-help contributed by the people:

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CRB</u>	<u>QNH</u>	<u>DNG</u>
Self-help Labor	85.0%	64.0%	71.3%	90.0%
Materials furnished	15.0%	10.0%	27.0%	5.0%

f. Major civic action programs:

	<u>Man-Days</u>	<u>\$VN</u>
Economic	590	3,379,750
Education	833	2,345,450
Social Welfare	4,725	6,701,800
Transportation	304	595,843
Refugee Assistance Support	1,328	4,967,186

g. Number of separate institutions assisted during the reporting period:

(1) Schools	171
(2) Hospitals/Dispensaries	66
(3) Orphanages	110
(4) Market Place	1
(5) Playground	1
(6) Poorhouse	2
(7) Church	5
(8) Seminary	3

(9) Boy Scout Troop	5
(10) Bridge Construction	4
(11) Village Offices	1
(12) Meeting Hall	2
(13) Water Works	1
(14) Leprosarium	1

h. Educational efforts:

(1) Classes:

<u>Class</u>	<u>Number of Classes</u>	<u>Total Students</u>
English	100	1,866
Motor Mechanics	6	120

(2) Training:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Total Students</u>
Nurses Aides	13
Machine Operator	58
Husbandry	32
Mechanics	320
Health Technician	11
Laborer	66
Painter	3
Maintenance Personnel	60
Kitchen Helper	21
Interpreter	5
Cook	6
Carpenter	15

i. Out of the 453 construction projects completed during the reporting period, 44 of them were joint US/FMAF projects.

j. Commodities distributed:

(1) Building materials:

(a) Cement (lbs)	567,234
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(b) Tin Sheets (ea)	2,361
(c) Lumber (bd ft)	1,968,504
(d) Paint (gal)	577
(e) Fire Wood (lbs)	69,100
(f) Bricks (ea)	50
(g) Metal Grates (ea)	36,900
(h) Sand (mtr)	278
(i) Nails (lbs)	4,414
(j) Kibbar (ft)	7,000
(k) Scrap Canvas (lb)	1,000
(l) Cabinets (ea)	7
(m) Gravel (mtr)	31
(n) Pipe (ft)	1,140
(o) Poles (30' x 12") (ea)	50
(p) Potable Water (gal)	9,000
(q) Trash Barrels (ea)	100
(r) Chairs (ea)	406
(2) Kits distributed (health, school, and refugee)	3,755
(3) Food (lbs)	270,514
(4) Clothing (lbs)	19,696
(5) Health Items (soap, toothpaste, etc.)	5,743
(6) Agricultural Tools (ea)	49

(7) Others:	
(a) Rat Poison (lbs)	25
(b) Shots (ea)	
1 Rabies	307
2 Plague	705
(c) Swill (gal)	4,700
(d) MEDCAP (no. patients treated)	1,265
(e) VETCAP (no. animals treated)	35
(f) Edible Garbage (lbs)	2,158,000
(g) Blankets (ea)	50
(h) Radios (ea)	200

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ANNEX P (C) ADJUTANT GENERAL

1. (U) Technical inspections of eleven postal units were completed to determine whether operations were being conducted in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and directives. Data concerning these inspections are at Inclosure two.
2. (U) On 21 January 1969 the 39th Base Post Office (BPO) assumed control of Army Post Office (APO) 96204 from the Air Force. The APO was re-classified from an operational APO to Mail Address Only (MAO). The 39th BPO provides complete postal service at MAO 96204 (Dalat).
3. (U) APO 96309 (MACV Annex), MAO 96222 (MACV HQ) and APO 96243 (Cholon) will be transferred from Air Force to Army control on 1 March 1969. Personnel were assigned to both Air Force APOs on 4 January 1969 to learn the postal operation at these locations and to assist in the transfer of this postal responsibility to the 1st Logistical Command. Attached as Inclosure three is a listing of postal activities for which the Adjutant General, 1st Logistical Command, has technical operational control.
4. (C) Rotational losses data is attached at Inclosure four.
5. (C) The command strength report is at Inclosure five.
6. (U) The command enlisted promotion statistics are at Inclosure six.
7. (U) Reenlistment data are attached at Inclosure seven.
8. (U) Command casualty figures are attached at Inclosure eight.
9. (U) Command awards and decoration figures are attached at Inclosure nine.
10. (U) Command morale and welfare programs are attached at Inclosure ten.
11. (U) Command critical MOS's are attached as Inclosure eleven.


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ANNEX Q (U) ACofS, PROCUREMENT


1. (U) A total of 376 FY 69 Purchase Requests and Commitments (PR&C's) valued at \$4.6 million was processed during the period. Of these, 185 valued at \$4.1 million were assigned to Contracting Officers at this agency. A total of 120 PR&C's valued at \$.3 million was forwarded to CONUS, and 71 valued at \$.2 million were forwarded to various WESTPAC agencies. The following charts give a graphical representation of the Purchase Request and Commitments activity for FY 67 - 69 and Requirements Distribution for FY 69.

JS ARMY PROCUREMENT AGENCY, VIETNAM PURCHASE REQUEST & COMMITMENTS RCY'D




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
PURCHASE REQUEST & COMMITMENT DISTRIBUTION




DISTRIBUTION OF REQUIREMENTS




2. (U) The number of contracts administered during the quarter dropped to a fiscal year low on 31 January 1969 of 226 with a value of \$598.3 million. There was a total of 107 contractors: 20 of which were US, 12 third country national, and 75 local national. Four contracts were terminated. Two were partially terminated for default, one was completely terminated for default, and one was terminated for convenience. The total number of contracts under administration has decreased during the reporting quarter primarily because of vigorous management emphasis on the retirement of inactive contracts. The following series of graphs show the contract activity since 1 July 1968 (precise figures for the reporting quarter are indicated).




CONTRACTS UNDER ADMINISTRATION
ACTIVE VS INACTIVE




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
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


CONTRACTS UNDER ADMINISTRATION
ACTIVE VS INACTIVE





CONTRACTS UNDER ADMINISTRATION
ACTIVE





3. (U) The number of US invited contractor personnel rose to a FY 69 high of 32,521 on 31 December 1968. (figures for January 1969 were not available at time of preparation of this report). 1st and 2nd quarter FY 69 figures are depicted graphically hereafter. The number of firms (graphically shown below) on the source list has decreased sharply during the reporting period due to the screening efforts of the Facilities Division to eliminate non-responsive and non-responsible sources. A concerted effort has been made to improve relations with contractors. The Large Purchases Branch has instituted contractor orientation sessions designed to clarify required procedures, and to explain complex contractual clauses. These sessions (conducted primarily for local national contractors) are generally followed by question and answer periods, during which time specific problem areas are discussed.

CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL (US INVITED CONTRACTORS)



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ANNEX R (C) T-DAY PLANNING

1. (C) With the increased emphasis on T-Day Planning a special planning staff consisting of three officers and two enlisted men was established on 15 November 1968. In addition, the Freighter Cargo Council which had been established earlier was reorganized and expanded. This Council, consisting of representatives from each major staff section, was formed to provide a primary point of contact in each section for T-Day matters. A single point of contact between the T-Day Planning Group and each support command was established. This contact has the responsibility of keeping his command informed of policies, concepts, problems peculiar to his command and for the coordination of responses to this headquarter's request for specific information and requirements. During the period 15 November 1968 to 31 January 1969 primary effort was concentrated on developing and refining force packages for several alternative situations; schedules; concepts; and long lead time actions required such as facilities, equipment, and other materials. Working conferences were held at this headquarters with support command representatives which resulted in the determination of facilities, equipment, and requirements necessary for T-Day. These requirements were further broken out as those required at present and would enhance the operational posture at T-Day, and those that are not absolutely necessary now, but which will be required for T-Day. Both categories of construction projects have or are being processed thru normal command/Engineer channels. Equipment requirements, over and above those presently on requisition, which will be necessary for T-Day for each support command are being requisitioned by this headquarters. As of the end of the period, no complete and final plan had been received from any higher headquarters although certain draft annexes had been received for comment.

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ANNEX S (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL

1. (U) Inspector General assistance was extended to 443 members of the command. Approximately 57% of the requests for assistance received concerned dissatisfaction with assignment, disciplinary matters, promotion and pay. Of the 60 complaints processed, 22 were justified. There were 90 Annual General Inspections conducted. A total of 5 units received a rating of unsatisfactory. Supply, maintenance, training and security continued to be major areas of interest.

2. (U) Annual General Inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated:

IG, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment US Army Support Command, Da Nang	7-9 November 1968
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay	20-22 November 1968
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 26th General Support Group	5-6 December 1968
Headquarters & Headquarters Company US Army Subarea Command, Qui Nhon	18-20 December 1968
576th Ordnance Company (Ammo)	7 January 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 3rd Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)(DS)	8-9 January 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 1st Logistical Command (Pre AGI)	15 January 1969
5th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat)	22 January 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 159th Transportation Battalion (Tml)	23-24 January 1969
533rd Ordnance Detachment (EDC)	29 January 1969

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IG USASC, SAIGON

536th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (GS)	1-2 November 1968
62nd Transportation Company (Mdm Trk)	5-6 November 1968
Harborcraft Company	5-6 November 1968
7th Finance Section (Disb)	8-9 November 1968
Company E, US Army Depot LEN, Troop Comd	12-13 November 1968
506th Supply & Service Company (DS)	15-16 November 1968
86th Transportation Company (Mdm Trk)	19-20 November 1968
124th Transportation Company	19-20 November 1968
10th Finance Section (Disb)	20-23 November 1968
Company D, US Army Depot LEN, Troop Comd	26-27 November 1968
321st Transportation Company (Mdm Trk)	29-30 November 1968
758th Supply & Service Company	3-4 December 1968
Company C, US Army Depot LEN, Troop Comd	6-7 December 1968
590th Maintenance Support Company	10-11 December 1968
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 11th Transportation Battalion	10-11 December 1968
352nd Transportation Company	17-18 December 1968
490th Supply & Service Company	20-21 December 1968
378th Maintenance Support Company	27-28 December 1968
5th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	7-8 January 1969
228th Supply & Service Company	10-11 January 1969
Company F, US Army Depot LEN, Troop Comd	14-15 January 1969
536th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company	17-18 January 1969

528th Quartermaster Company	21-22 January 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Company US Army Support Command, Saigon (Pre AGI)	23-25 January 1969

IG, USASC, QUI NHON

13th Finance Section (Disb)	4 November 1968
98th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	8 November 1968
554th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	20 November 1968
527th Personnel Service Company	21 November 1968,
2nd Transportation Company (Med Trk)	5 December 1968
160th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company	6 December 1968
661st Ordnance Company (Ammo)	10 December 1968
597th Transportation Company (Med Trk)	8 January 1969
552nd Light Equipment Maintenance Company	10 January 1969
630th Ordnance Company (Ammo)	16 January 1969
359th Transportation Company (Med Trk)	21 January 1969
64th Transportation Company (Med Trk)	22 January 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 62nd Maintenance Battalion	23 January 1969
618th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company	24 January 1969

IG, USASC, CAM RANH BAY

Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 10th Transportation Battalion	11 November 1968
116th Transportation Company	12 November 1968
123rd Transportation Company	12 November 1968
155th Transportation Company	13 November 1968

870th Transportation Company	14 November 1968
97th Transportation Company	15 November 1968
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 191st Ordnance Battalion	10 December 1968
33rd Ordnance Company	11 December 1968
606th Ordnance Company	12 December 1968
174th Ordnance Detachment	12 December 1968
611th Ordnance Company	13 December 1968
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 262nd Quartermaster Battalion	26-27 January 1969
524th Quartermaster Company	28 January 1969
525th Quartermaster Company	29 January 1969

IG, USASC, DA NANG

74th Repair Parts Company	12 November 1968
578th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	18 November 1968
515th Transportation Company	19 November 1968
585th Transportation Company	25 November 1968
596th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	3 December 1968
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 57th Transportation Battalion	4 December 1968
625th Supply & Service Company	5 December 1968
329th Transportation Company	16 December 1968
178th Maintenance Company (Div)(DS)	6 January 1969
588th Maintenance Company (Div)(DS)	13 January 1969
156th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company	16 January 1969

85th Light Equipment Maintenance Company

20 January 1969

Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment
39th Transportation Battalion

29 January 1969

3. (U) Complaints and Request for Assistance.

The following is a summary of complaints and request for assistance received by Inspectors General, 1st Logistical Command, during the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969, computed on the basis of the rate per 1,000 troops per month.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COMPLAINTS</u>		<u>REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE</u>
	<u>JUSTIFIABLE</u>	<u>UNJUSTIFIABLE</u>	
HQ, 1st Logistical Command	0.4	0.0	6.0
USASC, Saigon	0.2	0.3	2.8
USASC, Qui Nhon	0.0	0.3	2.6
USASC, Da Nang	0.2	0.4	2.6
USASC, Cam Ranh Bay	0.0	0.1	3.0

3. The following investigations and ~~inquiries~~ were conducted:

- a. Inquiry into allegation of SP5 Hill concerning unjust treatment.
- b. Inquiry into conditions at Tuy Hoa Subarea Command.
- c. Inquiry into Watercraft Operations in the Delta.
- d. Inquiry into promotions at US Army Support Command, Da Nang.

ANNEX T (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

1. (U) The amount paid for claims within this command during the past quarter showed a decrease over the previous quarter. A total of \$27,348.02 was paid for personal property claims of United States military personnel and civilians. In addition, judge advocates throughout the command handled 5146 legal assistance cases, including the preparation of correspondence and instruments.

2. (U) Court-martial rates (per 1000) changed as follows from the previous quarter: Summary court-martial rates increased from .81 to 1.04; special court-martial rates increased from 3.02 to 3.09; and general court-martial rates decreased from .11 to .07; Article 15 rates decreased from 27.07 to 23.63 per 1000. Confinement rates decreased the last quarter over the previous quarter.

3. (U) Nonjudicial punishment: The following figures represent the number of Article 15 actions imposed by the command during the period 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969.

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ 1ST LOG COMD	17	16	5	38
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	574	491	467	1532
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	327	223	223	773
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	319	318	368	1005
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>106</u>	<u>131</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>329</u>
Totals	1343	1179	1155	3677

4. (U) Supervisory review of inferior courts-martial: In the past quarter, this office reviewed the following number of inferior courts-martial cases received from subordinate units for correctness in law and facts:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Special Courts-Martial	146	133	106	385
Summary Courts-Martial	<u>39</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>134</u>
Totals	185	171	163	519

5. (U) Courts-Martial: The following is a breakdown of cases tried by courts-martial during the past quarter:

a. <u>General Courts-Martial</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ 1ST LOG COMD	0	0	0	0
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	5	0	4	9

<u>General Courts-Martial</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	0	0	0	0
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	1	0	1	2
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	6	0	5	11
b. <u>Special Courts-Martial</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ 1ST LOG COMD	0	1	0	1
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	73	69	65	207
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	15	29	16	60
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	53	73	64	190
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>7</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>29</u>
Totals	148	184	155	487
c. <u>Summary Courts-Martial</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ 1ST LOG COMD	0	0	0	0
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	21	38	37	96
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	5	2	8	15
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	17	17	8	42
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>
Totals	43	61	56	160

6. (U) Courts-martial rates per 1000 military personnel are furnished for the fiscal year as indicated:

	<u>1st Log Comd</u> (2d qtr, FY 69)	<u>USARV</u> (2d qtr, FY 69)	<u>Army Wide</u> (1st qtr, FY 69)
General Courts-Martial	.08	.10	.13
Special Courts-Martial	3.12	1.94	3.24
Summary Courts-Martial	.88	.51	.68

7. (U) The following figures represent claims paid to members of this command for property lost, destroyed or damaged incident to service under the provisions of AR 27-21 and AR 27-29:

	<u>NOV 68</u>	<u>DEC 68</u>	<u>JAN 69</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Number of claims paid	84	63	43	190
Amount claimed	\$16,150.80	\$8,799.04	\$7,255.30	\$32,205.14
Amount Paid	\$13,521.78	\$8,115.37	\$6,210.87	\$27,848.02

8. (U) Legal Assistance: The following is a breakdown of legal assistance problems handled during the period 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969.

	<u>Interviews</u>	<u>Instruments Prepared</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Adoption and change of name	70	11	81
Citizenship, Immigration & Passport	159	16	175
Civil Rights	32	0	32
Depositions	21	3	24
Domestic Relations & Paternity	700	136	836
Nonsupport	195	14	209
Notarizations	135	137	272
Personal Finances & Debts	312	31	343
Personal Property, Auto	150	52	202
Powers of Attorney	416	616	1,032
Real Property, Sales	91	22	113
Taxation	128	22	150
Torts	65	8	73
Wills and Estates	73	93	166
Miscellaneous	<u>1,149</u>	<u>289</u>	<u>1,438</u>
TOTALS	3,696	1,450	5,146

ANNEX U (U) PROVOST MARSHAL

1. (U) The CIC, Port Security and Waterways Detail, Provost Marshal's Office, this Headquarters, has drafted LC Reg 190-35 to provide specific responsibilities and general guidance for the security of ports and waterways. This regulation consolidates all existing regulations, directives, and policies pertaining to water security, threats and countermeasures, fire protection, safe cargo storage, control of merchant seamen, and coordination of specific tasks.

2. (U) Prior to November 1968, the 1st Logistical Command had Staff Provost Marshals established in only two of the four Support Commands, Saigon Support Command and Da Nang Support Command. The absence of Staff Provost Marshals in the Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands has been a recognized problem area for some time, but a lack of qualified officers to fill these staff vacancies prevented earlier establishment. In November 1968, a Staff Provost Marshal was assigned to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command. Effective 1 February 1969, a Staff Provost Marshal became operational at Qui Nhon Support Command. With a full complement of Support Command Provost Marshals, the necessary depth and support in the physical security field has been provided for the commanders. These Provost Marshals provide the commanders with expert advice and assistance in all facets of physical security, control and security of sensitive installations and ports, and at operational levels of Command.

ANNEX V (U) STAFF CHAPLAIN

1. (U) As of 31 January 1969 the 1st Logistical Command had 72 authorized TOE/TD spaces for chaplains. There were 69 chaplains present for duty of which 1 is Jewish, 54 are Protestant and 14 are Catholic. The number of chaplains assigned to the 1st Logistical Command has increased by eight. As a result, we have increased worship services by 18 percent.
2. (U) More emphasis has been placed on personal contact on a man to man basis in the chaplain program. In order to accomplish this end, each chaplain of the command made a particular effort to move into the depots, the motor pools, and the pier areas.
3. (U) Many chaplains have expressed dissatisfaction with the supply system for ecclesiastical items. The basic fault lies in the fact that many chaplains are unfamiliar with the mechanics of the Army Supply System. By way of familiarizing chaplains with the supply system the staff chaplain has set up a supply briefing for each chaplain arriving in country. In addition, chaplains from the 1st Logistical Command and Support Command Depot Chaplains conduct classes at chaplain training conferences throughout the Republic of Vietnam.
4. (U) Chaplains in I Corps were experiencing difficulties in obtaining such expendable items as candles, grape juice, and wine. The difficulty came principally from the inconvenience of a long trip to the depot at Qui Nhon to pick up these hand carry items. By way of solving this problem our commodity manager has arranged to keep a limited stock of wine, grape juice, and candles at the Da Nang Support Command, thereby locating these supplies close to the users in I Corps.
5. (U) A survey of the 192 chapels in Vietnam was completed. The result of this study led to a lowering of the Requisition Objectives (RO's) for 50% of the items of ecclesiastical supply. Most of these chapels are already well equipped, and therefore the future demand will be less than what has been needed in the past.
6. (U) A chrome plating project of brass altar-ware was 71% complete by the end of January.

ANNEX W (U) INFORMATION OFFICE

1. The hometown radio tape program underwent considerable changes in the month of November. In order to better utilize personnel and considerably reduce travel time, it was decided that one broadcast specialist would be placed in each of the four Support Command Information Offices on a permanent basis. The decentralization was accomplished by the first week of December.
2. Several important news events occurred in November and December that required special coverage. Interest was expressed by ten to fifteen media representatives in the traditional Thanksgiving and Christmas Dinner to be served to troops in Vietnam. Among the representatives requesting information and interviews were United Press International (UPI), Metromedia, Empire News, and Columbia Broadcasting System. There was also a special release on the same subject prepared and distributed through the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Saigon.
3. Arrival of the "Santa Claus Special Ship," in Vietnam in mid-December was covered by wire service and motion picture at Da Nang. The ship carried tons of Christmas gifts for troops serving in Vietnam. A photographer-reporter team was sent from the Headquarters Information Office to Da Nang to assist in the coverage of that arrival.
4. The Headquarters Information Office furnished one officer and one enlisted man to form a press section for the Annual Bob Hope Show visit in the month of December. The press officer acted as liaison between members of the show and military and civilian press representatives. The first show held at Long Binh Post attracted some 50 correspondents from the Saigon Press Corps. The 1st Logistical Command Information Officer was appointed by USARV to act as host for the visiting press.
5. The second edition of the 1st Logistical Command Magazine was edited and taken to Tokyo in November. Final proof copies were returned to Tokyo in December for printing. More than 80,000 copies were printed and shipped to arrive in Vietnam in late January. Distribution was made on a 1 to 1 basis for all personnel. Additional copies of the magazine will be kept on hand to be distributed to new arrivals in the command. Arrangements have been made with the printers for additional copies to be printed if necessary.
6. A total of 857 news stories and captioned photos were released to more than 50 news media (Significant general news releases are listed in Paragraph 7). All releases and photographs received from subordinate commands are reviewed to insure quality and completeness. Continued emphasis is placed on quality and propriety of news copy, highlighting the need for reporting in depth, newsworthy events and activities.

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>	<u>FROM</u>
7. New Zealanders Build Sanctuary For Montagnard Refugees	News w/ photos	Civic action project--New Zealand Red Cross volunteers supply food, medical aid and shelter for refugees.	QNH
First Log Supplies the Milk	Feature w/photos	Describes work done throughout Command to increase and improve production of milk for soldiers in RVN.	HQS
Operation "TACT"	Feature w/photos	Describes use of assistance teams to cut waste of ammunition issued by 184th Ord Bn.	QNH
Reserves Make Convoy Run	Feature	Describes typical convoy run by reserve unit at CRB.	CRB
Santa Claus Arrives in Vietnam	Feature w/photos	Describes Santa Claus distributing gifts to soldiers in I Corps from Santa's Special Ship.	DNC
Don Bosco School	Feature w/photos	Describes work done by departing civilian for Vietnamese trade school in Saigon.	HQS
Bob Hope Show '68	News w/ photo	Describes kick-off of Bob Hope tour with performance at Long Binh.	HQS
Doughboys of Long Binh	Feature w/photos	Describes work of bread bakers of 266th Supply and Service Bn.	SSC
Calibration Team	Feature w/photos	Describes work of 177th Ord Detachment--artillery calibration unit.	HQS
Anatomy of an Ambush	Feature w/photos	Describes sequence of ambush near Dau Tieng in December.	SSC

8. The Command Information Division distributed two Troop Topics and one Quarterly Guidance Letter.

TITLE

Personal Security

Command Information Guidance,
Third Quarter, FY 1969

R&R Facts

SYNOPSIS

Outlines basic security procedures
to insure personal safety.

Specified topics to be covered.

Summarizes main features of the
several R&R locations available.

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ANNEX I (C) SIGNAL OFFICE

1. (C) The facility for Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) for the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command became operational in early November 1968. The AUTOSEVOCOM equipment at Cam Ranh Bay Support Command is operational and the booth is scheduled to be completed in early February 1969. At Qui Nhon and Da Nang Support Commands, the facilities are completed and awaiting activation. AUTOSEVOCOM provides secure voice communications between the headquarters and the support commands in addition to other major commands throughout Vietnam. It will eventually provide access to world-wide secure voice communications.

2. (U) Installation of key telephone systems at the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and the United States Army Depot, Long Binh has been delayed due to improper routing of the equipment. The equipment for the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command key telephone system is considered lost and a report of survey and reordering will be accomplished during February 1969. The equipment for the United States Army Depot, Long Binh, key telephone system is in the depot at Long Binh. The depot has been notified and is making efforts to locate the equipment. The date for installation of either system cannot be determined at this time.

3. (U) Work on the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command Communications Center (ComCenter) was completed on 1 November 1968. The ComCenter became operational on 6 November 1968 with full duplex teletype circuits to the support commands at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang. A full duplex teletype circuit is also scheduled to Long Binh Area ComCenter thus giving the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command ComCenter world-wide routing capabilities. Through the use of the ComCenter, the handling time for teletype traffic to the three mentioned support commands has been greatly reduced. Activation of world-wide routing will also reduce handling time for teletype traffic to the United States.

4. (C) The Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command Inspector General Team conducting a survey of watercraft activities in the delta on 2 December through 10 December 1969 pointed out a need for improvement in the communications system used by the 159th Transportation Battalion. A communications study was made and it was determined that the radio, AN/SRC-32, presently being used was not adequate for the job. The study also revealed that a possible solution would be FM retransmission. As a result of several staff visits by members of this office and Saigon Support Command Signal Office then supervised the requisitioning of the equipment needed to establish the FM Command and Control Net for the 159th Transportation Battalion. The equipment should be completely installed by March 1969. The FM Command and Control Net when established will, through retransmission, provide the Headquarters, 159th Transportation Battalion continuous communications with all their boats and harbor masters in the delta.

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5. (C) A program to monitor the telephones of the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command was initiated by the 3rd platoon 101st Radio Research Company in December 1968. The monitoring conducted by the 3rd platoon revealed several communications security (COMSEC) violations. Action was taken and is being taken on a continuous basis to remind personnel of this command that they, individually, are responsible for COMSEC. It is felt that these continuing efforts will make this command security conscientious reducing security violations.

6. (C) An evaluation of HF frequencies used by this command was initiated at the beginning of November 1968. The procedure used in this evaluation was first to obtain a frequency utilization report from all support commands and civilian concerns which obtain frequencies through the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. Secondly, a complete HF frequency authorization was obtained from the United States Army, Vietnam. These two lists of frequencies were compared and the support commands and civilian concerns were then given a complete reauthorization of HF frequencies from this headquarters. This reevaluation has eliminated unauthorized and unused HF frequencies in the 1st Logistical Command.

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(U) CRITICAL MOS's

GROUP I - Critical because of long training lead time (Hard Skill)

<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>PCT</u>
04C Expert Linguist	15	9	60
26C Combat Area Surveillance Radar Repairman	62	44	70
45Z Armament Maintenance Foreman	99	58	58
53B Oxygen-Acetylene Production Specialist	69	48	69
53C Carbon Dioxide Hydrogen Production Specialist	20	5	25
76V Equipment Storage Specialist	1825	1083	59
76X Subsistence Storage Specialist	532	347	65
92C Petroleum Laboratory Specialist	85	60	70

GROUP II - Critical due to large numbers involved (Soft Skill)

45A Armament Maintenance Apprentice	121	18	14
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<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTB</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>PCT</u>
55A	1627	308	19
Ammunition Apprentice			
55B	1209	1379	114
TOTAL	2836	1687	59
55F	32	14	43
Missile and Rocket Explosive Specialist			
57A	3968	644	16
Duty Soldier			
57H	1180	1218	103
TOTAL	5148	1862	36
63A	1260	279	22
Mechanical Maintenance Apprentice			
63B	1205	1731	143
63C	1831	1226	67
TOTAL	4296	3236	75
64A	2241	3213	143
Light Vehicle Driver			
64B	6103	3676	60
TOTAL	8344	6889	83
71M	687	559	81
Movements Specialist			
71T	140	35	25
Maintenance Data Specialist			
76A	2669	1296	48
Supplyman			
76P	2730	3808	139
TOTAL	5399	5094	94

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UNIT
0185 CS Ba Hq Maint Spt Co
0610 CS Ba Hq Maint Spt Co
002 CS Ba Hq Maint Spt Co
0266 CS Ba S4S HHC
0490 CS Co Gen Sup
0061 CS Co HEM
0140 CS Co HEM
0536 CS Co HEM
0003 CS Co Maint DS/D1v
0094 CS Co Maint DS/D1v
0590 CS Co Maint DS/D1v
0238 CS Co Maint DS/D1v
0051 CS Co Lt Maint
0548 CS Co Lt Maint
0549 CS Co Lt Maint
0551 CS Co Lt Maint
0005 CS Co LEM
0483 CS Co Pld Svc
0228 CS Co S4S
0229 CS Co S4S
0506 CS Co S4S
0758 CS Co S4S
0352 TC Co Lt Trk
0029 CS Cp GS
0053 CS Cp GS

USASUPCOM SCN UNITS AFFECTED BY
PHASE III STANDARDIZATION

TOE	DEPSTAR	STAND	REQUIRED
	STR	STR	DATE
29-206F	249	275	14 Mar 69
29-206F	249	275	14 Mar 69
29-206F	288	275	14 Mar 69
29-216G	117	117	14 Mar 69
29-118G	214	214	31 Mar 69
29-137F	292	0 INAC	15 Apr 69
29-137F	292	0 INAC	15 Apr 69
29-137F	213	0 INAC	15 Apr 69
29-138F	175	180	15 Apr 69
29-138F	175	180	15 Apr 69
29-138F	175	180	15 Apr 69
29-207F	175	183	15 Apr 69
29-207F	154	183	15 Apr 69
29-207F	154	183	15 Apr 69
29-207F	154	183	15 Apr 69
29-134G	258	206	15 Apr 69
29-114G	305	305	15 Apr 69
29-217G	233	233	15 Apr 69
29-217G	233	233	15 Apr 69
29-217G	233	233	15 Apr 69
29-217G	233	233	15 Apr 69
55-28G	179	0 INAC	15 Apr 69
29-102F	92	99	30 Apr 69
29-102F	103	99	30 Apr 69

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USASUPCOM CRB UNITS AFFECTED BY
PHASE III STANDARDIZATION

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOE</u>	<u>DEPSTAR</u> <u>STR</u>	<u>STAND</u> <u>STR</u>	<u>REQUESTED</u> <u>DATE</u>
0069 CS Bn RHD	29-136G	52	55	14 Mar 69
0557 CS Co Lt Maint	29-207F	154	183	15 Apr 69
0059 CS Co Fld Svc	29-114G	297	305	15 Apr 69
0021 CS Co SAs	29-217G	233	233	15 Apr 69
0054 CS CP HHC	29-201F	103	99	30 Apr 69
0377 CS Co Lt Maint	29-207F	154	183	15 Apr 69

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USASUPCOM QNH UNITS AFFECTED BY
PHASE III STANDARDIZATION

UNIT	TOE	DEPSTAB STR	STAND STR	REQUESTED DATE
0086 CS Bn HHD	29-136G	52	55	14 Mar 69
0005 CS Bn Hq & Main Spt	29-206F	351	275	14 Mar 69
0062 CS Bn Hq & Main Spt	29-206F	351	275	14 Mar 69
0090 CS Co HNS	29-127G	199	199	31 Mar 69
0561 CS Co Gen Sup	29-118G	214	214	31 Mar 69
0160 CS Co HEM	29-137F	277	292	15 Apr 69
0618 CS Co HEM	29-137F	270	INAC	15 Apr 69
0136 CS Co Lt Maint	29-207F	212	183	15 Apr 69
0149 CS Co Lt Maint	29-207F	152	183	15 Apr 69
0552 CS Co Lt Maint	29-207F	154	INAC	15 Apr 69
0560 CS Co Lt Maint	29-207F	156	183	15 Apr 69
0098 CS Co IEM	29-134G	243	206	15 Apr 69
0554 CS Co IEM	29-134G	156	INAC	15 Apr 69
0243 CS Co Field Svc	29-114G	305	305	15 Apr 69
0019 CS Co S&S	29-217G	270	233	15 Apr 69
0226 CS Co S&S	29-217G	233	233	15 Apr 69
0304 CS Co S&S	29-217G	233	233	15 Apr 69
0573 CS Co S&S	29-217G	233	233	15 Apr 69
0045 CS Gp CS	29-102F	103	99	30 Apr 69
0593 CS Gp CS	29-102F	103	99	30 Apr 69

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0063 CS Bn Hq Maint Spt Co
0513 CS Bn Hq Maint Spt Co
0024 CS Bn S&S, HHC
0056 CS Co Hwy Mat Sup
0074 CS Co Rpr P-1s
0855 CS Co CS
0156 CS Co HEM
0178 CS Co Maint DS/D1v
0588 CS Co Maint DS/D1v
0237 CS Co Maint DS/D1v
0067 CS Co Maint DS/D1v
0085 CS Co Lt Maint
0596 CS Co Lt Maint
0578 CS Co IEM
0226 CS Co S&S
0026 CS Gp CS HHC
0080 CS Gp CS HHC

UNIT

TOE

29-206F
29-206F
29-216G
29-127G
29-119G
29-118G
29-137F
29-138F
29-138F
29-138F
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29-207F
29-207F
29-134G
29-217G
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29-102F

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USASUPCOM DMG UNITS AFFECTED BY
PHASE III STANDARDIZATION

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CIVILIANIZATION
Reduction/Inactivations With Contract Replacement.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SPACES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
(1) 170 POL Spaces from various units.	Qui Nhon	July 68-January 69	170	Pending
(2) 116 TC Company Terminal Service	Cam Ranh Bay	August 1968	329	Completed
(3) 532 TC Detachment Crane	Qui Nhon	August 1968	14	Pending
(4) 276 TC Detachment Crane	Cam Ranh Bay	October 1968	14	Pending
(5) 358 TC Detachment Tug	Cam Ranh Bay	October 1968	16	Pending
(6) 627 TC Detachment Tug	Cam Ranh Bay	October 1968	16	Pending
(7) 135 GS Company, MM Cam Ranh Bay GS	Cam Ranh Bay	January 1969	291	Pending

TOTAL: 850 spaces

Reductions/Inactivations without Contract Replacement

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SPACES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
(1) 577 Military Intelligence Detachment	1st Log Comd	November 1968	4	Reduction
(2) 498 TC Detachment Tug	Cam Ranh Bay	October 1968	16	Inactivate
(3) 529 TC Company Light Truck	Cam Ranh Bay	December 1968	175	Inactivate
(4) 528 CS Company Heavy Equipment Maintenance GS	Qui Nhon	December 1968	292	Inactivate
(5) 87 TC Company Light Truck	Saigon	October 1968/ March 1969	175	Inactivate
(6) 151 TC Company Light Truck	Saigon	March 1969	175	Inactivate
(7) 124 TC Company Terminal Service	Saigon	March 1969	210	Reduce

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SPACES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
(8) 154 TC Company Terminal Service	Saigon	March 1969	210	Reduce
(9) 567 TC Company Terminal Service	Saigon	March 1969	210	Reduce

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PROGRAM 6 UNITS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CLOSED</u>
64 FI Section (RA)	Quang Tri/Phu Bai	29 Aug 68
533 Eng Det Maint (RA)	Camp Evans	30 Aug 68
165 QM Det GRRRG (RA)	Da Nang	30 Aug 68
198th QM Det GRRRG (RA)	Da Nang	30 Aug 68
978 AG Det APU Type U (USAR, Arkansas)	Quang Tri	10 Sep 68
630 TC Co Mdm Trk Cgo (USAR, Pennsylvania)	Phu Bai	14 Sep 68
737 TC Co Mdm Trk POL (USAR, Washington)	Quang Tri	18 Sep 68
126 CS Co S&S DS (-) (Nat Guard, Illinois)	Chu Lai	18 Sep 68
336 OD Bn Ammo HHC (USAR, Arkansas)	Da Nang	28 Sep 68
452 CS Co Gen Sup GS (-) (USAR, Minnesota)	Da Nang	29 Sep 68
259 QM Bn POL HHC (-) (USAR Utah)	Quang Tri	30 Sep 68
173 QM Co POL Opn (-) (USAR, Mississippi)	Da Nang	30 Sep 68

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CLOSED</u>
842 QM Co POL Sup (-) (USAR, Kansas)	Quang Tri	14 Oct 68
1002 CS Co S&S DS (USAR, Ohio)	Phu Bai	20 Oct 68
424 AG Co Pers Svc Type B (USAR, Michigan)	Da Nang	21 Oct 68
295 OD Co Ammo DS/GS (USAR, Michigan)	Chu Lai	21 Oct 68
513 CS Co Hq & Main Spt DS (USAR, Massachusetts)	Phu Bai	18 Oct 68
237 CS Co Maint DS (USAR, Massachusetts)	Quang Tri	22 Oct 68
287 OD Det EOD (RA)	Phu Bai	26 Oct 68
235 TC Platoon Lt Trk 5T (RA)	Phu Bai	20 Oct 68
377 CS Co Lt Maint DS (USAR, Wisconsin)	Can Ranh Bay	*20 Nov 68
534 CS Platoon Const & Fort (RA)	Phu Loi	*18 Dec 68
423 FI Sect Disb & Pay Team (USAR, Georgia)	Phu Bai	29 Oct 68
1018 CS Co S&S DS (USAR, New York)	Da Nang	31 Oct 68
448 AG Det AFU Type Y (USAR, New York)	Phu Tai	30 Oct 68

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CLOSED</u>
172 TC Co Mdm Trk Cgo (USAR, Nebraska)	Cam Ranh Bay	11 Oct 68
234 TC Platoon Lt Trk 5T (RA)	Cam Ranh Bay	*22 Nov 68
231 TC Co Mdm Boat (USAR, Florida)	Vung Tau	7 Sep 68
950 AG Det APU Type U (USAR, Kentucky)	Can Tho	14 Sep 68
319 TC Co Lt Trk (USAR, Georgia)	Long Binh	27 Sep 68
1011 CS Co S&S DS (-) (USAR, Kansas)	Bear Cat	25 Sep 68
13 QM Platoon Tml Opn Hq (RA)	Vung Tau	29 Sep 68
238 CS Co Maint DS (USAR, Texas)	My Tho	24 Oct 68
826 OD Co Ammo DS/GS (USAR, Wisconsin)	Long Binh	17 Oct 68
269 OD Det EOD (RA)	Dong Tam	27 Oct 68
74 Eng Det CO ₂ (RA)	Long Binh	*22 Jan 69
52 CA Platoon Hq (RA)	Da Nang	*20 Nov 68

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*Closed during ORLL reporting period.

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CLOSED</u>
53 CA Platoon Hq (RA)	Da Nang	*20 Nov 68
54 CA Platoon Hq (RA)	Da Nang	*20 Nov 68
58 AG Det APU Type V (RA)	Cholon	Due 15-25 Feb 69
508 AG Det APU Type U (RA)	Saigon	Due 15-25 Feb 69

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MTOE SUBMISSIONS

During the ORLL period, this headquarters submitted the following MTOE to USARV/DA for approval:

<u>MTOE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
10-500G	POL Lab	Establishes POL Lab for SGN SUPCOM so that POL Lab of 525 QM Co can be returned to USASUPCOM CRB to maintain unit integrity and properly align resources and requirements.
9-500D	177 Ord Det	Increased unit strength to provide for increased mission requirements. Updated equipment to fit new mission support needs.
10-500G	QM Bkry Det	Replaced bkry of 19th S&S Co deleted by Phase III Standardization.
11-158E	120 SC Co	Added to military spaces to provide capability for DUFFLE BAG mission.
55-500R	380 TC Det	Adds liquid cargo barge and deletes dry cargo barge due to mission change.
55-500C	865 En Det	Adds 1 jeep to allow for liaison and meet transportation requirements of unit.
10-206G	240 QM Bn HHC	Increases unit strength and adds aviation section.
10-207G	514 QM Co	Reorganizes unit under "GOLF" series TOE. Upgrades skill and equipment.
10-477G	134 QM Co	Reorganizes unit under "GOLF" series TOE. Upgrades skill and equipment.
10-207G	QM Co	Establishes POL operating company for QNH.

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SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED:
OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (U) PERSONNEL

1. (U) Identification and utilization of qualified military personnel experienced in preparing TDA's and MTDA's.

a. OBSERVATION: A total of ten Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) TDA's plus MTDA's for Cam Ranh and Saigon Support Commands, Mortuary, Saigon and Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command were processed and forwarded to USARV during the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969. Considerable delay was experienced due to the lack of experienced personnel to prepare the documents.

b. EVALUATION: The format and proper identification of equipment with sufficient justification in TDA's must be processed by personnel with experience in this field. Identification of these personnel assigned to Vietnam is needed to assist in processing TDA's and to advise units in preparing TDA's and subsequent assembly and submission to USARV.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Personnel who have TDA experience be identified upon arrival in Vietnam for assignment to those headquarters having responsibility for processing TDA's. (ACofS, SP&O)

2. (U) Noncommissioned Officers Logistics Program (NCOLP).

a. OBSERVATION: The NCOLP is an important program for the maintenance of logistical expertise among Army career NCO's.

b. EVALUATION: The NCOLP is making progress; however, the program needs more publicity.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a broad publicity program be established to inform all Army personnel of the prerequisites, career opportunities, and benefits involved in the NCOLP. (ACofS, Personnel)

3. (U) Chaplain service to convoys.

a. OBSERVATION: Chaplains assigned to the 48th Transportation Group and 8th Transportation Group which often have convoys ambushed have begun conducting religious services in motor pools and assembly areas before convoys take to the road. In addition, chaplains of these units actually ride in the convoy to its destination.

b. EVALUATION: New methods must constantly be tested to make the religious program more relevant to the needs of the men. Conducting religious services in motor pools and assembly areas has proved very effective wherever it has been tried.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Knowledge of this technique should be disseminated by publicity in Army newspapers. Furthermore, chaplains should discuss it in their training conferences. (Chaplain)

4. (U) Shortage of Department of the Army Civilians (DACs).

a. OBSERVATION: As of 31 January 1969, the USAICCV had only 141 DACs present for duty of the 184 authorized.

b. EVALUATION: The majority of the 184 DACs authorized by the TDA of the USAICCV perform as supply system analysts and/or commodity managers. Supply systems analysts establish the procedures for the computer programs utilized by the USAICCV. Commodity managers are the item managers who establish the supply requirements for each particular item required in Vietnam. This shortage of 43, or 23.2 percent of the civilian personnel authorized, hampers operation of the USAICCV and hinders the supply efficiency and effectiveness to the field. Recruiting has improved in recent months; however, the shortage still exists and projected losses for the next few months exceed the expected arrivals. TDY personnel have been requested; however, this in itself will not alleviate the situation because it will not provide continuity required for sound supply management.

RECOMMENDATION: That emphasis be placed on the recruiting of DACs with supply management experience for one year tour assignments. (ACo/S, Supply/ICCV)

5. (U) Court Reporter shortages.

a. OBSERVATION: This office received authorization in December 1968 for two civilian court reporter spaces (GS-9 and GS-8). Local Civilian Personnel Office is attempting to recruit world-wide for these positions.

b. EVALUATION: The present TDA authorizes one military court reporter space (E-6). However, this office had three military court reporters assigned for duty and even with this number was very far behind in the transcription of general court-martial cases. Recently, one of these military court reporters was medically evacuated to CONUS. A second military court reporter has a DEROS date of 11 June 1969, which means that he will not be able to take any other cases after approximately 30 April 1968. It will be absolutely impossible to operate this section with only one court reporter. In addition, the remaining court reporter is an enlisted reservist and it is quite possible that he may be released from active duty earlier than his normal DEROS of October 1969.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken immediately to provide this command with two qualified civilian court reporters and one additional military court reporter. (Staff Judge Advocate)

B. (U) OPERATIONS

1. (U) Explosives and Pyrotechnic Devices on Perimeters.

a. OBSERVATION: Death and injury occurred in an explosion within an armored personnel carrier. A fire was observed in the vehicle just prior to the explosion.

b. EVALUATION: It was known that claymore mines and trip flares, that had been emplaced on a defensive perimeter and later recovered, were in the vehicle. A strong possibility exists that one of the flares functioned causing a fire which resulted in the detonation of the mines.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That extreme care be taken in recovering explosives and pyrotechnic devices from perimeter emplacement. Safety devices should be fully replaced and, if necessary, strips of tape should be placed around trip flares and grenades to prevent accidental functioning. (ACofS, Ammunition)

C. (U) TRAINING

1. (U) Training deficiencies in School Trained replacements.

a. OBSERVATION: A survey of Ammunition Company Commanders revealed that deficiencies exist in the training and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) qualifications of school trained replacements in the MOS 55 series.

b. EVALUATION: In general, deficiencies exist in ammunition identification, compatibility, interchangeability and lot number identification, operation of Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE), practical experience for renovation specialists, safety training in handling ammunition, recognition of hazard symbols and insufficient training in fire fighting procedures. It was reported that MOS 55 series personnel do not receive sufficient training in basic subjects such as Department of Defense Ammunition Condition Codes (DODACs), unit of issue, components of complete ammunition (issue component items are being counted as individual items), and ammunition Federal Stock Numbers (FSNs).

c. RECOMMENDATION: That increased emphasis be directed towards intensifying training in those areas where deficiencies exist to include more practical exercises in the operation of MHE and renovation lines. (ACofS, Ammunition)

2. (U) Lack of PDO training.

a. OBSERVATION: The lack of enlisted personnel trained in property disposal lowers the efficiency of the PDO Yard.

b. EVALUATION: There are many instances in the property disposal yards in Vietnam where the lack of knowledge of the essentials of property segregation has cost the US Government money. It is essential to have personnel knowledgeable in property disposal to monitor disposal operations - that is to be the eyes of the PDO at the working level. This is especially true in Vietnam where the bulk of the labor force consists of local nationals.

c. RECOMMENDATION: It is essential that a program be initiated to have specific personnel chosen to attend the property disposal course at the Quartermaster School, Ft. Lee, Virginia and assigned to a property disposal function in Vietnam. (ACofS, Services)

3. (U) Army Education Program.

a. OBSERVATION: The education program within the 1st Logistical Command started slowly in 1967. This was the first time educational opportunities

were offered at the same time that combat operations and support were being accomplished. Understandably, the acquisition of buildings, personnel, and equipment took some time and was delayed occasionally by removal of units and relocation of camps. The problems of building construction, manning and staffing, acquisition of supplies, and hiring of civilian educators, made it difficult to install education centers that could perform like those in other parts of the Pacific. However, in spite of such problems centers grew where none were before and each group of 1st Logistical personnel was brought gradually closer to a center offering educational advantages. In those areas where conditions favored establishment, the centers rose rapidly and the men were rewarded for their hard work by seeing counseling, testing, and classwork conducted where none existed before.

b. EVALUATION: The quality of the military adult education program advanced in the 1st Logistical Command when professional educators were brought to Vietnam to operate Army Education Centers. At one time, the 1st Logistical Command was told that it could have only four Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) Education Services Officers but additional hiring authority was developed with USARV G3 and a total of thirteen DACs were recruited and placed on duty. In the major locations, an additional DAC is authorized to relieve the Education Director so that he can make staff visits to units located in his surrounding area. This additional DAC can also take counseling and testing to the field on a scheduled basis, thus denying to none the benefits of the educational program. This emphasis caused the 1st Logistical Command program to grow from less than 5 percent to over 20 percent in troop participation.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That professional educators throughout the Armed Forces be made aware of the need for their services in Vietnam. That the best professional people be offered this challenge to serve in this unique counterinsurgency effort. That strong support at major command levels, backed up by frequent visits, be directed at presenting the case for improvements in educational opportunities throughout the Republic of Vietnam.
(ACofS, Personnel)

D. (U) INTELLIGENCE

1. NONE

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2. (C) LOGISTICS

1. (U) Military truck design.

a. OBSERVATION: The bodies of 5-ton cargo trucks and truck-tractors are poorly designed and insufficiently durable.

b. EVALUATION: The apparent design theory is that the body of the 5-ton truck is flexible so that it will give under strain. In practice, the body is weak, rapidly damaged by normal field use, and impossible to repair satisfactorily. For example, fenders and hood are assembled in such a way that they shake loose in a few thousand miles, deform, and can never be brought back to a good fit. The right fender, weighted with the heavy air cleaner, cannot be supported effectively by any modification so far developed and quickly breaks away from the body. Engine compartment side panels are mounted on inadequate hinges that break out of the panels if the hinge pins are not lost first. The side panel latches secure the panels to the body by engaging metal tabs which are spot welded to light gauge sheet metal; the tabs break off and cannot be rewelded successfully. The hydraulic fluid reservoir is secured by bolts through the inside part of the fender. The bolts break through the thin steel and cannot be resecured without replacing the fender metal. The fenders are not secured across the front, except by a light metal tie which seems to get lost within the first week of truck use and which, if not sooner lost, becomes bent and useless. For lack of a connection between the fenders, the two sides of the truck shake off separately. Battery box doors break away at the hinges and the latch quickly becomes undependable. Battery boxes are secured by thumbscrews engaging latches; the thumbscrews jam in the threaded fitting inside the battery boxes and require frequent rebuilding of the fastening device. Overall, the body is a collection of individual pieces of sheet metal, none of them supporting anything else, each of them replaceable and all of them requiring frequent replacement.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That future military truck cabs and front ends be engineered so that heavy components, such as air cleaners and fluid reservoirs are supported by frame members, not by sheet metal; so that sheet metal parts are firmly supported by and secured to frames; and so that hinges, latches and other fittings are heavy enough to serve for the life of the vehicle without loss or breakage. (ACofS, Maintenance)

2. (U) "No Buy Policy".

a. OBSERVATION: Application of the "No Buy" policy is made only where prices have been found to be unfair and unreasonable. With few statistics upon which to analyze FF&V prices in the Republic of Vietnam, contracting officers were obliged to develop their own market price. This was accomplished by the use of a local national Market Analyst, whose task was to visit

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the various markets in a given area, sampling the prices for the various items, and arriving at an average market price.

b. EVALUATION: The success of the Market Analyst determination of an average market price against which the contracting officer may match bids received for like items is dependent upon the Market Analyst not being associated with the US Government. Once his affiliation becomes widely known, the quotes he receives during the sampling process becomes suspect. It has been found that the best policy is to perform but one market survey per week, and alternate Market Analysts frequently.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, Procurement)

3. (C) Class III Supply Problems at Qui Nhon.

a. OBSERVATION: The supply status of Qui Nhon Support Command was adversely affected during January as a result of the destruction of the Red Beach pipeline in Qui Nhon and excessive enemy damage to petroleum facilities in the Qui Nhon area.

b. EVALUATION: The Red Beach line, damaged by storms twice during December, was washed out by tidal action on 8 January twenty-four hours after having been reinstalled. Pending completion of two new 8" welded buried lines by a more secure route, alternate lines with limited discharge capabilities were utilized. However, the consumption rate in Qui Nhon Support Command exceeds the capability to discharge through all alternate lines, and the supply situation will continue to deteriorate until the new 8" lines are completed in February. This situation has been further aggravated by excessive damage and pilferage on the Qui Nhon - An Khe and Qui Nhon-Phu Cat pipelines as well as the enemy attack on Tank Farm #2 early in January.

c. Recommendations:

(1) Future petroleum facilities construction planning should emphasize careful selection of routes for all pipelines to obtain maximum protection against adverse forces of nature and mankind.

(2) Since the enemy has the capability of seriously disrupting a particular line of supply by concerted harassment and sabotage, tactical forces must be prepared to supplement the security forces of logistical units in order to sustain the supply flow to all requiring units.

4. (C) Class III Supply Problems at Nha Trang.

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a. OBSERVATION: The Shell tanker HELISOMA damaged the commercial submarine line at Nha Trang on 1 December 1968. This line had been damaged several times previously.

b. EVALUATION: This submarine line is the primary one used by 1st Logistical Command to supply Nha Trang Air Force Base. The limited discharge facilities at the commercial pier were utilized until 20 December when the submarine line was re-installed. As a result of this and other events during the month, the supply situation at Nha Trang was adversely affected. A reliable military submarine line is being programmed to replace the commercial submarine line.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Military petroleum facilities are more desirable than commercial ones whenever reliability of performance is the major consideration.

5. (C) Distinctive marking for Cartridge, 105MM High Explosive, M444.

a. OBSERVATION: Presently the Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) of the 155MM, 175MM and the 8" variety are marked with a distinctive band of 1½" yellow diamonds painted on the ogive of the projectiles to allow for quick and definitive identification. The cartridge, 105MM HE, M444 is packed individually in fiber containers. The containers are marked with a band of yellow diamonds however the 105MM projectile is not.

b. EVALUATION: ASPs and depots in Vietnam are receiving unit turns of unserviceable 105mm HE, M444 rounds without the fiber containers. In many instances this particular ICM round is mistaken for an ordinary 105mm HE, due to lack of distinctive marking on the ogive. When the unserviceable ICM is destroyed, several problems occur due to unexpended bomblets being scattered in all directions causing hazardous conditions. It has also been noted that units in the field have been painting various colored stripes on the ogive for easier identification.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That 105mm HE, M444 rounds be marked in the same manner as the 155mm, 175mm and 8" ICM projectiles, using the distinctive band of yellow diamonds on the ogive. Any future shipments of this type ammunition be so marked in CONUS. (ACofS, Ammunition)

6. (C) Challenge of cargo shipments.

a. OBSERVATION: Many unnecessary and non-essential shipments of cargo are made because adequate procedures for challenging questionable shipments are not available. Also shippers often use higher priorities than are necessary for their needs and establish unrealistic required delivery dates (RDD). As a result the transportation system is overtaxed

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and critical shipments do not receive the attention necessary to move them in a timely manner.

b. EVALUATION: This command has established an intensified system of challenging shipments to eliminate unnecessary and non-essential shipments, extend unrealistic RDD's and lower priorities based on urgency of need. Shippers and consignees are contacted when questionable shipments are offered to determine if the requirement still exists, the urgency of consignee's need, and in the case of large shipments, if the entire amount is needed at one time. Thus far the program has been very successful. In many cases unrealistic RDD's have been extended and shipments no longer required by the consignee have been stopped.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That DA take action to have standardized challenging procedures incorporated in MILSTAMP. This change should establish standardized procedures for challenging all DOD sponsored shipments. (ACofS, Transportation)

7. (U) Repair Return (R&R) Maintenance Support Program on M107/110 Artillery Weapons.

a. OBSERVATION: Increasing deadline rates of M107/110 self-propelled artillery prompted a project to conduct a technical inspection of the entire USARV fleet of M107/110 weapons. A concept of scheduled quarterly maintenance services was developed as a result of the generally poor maintenance condition of the fleet and apparent lack of training and knowledge at the operator, organizational and direct support maintenance levels.

b. EVALUATION: The repair and return maintenance concept calls for the evacuation of a weapon to a direct support maintenance unit for one week of intensified maintenance on a quarterly basis. The crews accompany the weapon to perform organizational maintenance and receive maintenance instructions. During the course of the service, the direct support units, as a minimum, pull power packs for service and tuning, flush and steam clean radiators, purge hydraulic systems, check electrical systems, and perform direct support maintenance as required. Technical assistance and instruction is also provided for the crews. In areas where evacuation to direct support maintenance facilities is impractical, direct support maintenance units provide contact teams to the battery site or battalion maintenance point to perform the same services.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, Maintenance)

8. (U) Authorization of tools and test equipment.

a. OBSERVATION: Maintenance units are not receiving end item peculiar

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tools and test equipment concurrently with the receipt of newly adopted and Expedited Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment (ENSURE) items. AR 700-18 and AR 700-20 require approval by Department of the Army and inclusion of equipment in a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) prior to issue to field units. This procedure is especially cumbersome in Vietnam due to the accelerated receipt of newly adopted and ENSURE items.

b. EVALUATION: The lack of required tools and test equipment makes responsive maintenance support almost impossible. High deadline rates and a general lack of confidence in the equipment on the part of using units have resulted from the inability of support units to keep equipment operational. Peculiar tools and test equipment identified in Maintenance Allocation Charts (MAC) in appropriate technical manuals (TM) must be made available to maintenance units to coincide with the receipt of new items by using units. The identification of support items in the mission support plan (MSP) will insure that support items are included in the support package furnished. The submission of MTOE would be an after the fact and routine action.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That end item peculiar tools and test equipment be identified in mission support plan and issued to maintenance support units listed. (ACofS, Maintenance)

9. (U) Government Furnished Property.

a. OBSERVATION: Experience has indicated that it is often in the Government's best interest to provide GFP where the equipment to be provided is extremely expensive or difficult to acquire.

b. EVALUATION: Prior to contract award, contracting officers with the US Army Procurement Agency have received assurance that the property required was indeed available to assist in performance of the contract. The problem has been for the contractor to acquire the GFP from the supply depots involved once the contract award was made.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Action should be taken to change or modify DA policy as regards issuance of Government property to contractors with valid Government contracts. Specifically, contractors might be permitted to secure DFP using their valid US Government contract with schedule B attached as their authorization. Use of the contract could be coupled with a copy of their unapproved but submitted TDA. This would certainly reduce Government costs while allowing timely contract performance. (ACofS, Procurement)

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10. (U) Platform cargo checkpoints.

a. **OBSERVATION:** Gate guards at ports and depots are required by IC Reg 525-2 to check itemized Transportation Control Movements Document (TCMD) against the load on all departing shipments of cargo. The task becomes difficult when the checker has to climb up onto the vehicle to physically check the load, especially when a convoy of several vehicles must be checked.

b. **EVALUATION:** A platform cargo checkpoint has been constructed at the Cam Ranh Bay Depot. This platform is on the same level as a five ton truck bed and approximately 25 feet long. Guards no longer have to climb up onto trucks to look into truck beds or shout over the roar of five and ten ton truck engines. When counting cargo, or comparing Transportation Control Numbers (TCN) with the (TCMD) to verify the authorized load, guards can walk the full length of a trailer and check the load. Forming a traffic island, the platform checkpoint allows the guards to check and control two lanes of traffic without the danger of walking between and among trucks moving in both directions.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:**

(1) This type of checkpoint is recommended for use not only at depots, but also at ports, ammunition storage areas and other installations which ship and receive cargo by truck transport.

(2) It is recommended that the Military Police Agency, United States Army Combat Developments Command, study the feasibility of developing a light-weight, portable, collapsible platform checkpoint to be used by military police and cargo checkers in verifying loads, as a part of Table of Organizational Equipment (TOE). (Provost Marshal)

11. (C) Lack of specialized scrap handling equipment.

a. **OBSERVATION:** With the installation of specialized scrap handling equipment in disposal yards, higher returns on the sale of foreign excess personal property could be realized. The lack of yard space caused by large quantities of high volume, low density scrap would be greatly relieved.

b. **EVALUATION:** The property disposal yards are approaching their fill capacity. In the best interests of the government, it is imperative that steps be taken to alleviate this problem, especially in light of the possibility of T-Day. With the installation of certain scrap handling equipment, such as magnet-grapples, bailing presses, and aluminum smelters, this problem could be greatly reduced since scrap could be processed for easier

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handling, and the reduced volume for an equivalent weight would permit a greater amount of material to be transported for the same price. Processed material will encourage higher bids from buyers, thus increasing proceeds from sale of US Government excesses and scrap. Requisitions for specialized scrap yard equipment were submitted on 1 November 1968 with a priority of 05. This priority was later upgraded by the Army Materiel Command to 02. Despite this, the items have not yet been received, and delivery dates are still indefinite. Continuous followup action by this headquarters is being effected. (ACofS, Services)

12. (U) Air Conditioning of Chapels.

a. OBSERVATION: In the past, most chapels have had a very low priority in obtaining air conditioning. This was for two reasons, first air conditioners were scarce and second many installations did not have sufficient electricity to permit the chapels to install air conditioners. However, clubs, office buildings, and living quarters are supplied with air conditioners in most instances. Many chapels are of sufficient construction and yet so uncomfortable from the heat that men are reluctant to attend. Air conditioners are available if permission could be obtained for their installation.

b. EVALUATION: Church attendance would be increased by the installation of air conditioners. Chapels deserve priority equal to the many other installations which are now air conditioned.

c. RECOMMENDATION: The chapels which are of size and permanently constructed be given priority for installation of air conditioners.

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F. (U) ORGANIZATION

1. (U) Troop basis document approval delay.

a. **OBSERVATION:** Considerable problems result from the excessive time required to secure approval of troop basis documents.

b. **EVALUATION:** The system of combat service support in Vietnam is such that few TOE units, other than transportation units, perform functions in strict adherence to mission statements prescribed in their TOE. Consequently, there is a requirement to tailor units to fit their respective RVN missions. The rapidly changing tactical situation and the consequent effect on combat service support missions, demands that troop basis documents be processed expeditiously for effective management of personnel and equipment resources. To accomplish modified responsibilities during the period between submission and receipt of approved tables for authorization of additional resources, personnel and equipment must be drawn from existing TOE/TDA assets. Depot stocks of most DA controlled equipment are reserved for shortages and/or replacement of combat losses for units with approved authorizations, therefore, the equipment is not always available for temporary loan issue to units with pending MTOE/TDA/MTDA. The lack of authority to requisition mission essential MOS and grades often results in the necessity to utilize personnel in positions other than those for which they are authorized and trained. This situation is not acceptable if units are to accomplish their RVN mission without disrupting the authorized equipment and personnel structure of the command.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That the authority to requisition and fill both personnel and equipment requirements of MTOE/TDA/MTDA submissions be granted by HQ, USARPAC once the documentation is forwarded to DA with a recommendation for approval. (ACofS, SP&O)

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G. (U) OTHER

1. NONE

AVHGC-DST (19 Feb 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 14 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning identification and utilization of qualified military personnel experienced in preparing TDA's and MTDA's, page 197, paragraph A1. Neither flight notification rosters, reassignment orders, or personnel records contain any remarks that would identify personnel with experience in preparing authorization documents. It is also noted that no specific MOS, special or additional skill identifier, or schooling is directly related to preparation of authorization documents. In view of the above, the only way experienced personnel could be identified on arrival in RVN would be by personal interview. Since this procedure would involve the interview of several thousand personnel each month by the replacement battalions and would, consequently, lengthen personnel processing, it is not considered feasible.

b. Reference item concerning military truck design, page 207, paragraph E1; concur. Although heavy vehicular construction is highly desirable, it is recognized that certain trade-off is necessary to achieve an optimum balance of military characteristics. Factors such as weight, manufacturing cost, power requirements, and maintenance engineering must also be considered. The unit has been advised to submit EIR's on each defective component.

c. Reference item concerning distinctive marking for cartridge, 105mm High Explosive, M444, page 209, paragraph E5; concur. A recommendation for adoption of this recommendation has been forwarded to the US Army Munitions Command Customer Assistance Officer on duty at HQ USARV who will forward it to the CG, US Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency.

d. Reference item concerning authorization of tools and test equipment, page 210, paragraph E8; concur. HQ USARV cannot authorize increases in special tools or test equipment; authorization must be granted by DA. However, in accordance with AR 71-1, dated 16 September 1968, Appendix F, paragraph 4c and d, if the tools and test equipment can be identified at the submission of the ENSURE, they should be included in the request.

AVHGC-DST (19 Feb 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

e. Reference item concerning Government Furnished Property, page 211, paragraph E9; concur. DA has established a policy whereby an approved TDA must exist before it will be provided to contractors. USAH V message AVHGD-SP 44890, January 1969, informed DA that this requirement was causing difficulty and requested this policy be studied for possible modification. This matter was also discussed with a representative of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics) during a liaison visit in January 1969.

f. Reference item concerning troop basis document approval delay, page 214, paragraph F1. Concur in the necessity for requisition authority of personnel and equipment once documentation has been recommended for approval by HQ, USARPAC and forwarded to DA. However, final approval of authorization documents and approval for personnel and equipment fill, rests with DA and is not delegated since DA must conduct capability studies to determine availability or projected availability of both personnel and equipment requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Leg Comd

GPOP-DT (19 Feb 69) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Log Comd for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 **16 APR 1969**

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report, as indorsed, except as indicated below.

2. Reference Section II, paragraph A1, page 197. Headquarters, U. S. Army, Vietnam, had a similar problem in the identification on arrival of enlisted personnel to be used in the testing of certain weapons systems. The problem was solved by the annotation of flight notification rosters of incoming flights. Recommend Department of the Army consider this solution to the problem of identifying personnel experienced in preparing TDAs and MTDA's.

3. Reference Section II, paragraph A4, page 198. Recruitment of qualified US citizen civilian employees to meet manpower needs in Vietnam continues to receive special emphasis at Headquarters, U. S. Army, Pacific, Headquarters, Department of the Army and Army Material Command activities concerned with CONUS recruitment. From 1 February to 20 February 1969, Department of the Army civilian strength for U. S. Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam, increased from 141 to 153. To assure continued civilian support for all elements of U. S. Army, Vietnam, representatives from Department of the Army, Army Material Command, and U. S. Army, Pacific, will conduct a special CONUS recruitment campaign from 28 April through 15 April 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. E. SMITH
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

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